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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The development of the world’s economies has relied and will continue to rely on natural
resources. Phosphor, for example, is needed to produce fertilizers, bauxite is used for
aluminium production, copper is essential for electrical wires, iron ore is an input to
steel production, crude oil fuels global transport and natural gas heats people’s homes
and is, just like coal, burned to generate electricity. From a microeconomic perspective,
resource and energy markets, including the markets for power and heat, exhibit a variety
of characteristics that motivate the research questions investigated in the thesis at hand.
First, resource markets, including the markets for energy resources, are usually spatial
markets. Since resources are distributed unevenly over the world, there may be great
distances between supply and demand. Thus, the location of supply and demand and,
hence, transport costs play a crucial role. Second, many resource markets, such as the
European natural gas market or global seaborne trade of iron ore or coking coal, are
characterized by supply oligopolies. With regard to, for example, the European gas
market, governments of exporting countries (such as Russia, Norway, Algeria or the
Netherlands) enable an oligopoly by licensing a major part of the national exports to
solely one (state-owned) company.
Third, resource and energy supply is often capital intensive and requires investments
with long amortization times, such as conventional or renewable power plants for elec-
tricity supply or, from a household perspective, technologies for heat provision (e.g.,
gas heaters). The investment decisions are driven by a variety of aspects such as fu-
ture energy prices, technological development or energy policy: Policy instruments often
aim at influencing the investment decisions, since, fourth, production and transport of
1
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energy and resources may cause negative environmental externalities. One important
externality in energy markets is the emission of carbon dioxide (CO2). It is emitted by
burning fossil fuels, e.g., in the power sector or for the heating of private households.
Classical policy instruments to tackle CO2 emissions are subsidies for renewable energy,
CO2 taxes or emission quotas such as the European Union Emissions Trading System
(EU-ETS).
Many resource and energy markets are interdependent. Natural gas, for example, is an
input to the power market. Another type of interdependency is two natural resources
being substitutes. Coal and gas, for example, are substitutable inputs in power gener-
ation and compete both in the long-term (concerning power plant investment) and in
short-term (concerning power plant dispatch). A third possible interdependency of two
resource markets is both goods being complementary inputs, such as iron ore and coking
coal, both being indispensable inputs for steel production.
This thesis seeks to improve the understanding of resource and energy markets, their spe-
cific characteristics and their interaction with each other. Therefore, the thesis includes
four research papers on the markets for natural gas, coking coal, iron ore, electricity and
heat. Each paper, representing one chapter of this thesis, addresses one or more of the
specific characteristics outlined above.
Chapter 2 assesses the effects of a supply shock on the world market for natural gas.
Motivated by the modeling of gas supply as a spatial Cournot oligopoly, the paper inves-
tigate the vulnerability of different gas importing countries to price increases during a
supply shock. It seeks to evaluate the countries’ strategic positions during a crisis, which
are mainly influenced by their access to gas infrastructure and resource endowment.
Chapter 3 deals again with supply-side oligopolies. However, the paper presented here
does not account only for one market but rather for two interacting markets. The
research is motivated by the need for complementary inputs in steel production, namely
iron ore and coking coal. Interestingly, some of the biggest mining companies play a
major role in both markets. Therefore, it assesses the optimal business strategy for these
oligopolists: to optimize the iron ore and the coking coal division on a firm-level or on
a division-level?
Chapter 4 also investigates the interaction between two different markets: here, the
European markets for gas and power. The research is motivated by the hypothesis that
CO2 reduction policies in the power sector, such as the EU-ETS, subsidies for renewables
or a coal tax, do not only influence the power market but also have feedback effects on
the oligopolistic gas market. The analysis is driven by the question on how climate
policies affect the price elasticity of the power sector’s gas demand and, therefore, gas
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prices. If climate policies would, for example, decrease the gas price then they may even
be able to decrease the overall power system costs.
Chapter 5 assesses the CO2 abatement costs of the German heat market for private
households. The research is motivated by households making long-term investment
decisions about heating technologies. However, these decisions are not solely based on
monetary criteria, but also on household preferences. Accounting for both preferences
and expenditures of private households, welfare-based CO2 abatement costs of climate
policies are derived.
1.2 Methodology
Each of the four analyses is conducted using different numerical simulation models, which
are developed and presented in the thesis at hand. The research in Chapters 2 to 4 is
based on spatial Cournot oligopoly models of different resource markets, namely natural
gas, iron ore and coking coal (see Section 1.2.1). In Chapter 5, a dynamic bottom-up
model of the German heat market is developed, which simulates the investment decisions
of households in new heaters (see Section 1.2.2).
1.2.1 Modeling Resource Markets as Spatial Cournot Oligopolies
As stated before, many resource markets are spatial markets, such as the markets for
natural gas, iron ore or coking coal. Hitchcock (1941) or Kantorovich (1942) have con-
tributed seminal research papers on spatial market equilibria. In the focus of their
research is the so-called transportation problem, i.e. to satisfy a fixed demand of a good
produced in spatially separated production regions at minimal transport costs. The
transportation problem can be solved with standard linear programming algorithms (see
Samuelson, 1952) and can be scaled to model more complex systems such as the Euro-
pean natural gas market (see, for instance, Lochner and Dieckho¨ner, 2011). However,
the approach of minimizing supply costs implies that suppliers are price-takers.
As outlined above, a perfectly competitive supply-side appears to be a strong assumption
for many resource markets. In this light, Takayama and Judge (1971) were the first to
develop a spatial monopoly model. Beckmann (1972, 1973) and Harker (1984, 1986)
extended this approach in their research on spatial Cournot oligopolies. Unlike the
classical transportation problem, a Cournot oligopoly model is a non-linear problem:
since an oligopolist influences the price by its output quantity, the profit function (price
times output) is not linear.
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Mixed complementarity problems (MCP) are a common approach to simulate (larger
scale and spatial) Cournot oligopoly problems numerically. A variety of research has
been made in modeling energy and resource markets in an MCP such as Boots et al.
(2004), Gabriel et al. (2005), Paulus and Tru¨by (2011) or Tru¨by (2013).
The main idea of MCP models is to derive an equilibrium for the individual optimization
problems of different players in a market. Using the example of a gas exporter ei who
wants to produce and sell gas xi to a demand region d, the functioning of MCP models
is demonstrated in the following.
The exporter ei has only one competitor ej , produces at marginal costs ci and is subject
to a demand function, which is assumed to be linear in this example. Thus, the exporter
is faced with the following optimization problem:
max
xi
Πei = (pd(xi + xj)− ci) ∗ xi with pd(xi + xj) = a− b ∗ (xi + xj). (1.1)
This yields the following first-order condition:
∂Πei
∂xi
= pd − ci + ∂pd
∂xi
∗ xi. (1.2)
The respective complementary slackness condition, when assuming a linear demand
function, is:
0 ≤ xi⊥− pd + ci + b ∗ xi ≥ 0⇔ xi ∗ (pd − ci − b ∗ xi) = 0. (1.3)
This condition formalizes the economic rationale of the exporter ei: If the price pd covers
the costs ci plus the oligopoly markup b ∗ xi, then the exporter is willing to produce
a positive output xi. If, in contrast, costs and markup exceed the price, the output is
zero.
The same principle is applied when developing more complex models, including, e.g.,
transport decisions, capacity constraints or investment decisions in infrastructure, such
as the resource market models in the Chapters 2 to 4. Although being more complex,
each of the developed resource market models basically represents a spatial Cournot
oligopoly. More details will be discussed in the following:
The analysis in Chapter 2 is conducted using a spatial Cournot oligopoly model of the
global gas market, named COLUMBUS (see Hecking and Panke, 2012). The simulation
model has been developed in a joint work with Timo Panke and is formulated as a MCP.
In COLUMBUS, we aim to find a spatial equilibrium for gas suppliers, infrastructure
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operators and the demand side of the market. We include the most relevant players active
in the global gas market, i.e., pipeline operators, liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities,
storage operators and gas producers as well as their trading branches, the so-called
”gas exporters“. Since COLUMBUS also includes the decisions on future infrastructure
investment and the operation of gas storage, the model is intertemporal. Nonetheless,
it is a one-shot Cournot game, since all players make all decisions at once for the entire
time horizon of the model. Concerning the analysis in Chapter 2, the model enables
to derive the fundamental price effects of a supply shock and to disentangle these price
effects into factors which increase or decrease prices.
Although the MCP approach is useful to model a spatial Cournot oligopoly, some sim-
plifying assumptions limit the exact representation of the real-world gas market. First
of all, we assume perfect information of all players: That is, every player has full knowl-
edge about future market developments such as future costs, production and demand.
In particular, each player has perfect information about the costs, the capacities and
the transport options of every other player in the market. Thus, all players share the
same information set, or, in other words, the model assumes symmetric information.
Additionally, players have perfect foresight, i.e., they can anticipate shocks like a supply
disruption and their duration (as discussed in more detail in Section 2.3.3).
Another caveat is the modeling of the demand side of a market. Modeling a Cournot
oligopoly in a MCP requires a price-sensitive demand function. This demand function
has to be specified exogenously and has to be represented in an analytical form. Ob-
viously, the assumed demand elasticity is a major driver of the equilibrium price and
demand.
Furthermore, data requirements of a global gas market model such as COLUMBUS
are very high: The model requires data on country-wise, sector-wise and seasonal gas
demand, on production costs and capacities as well as on infrastructure. Although data
has been collected thoroughly, reasonable assumptions, e.g., on the demand elasticity
have to be made. To cope with this problem, this thesis includes a detailed sensitivity
analysis on the COLUMBUS assumptions in Sections A.3 and A.4.
The research in Chapter 3 is again based on MCP simulation modeling. In a joint work
with Timo Panke, we develop two spatial and interacting Cournot oligopoly models: one
simulating the seaborne iron ore trade, the other simulating the coking coal trade. Since
both goods are complementary inputs in pig iron production (which is then processed
to steel), we, in a next step, model the interaction between both markets. Our approach
to integrate two Cournot oligopolies into one model is based on two conditions. First,
since both products are complementary, the market output of iron ore Xi has to equal
that of coking coal Xc in each demand market. Second, the price of the final product
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(pig iron) ppi has to equal the price of iron ore pi plus that of coking coal pc, thereby
neglecting the other costs of pig iron production and assuming perfect competition in
the pig iron ore market. These conditions are common knowledge to all Cournot players
in both markets and are included in the players’ optimization rationale. The integrated
simulation model enables us to investigate whether mining companies that are integrated
in the production of both coking coal and iron ore, should optimize the output of both
goods on a firm-level or a division-level.
Besides the drawbacks that generally apply to MCP simulation models (as discussed
above), our integrated model of complementary inputs requires two strong assumptions:
first, that players active in one input market regard the price of the other complement
as given and second, that the output of both complements has to be equal. These
assumptions have the following effect: Iron ore producers, for example, optimize their
output with respect to the pig iron demand function given a certain coking coal price.
This coking coal price and the resulting iron ore price induce a certain market output
of both goods. However, if the output of both goods is not equal, the overall market of
iron ore and coking coal is not in equilibrium. The iron ore and coking coal producers
therefore have to include this equilibrium condition into their optimal output decision.
The strict equality of iron ore and coking coal output is a strong assumption which does
not hold in reality as, for example, stocking of coal and iron ore is an opportunity to
balance markets. In the literature on complementary goods, one can often find another
extreme assumption: If the output of one good exceeds the output of the other good, then
the price of the first good becomes zero. Obviously, this assumption is not more realistic.
Therefore, the approach presented in this thesis enables to at all model two Cournot
oligopolies of complementary goods. Nonetheless, other approaches for integrating two
complementary market models are still open for further research.
For the analysis in Chapter 4, I develop another simulation model that integrates two
markets: the global gas market and the European power market. The global gas market
is simulated with COLUMBUS (see above), which is combined with a linear model
of the European power market named DIMENSION (see, e.g., Richter, 2011). Both
models are, standalone, tools for partial analyses of the respective markets. That is,
the gas demand function in COLUMBUS is exogenous, whereas in DIMENSION, prices
of gas supply for the power market are exogenous. However, both models being run
standalone could yield inconsistent results. The procedure to integrate the models is as
follows: First, n gas price samples are drawn, and for each sample one DIMENSION
run is simulated to derive the gas demand from the power sector. Second, the derived
price/demand samples are used to approximate annual inverse demand functions p(x)
in an analytical form. Third, these demand functions are used in COLUMBUS to derive
the oligopolistic gas market equilibrium. Lastly, the gas market equilibrium prices are
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used as inputs of the DIMENSION model in order to derive the power market outcome
which is consistent with the gas market outcome. Applying the simulation approach
enables, e.g., the analysis of climate policies in the power market, thereby accounting
for the feedback effects on the oligopolistic gas market.
This approach tackles one major disadvantage of common MCP models. Instead of using
an exogenous demand function in COLUMBUS, the demand function (for the power
sector) is endogenous. However, the integrated simulation model has other caveats.
Deriving an analytical representation of gas price/demand samples can be challenging.
If the approximation does not fit the point cloud well, the gas demand of the power
market model and the gas market model may not converge. Additionally, deriving
numerous runs of the DIMENSION model is computationally expensive.
1.2.2 Combining a Dynamic Bottom-up Model with a Discrete Choice
Model
Whereas in Chapters 2 to 4 MCP models of spatial Cournot oligopolies play a funda-
mental role, the simulation model developed and applied in Chapter 5 follows a different
approach. The development of the German heat market, which is in the center of the
research of Chapter 5, is influenced by millions of private households’ investment deci-
sions in new heating systems. Therefore, in a joint work with Caroline Dieckho¨ner, we
develop DIscrHEat (DIscrete choice HEat market simulation model), which is a dynamic
bottom-up simulation of the German heat market of private households. DIscrHEat de-
rives the development of installed heating systems of German private households up to
2030. The simulation, inspired by an earlier approach of Stadler et al. (2007), combines
a dynamic bottom-up model with a discrete choice model (see Train, 2003):
DIscrHEat includes a dataset on the entirety of German residential buildings, distin-
guished by age, size, insulation level, demand of heat energy and installed heating sys-
tem. Let Xt represent the state (i.e., the heating system installed and the insulation
level) of all German residential buildings in time period t. The main idea of DIscrHEat
is that the state Xt evolves in time, mainly because of buildings changing the installed
heating system. The state change, Mt, i.e., the households’ decision about the invest-
ment in a certain heating technology, is derived using a discrete choice model, which was
estimated using a unique dataset on historic technology choices and heating costs. The
state change depends on the building characteristics and on the costs of the different
heating system alternatives. This yields the following relation:
Xt+1 = Xt +Mt (1.4)
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The detailed representation of the states of all residential buildings and their installed
heating system enables us to derive, e.g., CO2 emissions, energy consumption or total
costs in each time period t. Additionally, we are able to simulate separate climate
policies such as carbon taxes or subsidies for low-carbon technologies, which affect the
costs of heating systems and therefore the state change Mt. This enables us to measure
welfare costs of CO2 abatement, e.g., the excess burden of these climate policies.
Clearly, the chosen approach has some caveats. First, we assume exogenous moderniza-
tion rates of heating systems. This assumption reflects the observation that nowadays
most of the households modernize the heating system when it breaks down. However,
we do not know whether households might change their behavior in the future. Second,
since we model the households’ choices of a heating system using an estimation based on
historical data from 2010, we implicitly assume that this behavior and, hence, household
preferences will remain the same in the future. Third, our discrete choice estimation
is based on historical observations of, e.g., heating system costs and technology choices
for the year 2010. However, in our model, we vary the heating system costs in large
ranges by simulating a variety of carbon tax levels and subsidy levels. Therefore, we
extrapolate from our discrete choice estimation. Some of these caveats could be tackled
in future research by estimating a discrete choice model with data from another year.
As such, it could be investigated, whether preferences may have already changed during
the last years.
1.3 Outline of the thesis
After having discussed the motivation and the methodology of the four research papers
included in this thesis, the following section outlines the overall structure of the thesis.
Chapter 2, Supply Disruptions and Regional Price Effects in a Spatial Oligopoly, exam-
ines a supply shock on the global gas market, the output decisions of oligopolistic gas
producers and the implications for the security of gas supply of importing countries.
This essay is a joint work with Christian Growitsch and Timo Panke and was recently
published in Growitsch, Hecking, and Panke (2014)1:
Supply shocks in the global gas market may affect countries differently as the market
is regionally inter-linked but not perfectly integrated. Additionally, high supply-side
market power may expose countries to market power in different ways. To evaluate
the strategic position of importing countries with regard to gas supplies, we disentangle
the import price into different components and characterize each component as price
1This article is copyrighted by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. and reprinted by permission. The presented
article is forthcoming in Review of International Economics from Wiley Blackwell.
Chapter 1. Introduction 9
increasing or price decreasing. Because of the complexity of the interrelations in the
global gas market, we use an equilibrium model programmed as a mixed complementarity
problem (MCP) and simulate the blockage of liquefied natural gas (LNG) flows through
the Strait of Hormuz. This enables us to account for the oligopolistic nature and the
asymmetry of the gas supply. We find that Japan faces the most severe price increases
as the Japanese gas demand completely relies on LNG supply. In contrast, European
countries such as the UK benefit from good interconnection to the continental pipeline
system and domestic price-taking production, both of which help to mitigate an increase
in the physical costs of supply as well as in the exercise of market power.
Chapter 3, Quantity-setting Oligopolies in Complementary Input Markets, assesses the
strategic behavior of mining companies integrated into the production of iron ore and
coking coal, with both goods being complementary inputs in pig iron production. This
paper was written in co-authorship with Timo Panke and was published in the EWI
working paper series.
The global market for coking coal is linked to the global market for iron ore since both
goods are complementary inputs in pig iron production. Moreover, international trade
of both commodities is highly concentrated, with only a few large companies active om
both input markets. Given this setting, the paper presented investigates the strategy
of quantity-setting (Cournot) mining companies that own both a coking coal and an
iron ore division. Do these firms optimize the divisions’ output on a firm-level or by
each division separately (division-by-division)? First, using a theoretical model of two
Cournot duopolies of complementary goods, we find that there exists a critical capacity
constraint below/above at which firm-level optimization results in identical/superior
profits compared to division-level optimization. Second, by applying a spatial multi-
input equilibrium simulation model of the coking coal and iron ore markets, we find
that due to the limited capacity firms gain no (substantial) additional benefit from
optimizing output on a firm-level.
Chapter 4, CO2 Abatement Policies in the Power Sector under an Oligopolistic Gas
Market, deals with the impact of climate policies on European power system costs,
thereby accounting for the interaction of the power market and the oligopolistic gas
market and therefore gas price changes. The paper was written by the author of this
thesis and was published in the EWI working paper series.
The essay examines the power system costs when a coal tax or a fixed bonus for renew-
ables is combined with CO2 emissions trading. It explicitly accounts for the interaction
between the power and the gas market and identifies three cost effects: First, a tax and a
subsidy both cause deviations from the cost-efficient power market equilibrium. Second,
these policies also impact the power sector’s gas demand function as well as the gas
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market equilibrium and therefore have a feedback effect on power generation quantities
indirectly via the gas price. Thirdly, by altering gas prices, a tax or a subsidy indirectly
affects the total costs of gas purchased by the power sector. However, the direction
of the change in the gas price, and therefore the overall effect on power system costs,
remains ambiguous. In a numerical analysis of the European power and gas market, I
find using a simulation model integrating both markets that a coal tax affects gas prices
ambiguously, whereas a fixed bonus for renewables decreases gas prices. Furthermore,
a coal tax increases power system costs, whereas a fixed bonus can decrease these costs
due to the negative effect on the gas price. Lastly, the more market power that gas
suppliers have, the stronger the outlined effects will be.
Chapter 5, Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curves of the Residential Heating Market,
investigates the effects of climate policies on the decision behavior of private house-
holds concerning heating system installations. The essay is a joint work with Caroline
Dieckho¨ner and was published in the EWI working paper series.
In this paper, we develop a microeconomic approach to deduce greenhouse gas abate-
ment cost curves of the residential heating sector. Our research is based on a dynamic
bottom-up microsimulation of private households’ investment decisions for heating sys-
tems up to 2030. By accounting for household-specific characteristics, we investigate
the welfare costs of different abatement policies in terms of the compensating variation
and the excess burden. We investigate two policies: i) a carbon tax and ii) subsidies
on heating system investments. We deduce abatement cost curves for both policies
by simulating welfare costs and greenhouse gas emissions up to 2030. We find that i)
welfare-based abatement costs are generally higher than pure technical equipment costs,
ii) given utility maximizing households a carbon tax is the welfare-efficient policy and
iii) if households are not utility maximizing, a subsidy on investments may have lower
marginal greenhouse gas abatement costs than a carbon tax.
Chapter 2
Supply Disruptions and Regional
Price Effects in a Spatial
Oligopoly – an Application to the
Global Gas Market
2.1 Introduction
International resource markets link more and more of the world’s economies. As inter-
dependence increases, regional supply shocks, such as disruptions of trade flows caused
by, e.g., geopolitical conflicts, may be of global relevance. The global oil market, for
example, has seen several of such supply shocks in history, among the most prominent
conflicts being the First Gulf War in 1991 as well as the Iraq War in 2003. As a result of
the high level of integration within the global oil market, these regional conflicts caused
global price shocks that affected countries all over the world.
A notable example of a resource market that is not highly integrated on a global scale
is the natural gas market. Imperfect global integration is indicated by high regional
price differences, e.g., between Asia and the United States. Various aspects may ex-
plain these regional price differences: First, transport of liquefied natural gas (LNG)2,
including liquefaction and regasification, is more complex and costly compared with
that of crude oil. Second, the supply side of the global gas market is characterized by
high market concentration, as large state-owned companies such as Gazprom (Russia),
Sonatrach (Algeria), Statoil (Norway) or Qatargas (Qatar) control significant export
2LNG is natural gas that is liquefied by cooling it down to about −162◦C. Thereby its volume is
reduced by approximately 600 times.
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volumes. Third, differences in flexibility of demand and, fourth, the degree of import
diversification are further important aspects that have to be taken into account when
investigating changes in prices due to supply shocks. Japan, for example, relies solely
on LNG imports to meet its gas demand. Furthermore, following the catastrophic inci-
dent in Fukushima the country’s natural gas demand has become more and more price
inelastic owing to the reduction in nuclear power generation and the subsequent higher
utilization of the remaining coal- and gas-fired power plants.
Since gas is sometimes transported thousands of kilometres, often crossing different
countries or crucial waterways, trade flows are highly vulnerable to disruption. One
example of such a supply shock was the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis in 2008/2009.
While European gas prices significantly increased during the crisis, US gas prices, for
example, were hardly affected, thereby illustrating the low integration of the global gas
market. Another prominent example of a neuralgic transport route is the Strait of
Hormuz, a passage that is 21 nautical miles wide and connects the Persian Gulf with the
Indian Ocean. The Strait of Hormuz is already today of eminent importance, as LNG
exports from the Persian Gulf, i.e., from Qatar (77.4 billion cubic meters (bcm)) and the
United Arab Emirates (7.8 bcm), accounted for 29% of worldwide LNG trades in 2010
(IEA, 2011c). Furthermore, there is no opportunity to bypass this crucial waterway by
means of pipeline transport and its importance is likely to increase considerably in the
upcoming years as gas demand in Asia is expected to strongly increase. In fact, the IEA
projects a doubling of gas demand based on 2011 values in China and India by 2017. The
world’s two largest LNG importers are Korea and Japan both satisfying more than 95%
of national gas demand with LNG – and will presumably continue to increase their gas
consumption as well. Although demand is not predicted to rise in Europe, decreasing
indigenous production will foster imports into the European market as well (ENTSOG,
2011).
In economic terms, given the regional differences in supply structure, demand flexibility
and the supply-side concentration, a potential blockage of the Strait of Hormuz could
therefore be interpreted as a supply shock in a spatial oligopoly with a competitive
fringe and asymmetric players. Owing to the nature of this economic problem, the price
effect of the supply shock in a gas importing country may differ depending on the (i)
location of the disruption and (ii) the demand-supply situation in the country under
consideration.
With respect to the supply shock caused by the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, our
paper aims at identifying and quantifying the major factors influencing the magnitude
of price effects in globally disperse demand regions. We therefore develop a model to
disentangle the import price into different components and characterize each component
Chapter 2. Supply Disruptions and Regional Price Effects in a Spatial Oligopoly 13
as price increasing or price decreasing (hereinafter referred to as price-increasing compo-
nents or price-decreasing components, respectively), such as production and transport
costs, scarcity rents of production and infrastructure, oligopoly mark-ups, supplies of
competitive fringe and long-term contracts.
Our methodology to analyze regional price effects in a spatial oligopoly is structured
in three steps. First, we illustrate the price formation in a simple asymmetric Cournot
oligopoly. Second, since the interrelations of the global gas market are more complex
owing to, e.g. seasonal demand patterns, capacity constraints and spatial supply cost
differences, we use a global gas market simulation model (Hecking and Panke, 2012).
The spatial partial equilibrium model accounts for 87 countries, comprising the major
national producers and importers, as well as the relevant gas infrastructure such as
pipelines, LNG terminals and storages. In order to accurately simulate the global gas
market, i.e. incorporate demand reactions and the possibilities of strategic behavior, the
model is programmed as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). The flexibility and
the high level of detail of the model allow us to simulate the interrelations of the global
gas market within a consistent framework and to identify regional price and welfare
effects. The third and central step of our approach to identify and quantify region-
specific price drivers is to combine the price formation from the simple Cournot model
with the gas market simulation model. By using the dual variables from the simulation,
we are able to quantify to what extent marginal transport and production costs, scarcity
rents of transport and production capacity as well as the exploitable oligopoly mark-up
cause prices to increase. We are also able to identify factors that may result in decreasing
prices such as trade relations to price-taking fringe suppliers and secured deliveries by
long-term supply contracts.
Although a disruption of the Strait of Hormuz is fictitious, its consequences are inter-
esting from an economic as well as a geopolitical point of view, especially since Qatar’s
LNG exports supply countries all over the world. We simulate a blockage lasting 6
months and focus on the USA, the UK and Japan, each serving as a prominent example
of a distinct supply structure. We observe the strongest price reactions in Asia, with
prices in Japan rising from an already high level (US$505 per 1000 cubic metres (kcm))
by US$171/kcm during the 6-month disruption. While US gas prices hardly change at
all, European gas prices are significantly affected during the disruption, albeit to a lesser
extent than in Japan, as, e.g., gas prices in UK increase by up to US$79/kcm.
We identify and quantify three other factors to explain the difference in price changes be-
tween the UK and Japan. First, Japan is fully dependent on imports from the disturbed
LNG market, whereas the UK has alternative supply opportunities from the European
pipeline grid. Second, Japan’s lower endowment of price-taking indigenous production
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and storage capacity explains its higher exposure to changes in supply costs as well as
increased exertion of market power. Third, as Qatar is an important source of Japan’s
contracted LNG import volumes, the price decreasing effects of Japan’s long-term con-
tracts (LTCs) are reduced in comparison with the reference scenario. Consequently,
Japan’s gas price increase is US$92/kcm higher than any increase seen in the UK.
Thus, the spatial impact of the supply disruption becomes obvious with respect to
different gas importing countries. However, the location of the supply shock matters
as well. In another fictitious supply disruption scenario we assume a 6-month blockage
of Ukrainian gas transits to Europe and contrast the results in this scenario with the
scenario of the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz. We find that gas prices, for example, in
Italy are affected most by the Ukraine blockage whereas Japanese gas prices, contrary to
the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, are hardly affected. Consequently, our analysis
underlines that in a spatial oligopoly shocks will have a different impact depending on
(i) where they occur and (ii) the importing country under consideration.
Our research is related to literature on quantitative analyses of security of gas supply
with particular attention to numerical simulations of spatial Cournot oligopolies in re-
source markets. Building on the seminal paper by Takayama and Judge (1964), as well
as on Harker (1986) and Yang et al. (2002), a variety of research has been made on
spatial Cournot oligopolies and MCP models in resource markets (see, e.g., Haftendorn
and Holz, 2010, Paulus and Tru¨by, 2011 or Tru¨by, 2013). Applications of MCP models
to natural gas markets are, e.g., Boots et al. (2004), Gabriel et al. (2005), Holz et al.
(2008) and Egging et al. (2010). Yet to our knowledge, none of the existing papers
applying MCP models to natural gas markets tries to identify which factors influence
price changes during a supply shock and to what extent prices may be affected.
Quantitative research on security of supply is rather scarce and solely concentrates on
Europe. Three of the few examples are Lise and Hobbs (2008), Lise et al. (2008) and
Dieckho¨ner (2012b), who measure the impacts of new pipeline corridors to Europe and of
new LNG ports on security of supply. Papers on simulation-based analyses of the effects
of (geo-) political conflicts on the natural gas market are also rare and concentrate on
Europe only. Bettzu¨ge and Lochner (2009) and Egging et al. (2008) analyze the impact
of disruptions on Ukrainian gas flows and short-run marginal supply costs. Lochner
and Dieckho¨ner (2011) analyze the effects of a civil unrest in North Africa on European
security of natural gas supply.
We contribute to the existing literature on security of supply and spatial oligopolies in
energy markets in three ways. First, we develop a framework for analyzing regional price
reactions after a trade disruption in a spatial oligopoly by separating price components
into increasing and decreasing factors. Second, we assess the strategic position of gas
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importing countries during a trade disruption by applying our methodology. Third, as
opposed to most studies on security of gas supply, our model covers the global natural
gas market, thus allowing us to analyze the consequences of a regional (geo-) political
conflict across the world.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The methodology is described in
Section 2.2, in which we derive the spatial oligopoly simulation model and develop an
approach to distinguish price components using the model results. Section 2.3 describes
the data, main parameter assumptions and the scenario setting. The results are pre-
sented in Section 2.4, with particular focus on analyzing the price difference between
Japan and the UK, identifying the major price drivers and providing an in-depth analysis
of both countries’ supply situations. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Methodology
We argue that international gas trade is best represented by a Cournot oligopoly with
a competitive fringe: on the one hand, large state-owned companies such as Gazprom,
Sonatrach, Qatargas or Statoil account for a significant share of global export volumes.
On the other hand, a large number of companies with little annual production operate on
the supply side, most of them providing no significant export volumes – thus representing
a competitive fringe.3
In order to separate natural gas import price into price-increasing and price-decreasing
components, we first provide a theoretical foundation of how prices are determined in a
Cournot oligopoly with a competitive fringe. However, the natural gas market is more
complex than a simple Cournot oligopoly. Since international gas trade is characterized
by spatially distributed demand and supply plus a complex network of pipelines and
LNG infrastructure, it is necessary to develop a numerical spatial oligopoly model to
simulate the market. Next, we apply the price formula from the simple Cournot oligopoly
model to the numerical oligopoly model in order to identify factors that increase and
decrease import prices.
3We provide model results for the international gas market in 2010 assuming perfect competition in
Appendix A.3. We find that the model results do not match actual market results. Consequently, we
choose to model the global gas market as a Cournot oligopoly with a competitive fringe. We model
the eight most important LNG exporting countries and the three most important pipeline exporters as
Cournot players. The countries able to exercise market power are Australia, Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Nigeria, The Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, Russia and Trinidad and Tobago. All countries
have almost all of their exports coordinated by one firm or consortium. Appendix A.3 also contains the
model results for our Cournot setting. By comparing these with actual market results, a better match
is found than under the perfect competition setting.
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2.2.1 Oligopoly Pricing
We start out by quickly recalling how the price in a Cournot oligopoly with a compet-
itive fringe is determined (see also Tirole, 1988), which provides us with a theoretical
foundation for our analysis. We begin by deriving the optimal supply Q∗ in a Cournot
oligopoly with N asymetric players, i.e., players having differing marginal cost functions.
In a second step, we derive the resulting price formula in such a market and elaborate
on how a competitive fringe changes the way prices are determined in an oligopoly.
Initially, we assume that N players maximize their profits by setting their optimal supply
to a single end user market (qi). Each player i ∈ N has individual marginal costs of
supply, msci, that are assumed to be constant and positive. Furthermore, we assume a
linear inverse demand function, where the price P (Q) decreases with the total quantity
Q =
∑N
i=1 qi supplied to the market, i.e.,
P (Q) = A−BQ with A,B > 0. (2.1)
For a player i, the first order condition for sales is as follows:
∂pii
∂qi
= P (Q)−Bqi −msci = 0 ∀i (2.2)
with pii representing the profit of player i. Substituting the wholesale price P (Q) by the
linear inverse demand function yields:
∂pii
∂qi
= A−B
N∑
i=1
qi −Bqi −msci = 0 ∀i. (2.3)
Consequently, the profit-maximizing total supply to the wholesale market, Q∗, is deter-
mined by the following equation:
N∑
i=1
∂pii
∂qi
= N(A−BQ∗)−BQ∗ −
N∑
i=1
msci = 0 (2.4)
⇔ Q∗ = NA−
∑N
i=1msci
B(N + 1)
. (2.5)
Inserting Equation 2.4 into the linear inverse demand function yields:
P ∗(Q∗) = A−BQ∗ (2.6)
=
1
N + 1
A+
1
N + 1
N∑
i=1
msci (2.7)
=
BQ∗
N
+
∑N
i=1msci
N
. (2.8)
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Consequently, in a Cournot oligopoly with asymetric players, the equilibrium price equals
the average marginal supply costs plus an average mark-up that depends on the slope
of the demand function and total supply to the market.
The existence of a zero-cost competitive fringe with a binding capacity constraint (qmaxcf )
simply leads to a reduction of the mark-up by
Bqmaxcf
N , as the competitive fringe produces
its maximum capacity and the oligopolistic players maximize profit over the residual
demand function.4
2.2.2 A Spatial Equilibrium Model of the Global Gas Market
Although we derive the formula for a simplified market, the method to determine the
price is essentially the same as in a set-up with multiple interconnected markets and
time periods (due to, e.g., the possibility of storing a commodity). The main difference
between the simplified and complex formula is that scarcity rents of production and
infrastructure capacity are affected by the interrelation of all markets and time peri-
ods. Because of the size of the problem at hand (high number of players, markets and
time periods), deriving an equilibrium solution is challenging. Therefore, we develop a
numerical spatial oligopoly model to simulate international gas trade.
The spatial equilibrium model is formulated as a mixed complementarity problem. This
method allows us to make use of elastic demand functions as well as simulate strategic
behavior in international gas trade. As we argue that the natural gas market is best
represented by a Cournot oligopoly with a competitive fringe, both aspects (elastic de-
mand and strategic behavior) are essential to accurately model the natural gas market.5
Figure 2.1 illustrates the logical structure of our model.
Exporters are vertically integrated with one or more production nodes and trade gas with
the buyers located at the demand nodes. We use a linear function to represent total
demand at each of the demand nodes.6 Exporters compete with each other in satisfying
the demand, thereby acting as Cournot players or in a competitive manner. Therefore,
at each demand node, all exporters form an oligopoly with a competitive fringe. The
4In the natural gas market, short-run marginal costs of price-taking fringe players are substantially
lower than actual market prices. In addition, capacity of the competitive fringe is low compared with
overall market size. This justifies why we focus on a zero-cost competitive fringe with a binding capacity
constraint. Our application therefore follows the approach chosen in Borenstein and Bushnell (1999).
5Haftendorn (2012) stresses the point that when modeling a Cournot oligopoly with a competitive
fringe with non-binding capacity constraints using conjectural variation models, the resulting market
equilibrium may yield the oligopoly players lower profits compared with a setting in which they set
prices equal to marginal supply costs, i.e., act as price takers. However, this objection is of no concern
to our analyses since the competitive fringe in the reference scenario, and hence also in the scenario with
a blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, faces binding capacity constraints.
6For more details on how the demand functions are determined, please refer to Section 2.3.1.
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Figure 2.1: Logical Structure of the Gas Market Model
oligopoly is spatial and asymmetric, as each exporter’s marginal supply costs (λe,d,t), i.e.,
the costs associated with the physical realization of the trades, vary depending on the
location of production and demand nodes. Each exporter’s marginal supply costs consist
of marginal production and transport costs, including the scarcity rent for production
and transport capacity. As different exporters compete for transport capacity, e.g., two
exporters may want to use the same pipeline to deliver gas to a demand node, trades of
one exporter influence the costs of another exporter’s physical transports.
We start out by developing the optimization problems of the different players in our
model and derive the corresponding first-order optimality conditions for one player. The
first-order conditions combined with the market clearing conditions constitute our partial
equilibrium model for the global gas market. The vector of variables in parentheses on
the right-hand side of each constraint are the Lagrange multipliers used in developing
the first-order (Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)) conditions. The complementary slackness
condition is indicated by the perpendicular sign, ⊥, with 0 ≤ x⊥y ≥ 0 ⇔ xty = 0 for
vectors x and y.
2.2.2.1 The Exporter’s Problem
The exporter e ∈ E is defined as a trading unit of a vertically integrated firm owning one
or more production regions p ∈ Pe. The exporters earn revenues by selling gas (tre,d,t)
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on the wholesale markets of the importing regions d ∈ D. Each exporter e maximizes
its profits, i.e., revenues from sales minus costs of supply over all modeled time periods
t ∈ T and all importing regions d. Exporters may behave as price-takers in the market,
but can alternatively be modeled as if able to exercise market power.
The profit function ΠeI(tre,d,t) is defined as
7
max
tre,d,t
ΠeI(tre,d,t) =
∑
t∈T
∑
d∈D
(βd,t − λe,d,t) ∗ tre,d,t (2.9)
where βd,t is the market clearing price in importing region d, tre,d,t is the quantity that
trader e sold to region d at time t and λe,d,t corresponds to the exporter’s costs of physical
gas delivered to demand node d. LTCs play a significant role in natural gas markets.
Therefore, some of the trade flows between the exporters and importing regions have a
lower bound, i.e., a minimal delivery obligation mdoe,d,t.
8 Thus, LTCs are taken into
account by incorporating the following constraint:
∑
t∈T
tre,d,t −mdoe,d,t ≥ 0 ∀e, d, t (χe,d,t). (2.10)
The Lagrange of the exporter’s optimization problem is defined by Inequality 2.10 and
Equation 2.9. Taking its first partial derivative with respect to the decision variable
tre,d,t gives us the first-order condition (FOC) for trade between exporter e and demand
node d:
∂LeI
∂tre,d,t
= −βd,t + cve ∗ sloped,t ∗ tre,d,t − χe,d,t + λe,d,t ≥ 0 ⊥ tre,d,t ≥ 0 ∀e, d, t.
(2.11)
The parameter sloped,t is the slope of the linear demand function in node d. The term cve
is the conjectural variation of exporter e and is a binary parameter indicating whether
(cve = 1) or not (cve = 0) the trader is able to exercise market power.
In addition to the LTC constraint, each exporter also faces an individual market clearing
condition that has to be fulfilled for every model node in which an exporter is active
pre,p,t−tre,d,t+
∑
n1∈A·,n
fle,n1,n,t−
∑
n1∈An,·
fle,n,n1,t = 0 ⊥ λe,n,t free ∀e, n, t (2.12)
with A·,n a set including all transport routes leading to node n. Variables pre,p,t and
fle,n,n1,t denote produced gas volumes in production region p(n) ∈ Pe and physical
transport volumes between node n and n1, respectively. Therefore, the corresponding
7In order to keep the formulae as simple as possible, no discount factor is included.
8To limit complexity, we exclude the possibility of reshipping contracted LNG to other countries, as
observed in 2011 and 2012 in the USA. Volumes however are rather small.
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dual variable λe,n,t equals the exporter’s costs of physical supply to node n. If we consider
a demand node d(n) ∈ De, market clearing condition 2.12 simplifies to9∑
n1∈A·,d
fle,n1,d,t − tre,d,t = 0 ⊥ λe,d,t free ∀e, d, t. (2.13)
Hence, Equation 2.12 ensures that the gas volumes, which exporter e sold on the whole-
sale market of demand node d, are actually physically transported to the node. If we
consider a production node p, market clearing condition 2.12 collapses to:
pre,p,t −
∑
n1∈Ap,·
fle,p,n1,t = 0 ⊥ λe,p,t free ∀e, p, t. (2.14)
Thus, the gas volumes produced have to match the physical flows out of node p. Produc-
tion costs are represented by a production function, as used in Golombek et al. (1995,
1998). The corresponding marginal production cost function mprce,p,t(pre,p,t) takes the
form: mprcp,t(pre,p,t) = a + b ∗ pre,p,t − c ∗ ln(1 − pre,p,tcape,p,t ). Since trader e and its asso-
ciated production regions Pe are considered to be part of a vertically integrated firm,
profit maximization dictates that either the production entity or the trading entity sell
their product at marginal costs, while the other entity exercises market power. In our
setting, the trading units are modeled as oligopoly players while production is priced at
marginal costs. Hence, the corresponding dual variable λe,p,t to Equation 2.14 represents
marginal production costs. Production in production region p is subject to a production
constraint:
cape,p,t − pre,p,t ≥ 0 ∀e, p, t (µe,p,t). (2.15)
Equations 2.13 and 2.14 also ensure that
∑
p∈Pe pre,p,t =
∑
d∈De tre,d,t, i.e., total produc-
tion equals total trade volume for every exporter e in each time period t. As trade flows
are linked to physical flows, each exporter also faces the problem of how to minimize
transport costs by choosing the cost-minimal transport flows fle,n,n1,t. In our model,
this is implicitly accounted for by a separate optimization problem of the following form:
max
fle,n,n1,t
ΠeII(fle,n,n1,t) =
∑
t∈T
(λe,n1,t − λe,n,t − trcn,n1,t − opcn,t) ∗ fle,n,n1,t (2.16)
where opcn,t is defined as the operating costs at node n in month t and trcn,n1,t as
the cost associated with transporting gas from node n to node n1. Therefore, if n is a
liquefaction node l(n), opcn,t would reflect the costs of liquefying a unit of natural gas.
If n is a liquefaction node then n1 has to be a regasification node, thus trcn,n1,t would be
9Equation 2.13 holds true if the demand node has no further connections, i.e., is a no-transit country.
In case of a country such as Poland, physical flows of the Russian exporter to Poland have to equal the
volumes sold to Poland plus all transit volumes.
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the short-run marginal LNG transport costs from node n to node n1. The optimization
problem is subject to some physical transport constraints such as the pipeline capacity:
capn,n1,t −
∑
e∈E
fle,n,n1,t ≥ 0 ∀n, n1, t (φn,n1,t). (2.17)
Thus, the sum over all transport flows (decided on by the traders) through the pipeline
between nodes n and n1 has to be lower than the respective pipeline capacity capn,n1,t.
The dual variable φn,n1,t represents the value of an additional unit of pipeline capacity.
Along the lines of Inequality 2.17, we also account for capacity constraints on liquefied
(ζl,t being the corresponding dual variable) and regasified volumes (γr,t), as well as LNG
transport levels (ιt).
10
This optimization problem may also be interpreted as a cost minimization problem as-
suming a benevolent planner, since in equilibrium there will be gas flows between two
nodes n and n1 until the absolute difference of the dual variables associated with the
physical market clearing constraint (Equation 2.12) of the two nodes (λe,n1,t − λe,n,t)
equals the costs of transporting gas from node n to node n1. Hence, λe,n,t can be inter-
preted as the exporter’s marginal costs of supplying natural gas (including production
costs λe,p,t) to node n, as shown in Equation 2.9.
2.2.2.2 The Storage Operator’s Problem
Each storage facility is operated by one storage operator s ∈ S. The storage facilities
are assumed to be located in the importing regions. The storage operator maximizes its
revenues by buying gas during months with low prices and reselling gas during months
with high prices. In our model, we assume storage operators are price takers11 and,
due to the nature of our modeling approach, also have perfect foresight.12 Each storage
operator faces a dynamic optimization problem of the following form:
max
sis,t,sds,t
Πs(sis,t, sds,t) =
∑
t∈T
βd,t (sds,t − sis,t). (2.18)
10The interested reader is referred to Appendix A.1 for a detailed description of the omitted capacity
constraints.
11This assumption must be made in order to reduce model complexity and ensure solvability. Yet,
the direction of the identified effects remains unchanged if storage operators are modeled as Cournot
players.
12When analyzing a supply disruption, this assumption may overestimate the price decreasing effect
of storage. For a description of how we handled this issue, see Section 2.3.3
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Using injection sis,t as well as depletion sds,t in month t, we can define the motion of
gas stock (sts,t), i.e., the change in stored gas volumes, as:
∆sts,t = sts,t+1 − sts,t = sis,t − sds,t ∀s, t (σs,t). (2.19)
Additionally, the maximization problem of the storage operator is subject to some ca-
pacity constraints:
caps,t − sts,t ≥ 0 ∀s, t (s,t) (2.20)
cfs ∗ caps,t − sis,t ≥ 0 ∀s, t (ρs,t) (2.21)
cfs ∗ caps,t − sds,t ≥ 0 ∀s, t (θs,t). (2.22)
Hence, we assume that storage capacity can be linearly transferred (by use of the pa-
rameter cfs) to the restriction on maximum injection (sis,t) and depletion (sds,t).
2.2.2.3 Price Determination
The equilibrium problem comprises the first-order conditions derived from the different
optimization problems as well as the market clearing conditions previously discussed. In
addition, we have to include one last market clearing condition:
∑
e∈E
tre,d,t + sds,t − sis,t = intd,t − βd,t
sloped,t
⊥ βd,t free ∀d, t. (2.23)
The last market clearing condition (Equation 2.23) states that the final demand for
natural gas, represented by a linear demand function (where intd,t and sloped,t represent
its intercept and slope, respectively), and the gas volumes injected (sis,t) into the storage
facility at node s(d) are met by the sum over all gas volumes sold on the wholesale market
by traders e and gas volumes depleted (sds,t) from storage facility s. Thus, the dual
variable associated with Equation 2.23 (βd,t) represents the wholesale price in demand
node d in month t.
Our model of the global gas market is defined by the stated market clearing conditions
and capacity constraints, as well as the FOCs of the respective maximization problems.13
The model is programmed in GAMS as a MCP and solved using the PATH solver (Dirkse
and Ferris, 1995, Ferris and Munson, 2000).
13See Inequality 2.11 and Appendix A.1 for the remaining FOCs of our model.
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2.2.3 Disentangling Prices in a Spatial Equilibrium Model
Figure 2.2 illustrates our methodology to disentangle import prices into price-increasing
and price-decreasing components that we subsequently use to evaluate a certain import
country’s strategic position in the global gas market. In Section 2.2.1, we discuss a
simple oligopoly model with a single market, asymmetric players and a competitive
fringe. Here, natural gas prices equal the sum of an average oligopoly mark-up and
average marginal supply costs of the Cournot players. In contrast, the model presented
in Section 2.2.2 allows us to incorporate more complex market settings, such as additional
import regions, long-term supply contracts as well as production and transport capacity
constraints. As a result of the added complexity, price influencing factors are more
diverse.
As seen in the exporter’s FOC for optimal trade to demand node d (see Inequality 2.11),
the exporter is willing to trade with demand node d as long as the price βd covers his
supply costs λe,d and his individual oligopoly mark-up cve ∗ sloped ∗ tre,d. If an exporter
is obliged to deliver LTC volumes to a certain import node, he may even be willing to
accept a βd that is smaller than the sum of supply costs and oligopoly mark-ups. This
economic disadvantage for the exporter is denoted by χe,d in the model.
According to the oligopoly pricing formula deduced in Section 2.2.1, we are now able
to identify to which extend marginal supply costs and oligopoly mark-ups explain the
different market prices βd. The influence of marginal supply costs equals the average
of all Cournot player’s λe,d. Each λe,d can be further subdivided into production costs,
transport costs and scarcity rents for transport and production infrastructure. Therefore,
by taking the average of all aforementioned supply cost components, we can identify to
what extent these components explain prices.
The price influence of the exporters’ oligopoly mark-ups is defined as the average of each
Cournot player’s mark-up. For our analysis, we also need to identify the price-reducing
effects of competitive fringe players. We therefore introduce the so-called “maximal
oligopoly mark-up”, which is the hypothetical mark-up that Cournot oligopolists could
realize at a demand node if there were no gas volumes from a competitive fringe available.
Thus, as stated in Section 2.2.1, the fringe producers reduce the maximal oligopoly mark-
up by sloped ∗ trCFd and the fringe storages by sloped ∗ sdd. Besides fringe suppliers,
LTC’s may also have a price decreasing effect that can be identified by taking the average
LTC opportunity costs of all Cournot players, χe,d.
Now, as we are able to disentangle the import price simulated by the equilibrium model
into price-increasing and price-decreasing components, we use this approach in Section
2.4 to evaluate the market position of different countries during a supply crisis. There we
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Figure 2.2: Disentangling Prices in a Spatial Equilibrium Model
will distinguish between “cash-based supply costs” and exporters’ “profits”. We define
“cash-based supply costs” as monetary costs for using transport infrastructure (marginal
costs and scarcity rent) and gas production. The scarcity rent of production and the
oligopoly mark-up may both be interpreted as monetary profit for the exporter.
2.3 Data, Assumptions and Scenario Setting
In this section, the data used in our global gas market model as well as the scenario
settings of our analysis are described. This section’s description focuses on the demand
side and the role of long-term contracts in the global gas market. In addition to the in-
formation provided in this section, we list details on data used for production capacities,
costs, infrastructure capacities and transport costs in Appendix A.2.
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2.3.1 Demand
To study the economics of a disruption of the Strait of Hormuz and the effects on regional
import prices with a high level of detail, we put a special focus on the demand data. In
particular, monthly demand functions must be derived.
The total gas demand of a country and its sensitivity to prices are heavily affected by
the sectors in which the gas is consumed. Gas consumption in the heating sector mainly
depends on temperature and therefore has a seasonal pattern. On the other hand, gas
consumption in industry has no seasonal and temperature-dependent demand pattern,
making demand rather constant. Concerning price sensitivity, it is fair to assume that
gas demand in the heating sector is rather insensitive to prices, since the gas price does
not strongly change the heating behavior and since the heating technology is fixed in the
short-term. On the contrary, in power generation, the gas-to-coal spread has a higher
impact on gas demand, implying high price sensitivity. Moreover, price sensitivities may
also vary by country: It is reasonable to assume that, e.g., Japan (because of its tight
generation capacity situation) is less price sensitive in power generation than Germany.
To derive a country’s gas demand function, we have to account not only for the afore-
mentioned aspects, but for the different sectoral shares of total demand as well. In
addition, owing to different seasonal demand patterns of each sector, the sectoral share
of total demand may vary by month. If, for example, heating demand takes a large
share of some country’s total gas demand in January, then the corresponding demand
function would be rather price insensitive. On the contrary, if in July, gas is mainly used
in power-generation, the demand function would be rather price sensitive.
Our aim is to consistently derive country-specific monthly linear demand functions ac-
counting for sectoral shares, seasonalities and price sensitivities. In the following, we
outline our approach to determine these functions and the accompanying data sources.
First, we use country-specific annual demand data for the years 2010 and 2012. Demand
data per country for those years is taken from IEA (2011c), IEA (2011b) and ENTSOG
(2011). IEA (2011c) provides consumption data on a country by country basis for the
year 2010. For natural gas demand in 2012, we rely on forecasts from IEA (2011b) and
ENTSOG (2011).
In a second step, annual demand is split into monthly demand, using historical monthly
consumption data provided by, e.g., IEA (2011c), and FGE (2010). Concerning the linear
demand functions, sufficient data is only available for 27 nodes representing China, India
and most of the OECD countries. For the other countries, we assume monthly demand
to be inelastic and exhibit no seasonality.
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Next, we distinguish two groups of sectors: We assume “industry and power (IP)” to
have a higher price sensitivity than “heating and miscellaneous (HM)”. IEA (2011c)
provides sectoral shares of gas demand in industry, heat and power generation on an
annual basis. For the heating sector, we derive monthly demand data from heating
degree days provided by, e.g., Eurostat (European countries) or National Resources
Canada (Canada)14. We further assume miscellaneous gas demand to exhibit no seasonal
fluctuation. We derive the monthly demand for “industry and power generation” as a
residual of total demand minus heating demand and minus miscellaneous demand. The
monthly demand for both groups, IP and HM, serves as a reference demand with which
linear demand curves for each group may be derived.
Monthly reference prices are provided by IEA (2011c) for the majority of countries. We
add monthly price information from the spot indices Henry Hub, Title Transfer Facility
(TTF) and National Balancing Point (NBP). For all European countries where no data
is publicly available, we use the European average gas price provided by IEA (2011c).
Having set up reference price-volume combinations, we still have to determine the
monthly price sensitivities in the relevant countries for both demand groups IP and
HM to derive specific linear demand functions. We thereby stick to an approach that
is commonly used in modeling literature (e.g., Egging et al., 2010, Holz et al., 2008 or
Tru¨by, 2013) by assuming point elasticities in the reference point. While we assume the
demand elasticity of the HM group to be approximately -0.1 in all countries with a price
sensitive demand function, we differentiate within the IP group. Because of the high
degree of oil-price indexation as well as the tight capacity supply in Japan, we assume
natural gas demand of the Asian countries to be less price sensitive than the other coun-
tries (-0.1 vs. -0.4).15 These elasticity assumptions are in line with, e.g., Neumann et al.
(2009) and Bauer et al. (2011) who assume a price elasticity of -0.3, or Egging et al.
(2010) who assume price elasticities between -0.25 and -0.75.
Having derived monthly country-specific demand curves for IP and HM with different
price sensitivities, we aggregate both demand functions horizontally. The resulting de-
mand functions account for different seasonal demand patterns, different sectoral shares
of total demand and different price sensitivities, therefore varying by month and coun-
try.16
14http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/sources/natural-gas/monthly-market-update/1173
15These elasticity values provide the best fit with actual market outcomes in 2010. Please refer to
Appendix A.4 for information on how prices in select countries change when the assumed elasticity is
varied.
16Horizontal aggregation of two linear demand functions leads to a kinked demand function. Our
modeling approach is only able to handle differentiable functions. After having checked all equilibrium
price/quantity combinations, we can exclude the market outcomes in the steeper part of the kinked
demand function. Therefore, we only use the less steep part in our analysis.
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Overall, the model covers a gas demand of 3267 bcm for 2010 and 3426 bcm in 2012.
This equals 99% of both global gas consumption in 2010 reported by the IEA (2011c) and
global gas demand in 2012 as forecasted in IEA’s Medium-Term Oil and Gas Markets
report (IEA, 2011b). We model 49% of total global demand to be price sensitive and
51% to be inelastic. In Asia/Oceania, 379 of 645 bcm of total demand is elastic (59%),
whereas in Europe and North America, more than 90% of total demand is modeled
as elastic demand functions. The comparably low share of Asian elastic demand is
acceptable for our study because most of the Asian countries with inelastic demand
are gas producers and are therefore import independent (e.g., Malaysia, Indonesia or
Australia).
2.3.2 Long-term Contracts in the Global Gas Market
Long-term contracts still play a significant role in the natural gas market, in particular
in Europe and Asia. Therefore, our model also accounts for LTCs. For Europe, data on
LTCs are based on information provided by Gas Matters17. LTCs are also important
for LNG deliveries: In 2010, about 60 bcm were traded on a spot and short-term basis18
(GIIGNL, 2010). Of the total LNG trades that occured in 2010 (300 bcm), 80% were
carried out as a result of long-term contracts.
As precise information on actual LTCs is not widely available, we model long-term
contracts as a minimal delivery per annum from an exporting to an importing country,
e.g., 6.4 bcm have to be shipped from Qatar to Italy over the course of the year. In
other words, because the annual natural gas imports can be flexibly optimized during a
year, we can neglect monthly minimal deliveries. Since our study focuses on security of
supply effects during a disruption, we focus on the minimal deliveries instead of take-
or-pay volumes, which serve as a means to guarantee “security of demand” for certain
exporters.
Long-term contracts are often oil price indexed. This holds true in particular for the
Asian LNG importers (Japan Crude Cocktail). However, our model derives prices en-
dogenously, thus allowing the LTC reference prices to be determined via implicit mod-
eling.19 Our analysis focuses on a short time frame, i.e., one year.
17http://www.gasstrategies.com/home
18GIIGNL defines short-term contracts as contracts with a duration of less than 4 years. Since our
analysis focuses on the effects of an LNG disruption, it is necessary to include LNG long-term contracts in
the model. Neglecting that fact would presumably overestimate the flexibility of LNG trade and therefore
underestimate the severity of a disruption of the Strait of Hormuz. Since we lack more detailed data and
do not have information about potential flexibilities (neither in long- nor in short-term contracts), we
stick to an amount of 240 bcm contracted in the long-term. We further assume this to be the contracted
volume for 2012 as well.
19It is unclear how prices in an oil-price indexed LTC would react to a blockage of the Strait of Hormuz,
as this depends on the specific contract structure as well as the change in the oil price. Therefore, the
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2.3.3 Scenario Setting
In our study, we simulate two scenarios. In the reference scenario, gas flows between
November 2012 and October 2013 are computed assuming no disruption of the Strait
of Hormuz. In the other scenario, we simulate a 6-month blockage of the Strait of Hor-
muz beginning in November. As our model is non-stochastic, we fix storage levels in
November based on the results from the reference scenarios. Otherwise, market players
would anticipate the blockage and fill the storages in advance (perfect foresight assump-
tion). We, however, implicitly assume that storage operators have information about
the length of the disruption. Concerning LNG long-term contracts, we proportionately
diminish the annual minimum take/delivery quantity to match the length of the disrup-
tion (i.e., a 12 bcm contract is reduced to 6 bcm). This is in line with a reference LNG
contract provided by GIIGNL (2011), according to which a blockage is a force majeure
and relieves the contracting parties from the take/delivery obligation.
2.4 Results of the numerical analysis
2.4.1 Prices
To analyze the fundamental price effects of a disruption of the Hormuz Strait, Figure
2.3 gives the monthly gas prices for Japan, the UK and the USA in both scenarios (no
disruption and 6-month disruption).20
First, we observe rather identical price curves for the USA. In our simulations, the USA
neither import nor export significant amounts of LNG in 2012. Therefore, US gas prices
are not affected by the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz.
Second, it can be seen that UK’s natural gas price is connected to and affected by
incidents on the global LNG market.21 Whereas in the reference run the gas price varies
between US$220/kcm in summer and US$250/kcm in winter, we observe an increase in
the gas price when simulating a 6-month long blockage. Once the disruption starts, the
UK gas price immediately increases by up to 31% in the winter months (US$328/kcm
in January).
approach used in this paper is, in our view, only tractable in a partial equilibrium analysis such as the
one presented.
20We use the market clearing price of the US southern demand node as a proxy for the monthly price
of the USA.
21Around 14 bcm of the total LNG imports in 2010 (18.7 bcm) stem from long-term LNG contracts
(GIIGNL, 2010).
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Figure 2.3: Price Effects of a Disruption of the Hormuz Strait in Three Selected
Countries
Third, we notice that Japan, which relies solely on LNG imports, is most affected by
the disruption of Qatar’s and United Arab Emirates’ LNG exports. The monthly gas
price in Japan varies between US$467/kcm and US$505/kcm in the reference case. A
6-month long blockage of Hormuz Strait increases the gas price in Japan by nearly 34%
(to more than US$677/kcm in January).
Figure 2.4: Changes in Japan’s Supply Cost Curve after a Disruption of the Hormuz
Strait
Thus, for both countries (Japan and the UK), we observe increasing prices during the dis-
ruption. However, it remains unclear whether an exporter’s profits increase or whether
higher supply costs cause the increase in prices. As an example, Figures 2.4 and 2.5
provide closer insight into the formation of January prices in both scenarios for Japan
and the UK, respectively. Both figures contain the respective country’s January demand
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function and the cash-based supply cost curves for both scenarios.22
Concerning Japanese supplies, we observe a remarkable increase in supply costs, whereas
in the UK, supply costs in both scenarios are nearly identical except for the rightmost
part of the curve. Increasing prices, however, seem to be also driven by higher profits
for the suppliers in both countries. Yet, neither figure provides an indication as to what
factors drive prices most.
Figure 2.5: Changes in UK’s Supply Cost Curve after a Disruption of the Hormuz
Strait
Therefore, the observed price effects raise two questions: (1) Why does the import
price level differ among different countries, even in the reference scenario? (2) What
drivers explain the different price reactions after a supply shock? To answer these
questions, we apply the approach introduced in Section 2.2.3. Using the dual variables
from our simulation model, we are able to quantify price components that help us
evaluate the strategic market positions of different countries. To give an application
of our methodology, we next focus on the January prices of Japan and the UK in the
reference scenario and during the supply shock.23
2.4.2 Price Structure in the Reference Scenario
To explain the price differences between Japan and the UK, we first take a look at Figure
2.6. The diagram illustrates the different components of Japanese and British import
prices in January in the reference scenario (no disruption).
22According to the terminology used in Section 2.2.3, cash-based supply costs include marginal costs
of production and transport plus a scarcity rent for transport infrastructure.
23Concerning the USA, the abundant domestic production makes the country independent from im-
ports. This does not only explain the low prices, but also the insensitivity to prices during the global
supply shock (disruption of the Strait of Hormuz).
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As stated in Section 2.2.3, we distinguish between “cash-based supply costs” and “prof-
its”. We define “cash-based supply costs” as those costs that the exporter actually has
to bear in order to deliver gas to an importing country (i.e., marginal costs of production
and transport as well as congestion rents for transport infrastructure). The scarcity rent
for production capacity is monetary profit for the exporter. Therefore, it is part of what
we refer to as “profits”. Another component of the profits is the average mark-up, which
oligopolistic players can realize in a certain import market. The term “maximal poten-
tial oligopoly mark-up” labels the mark-up that exporters could realize if the complete
demand of a country was satisfied by Cournot players. However, gas purchases from
price-taking players or depletion from storages lowers the “maximal potential mark-up”.
In other words, the presence of a competitive fringe reduces the oligopoly rents. Last,
LTCs have a decreasing effect on import prices and, in particular, the exporters’ margin.
Since LTCs are modeled as minimal deliveries from an exporter to an import country,
the LTC is a binding constraint for the exporter. This can be interpreted as an eco-
nomic disadvantage that the exporter has to bear or, conversely, a price advantage for
the importer.
Figure 2.6: Structure of British and Japanese Import Gas Prices in the Reference
Scenario
As Figure 2.6 reveals, the total January price difference between Japan and the UK is
US$255/kcm, yielding US$31/kcm to be explained by higher supply costs. The “profits”
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account for the major price difference (US$224/kcm). Whereas the scarcity rent for
production capacity has a similar impact on prices in both countries, the “maximal
potential oligopoly mark-up” explains most of the differences between the “profits”.
Compared with the UK, we assume the gas demand of Japan to be more inelastic.
Thus, the high Japanese dependency on natural gas lets Cournot players realize higher
mark-ups in Japan than in the UK.
Yet, both countries are able to limit the oligopolistic mark-ups: The UK has significant
domestic production (which we assume to be provided by price-taking producers) and
storage reserves that in total lead to a price reduction of US$56/kcm (-US$41/kcm and
-US$15/kcm, respectively). Japan, in contrast, only has small capacities of domestic
natural gas production and seasonal underground gas storages, which only reduce the
gas price in total by US$12/kcm. Japan’s key advantage in limiting oligopoly mark-
ups is its access to long-term contracted LNG volumes. In our setting, the contracts
lead to an import price reduction of US$123/kcm. In other words, without the secured
deliveries by long-term contracts, Japan would be much more likely to be exploited by
its suppliers.
2.4.3 Structure of Price Reactions during a Supply Disruption
After having provided insight into the price structure of both Japan and the UK in
the reference scenario, we focus next on the price increase during a blockage of Hormuz
Strait. Figure 2.7 illustrates the January price level in both countries without a disrup-
tion (topmost bar) and with a 6-month disruption (lowest bar). Additionally, the middle
bars of the figure display the cost components leading to an increase and decrease of the
gas price during the disruption.
Marginal transport and production costs: We observe a slight increase in those
two cost components because gas must be imported from more distant sources and gas
production is intensified during the blockage. However, since both production and trans-
port capacities already have high utilization rates (compared with the global average) in
the reference scenario, marginal production and transport costs only explain a fraction
of the total price increase in Japan and the UK.
Scarcity rent of transport: A blockage of the Hormuz Strait results in an outage
of approximately 30% of global LNG trade volumes. LNG importers therefore need to
find alternative sources of supply, which makes the available LNG liquefaction capacity
(which we account to transport infrastructure) scarce. Costs resulting from transport
scarcity explain US$52/kcm of the total price increase in Japan, but only US$32/kcm in
the UK. The difference can be explained by taking a closer look at both countries’ market
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Figure 2.7: Structure of the Import Price Increase during a 6-month Disruption of
the Hormuz Strait in Japan and the UK
positions: Japan depends solely on LNG imports, is price insensitive and competes for
supply with other countries in the same situation (such as South Korea). The UK,
however, is more sensitive to prices and, being connected to the European pipeline grid,
is linked to producing countries such as Norway, the Netherlands and even Russia. Thus,
the UK is less willing to buy gas from LNG terminals where capacity is scarce and prices
are consequently high. Most of the increase in transport scarcity rent in the UK results
from bottlenecks in the European pipeline grid, especially during deliveries from Russia.
Japan, in contrast, has to rely on the LNG volumes still available to the global gas
market during the blockage of the Hormuz Strait. As Japan competes for LNG supplies
(and therefore also for LNG transport capacities) with other LNG-dependent importers,
the opportunity costs of the transport value chain to deliver LNG to Japan increase
during the blockage.
Scarcity rent of production: Production capacity costs explain the major part of
the total price increase in Japan (US$86/kcm) and in the UK (US$52/kcm). The price
increases induced by the scarcity rents of production are therefore higher than those
induced by the transport scarcity rents. This indicates that given a blockage of the Strait
of Hormuz, production capacity on a global scale is more scarce than transport capacity.
Japanese import prices are, however, more affected by the scarcity of production capacity
than are the British ones. The reason for the difference is similar to that of the transport
scarcity rents. Whereas the UK has alternative sources of supply connected by pipelines,
Japan competes with other LNG importers for the production volumes of LNG exporting
countries. The opportunity costs of producing gas to sell to Japan at a later point in
time therefore increase when the supply side becomes tighter as a result of a blockage
of the Hormuz Strait.
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Maximal potential oligopoly mark-up: On the one hand, countries reduce demand
during a disruption of Hormuz Strait, which decreases the potential mark-up ceteris
paribus. On the other, as Qatar (QA) and the United Arab Emirates (AE) are not
able to export gas, the number of oligopoly players decreases, which in turn increases
the potential mark-up. In our setting, we observe that in both Japan and the UK, the
impact on the price increase is approximately US$25/kcm.
Reduction by price-taking players: During the disruption, the UK increases domes-
tic and polypolistic production, which reduces the import price increase by US$18/kcm.
Japan, in contrast, covers only a small fraction of total gas supply with domestic pro-
duction. Therefore, its ability to lessen the import price increase during a blockage of
the Strait of Hormuz is limited.
Reduction by storage usage: The UK augments its storage depletion by 160 mcm
during the disruption, leading to a decrease in the import price by US$7/kcm. Even
though the storage usage in Japan is only increased by 100 mcm, we observe a reduction
of US$5/kcm. This indicates that in improving a country’s market position, storages
increase in importance as countries grow more insensitive to prices.
Reduction by LTCs: The UK holds several LTCs, meaning it has secured deliver-
ies from certain exporters. These LTCs lead to a reduction of the price increase by
US$10/kcm during the disruption. Long-term contracts and the corresponding contrac-
tual obligations for certain LNG exporters (Algeria, Nigeria and Trinidad) to deliver
gas to the UK result in opportunity costs for the exporters. These costs can be inter-
preted as a realization of their price risk. Concerning Japan, LTCs explain a surprising
US$10/kcm of the price increase during a blockage of the Strait of Hormuz. While LTCs
lead to a price decrease of US$123/kcm in the reference scenario, LTCs only decrease the
import price by US$113/kcm in the scenario with a 6-month disruption. This interesting
observation can be explained by the fact that Qatar is one of the more important sources
of contracted LNG volumes that, in the event of a blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, have
to be substituted by non-contracted LNG volumes. Consequently, the price decreasing
effect of Japanese LTCs is reduced in the case of a 6-month disruption.
So far, we have identified three factors that explain why a blockage of the Strait of
Hormuz would affect the Japanese import price twice as much as the British one. First,
Japan’s import dependency on LNG forces Japan to compete for supplies in the dis-
turbed LNG market. Therefore, scarcity rents for both transport and production are
affected stronger than in the UK, where the connection to the European pipeline grid
provides a viable alternative to LNG gas during the disruption. Second, during the
crisis, the UK profits from price-taking domestic production and storage gas reserves
that limit the mark-up rents for oligopolistic players. Japan, in contrast, has only small
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capacities of domestic production and underground storage and is therefore more ex-
posed to Cournot behavior. Third, LTCs help the UK to decrease prices by securing
gas deliveries that would normally be sold to the UK at higher price levels. Japan also
has significant volumes of LTCs helping to overcome the crisis; however, since part of
Japan’s LNG long-term contracts are supplied by Qatar (and hence not available in case
of a blockage of the Strait of Hormuz), the decreasing price effect in Japan is reduced in
comparison with the reference scenario.
2.4.4 The Spatial Impact of Supply Disruptions
As we have seen so far, the supply shock of a Hormuz Strait blockage has a differential
impact on importing countries because of their spatial location, i.e. the connection to
exporters, e.g. via pipelines. In a spatial oligopoly model the question is whether also
the location of the shock affects the importing countries differently. Therefore we derive
another scenario of a 6 months lasting blockage of gas flows: in this setting, we assume
that gas transits from Russia to Europe are blocked in the Ukraine – a situation that has
already occurred in 2009, although for a shorter time period. In the Ukraine scenario,
the Hormuz Strait is not blocked.
Figure 2.8 compares the price impacts of the Hormuz disruption and the Ukraine dis-
ruption: the US gas price is again not affected by the Ukraine scenario. In Germany
and the UK, the price effect of both disruptions is in a similar range. The locational
influence of the supply shock becomes obvious when comparing the prices of Italy and
Japan for both scenarios. In Italy we observe a strong price increase during the Ukraine
disruption (+US$239/kcm), which is more than three times as high as in the Hormuz
scenario. In Japan the Hormuz disruption (+US$171/kcm) affects prices by far more
than the Ukraine disruption (+US$32/kcm). The reason for this result is similar to the
finding from the previous section. Italy has to compensate for missing pipeline based
imports from Russia. In order to do so, Italy has to attract LNG volumes by higher
prices and the other main supplier Algeria increases its oligopolistic markup in the ab-
sence of Russian gas. Japan does not receive any gas which is transited through the
Ukraine. Therefore no missing volumes have to be compensated. However, since Eu-
rope attracts more LNG in the Ukraine scenario than in the reference scenario, LNG
prices rise globally, thus also in Japan.
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Figure 2.8: Select Import Prices during a 6-month Disruption of the Hormuz Strait
and Ukraine Gas Transits Respectively
2.5 Conclusions
The political situation in the Persian Gulf is exacerbating. Since the beginning of 2012,
Iran has threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most important liquefied
natural gas choke point. Because regional security of supply depends on the individual
supply structure, a potential blockage would affect gas supplies differently depending on
the region of the world.
In our paper, we raise the question in which regions would gas import prices be most
affected by a blockage and why. For this purpose, we interpret the case of a blockage
of the Strait of Hormuz as a supply shock in a spatial oligopoly. We analyze the com-
pensation of missing Qatari gas supplies and compare regional price effects. Moreover,
we develop a framework to disentangle regional prices into components and character-
ize them as price-increasing or price-decreasing components. Identifying the main price
drivers allows us to quantify the supply situation in different regions.
We find that the gas price increases most in Japan. We also observe that gas price
increases in the UK are significantly lower than those in Japan. US gas prices are
hardly affected, as the country is rather independent from global gas trade.
We identify three reasons why a blockage of the Strait of Hormuz affects the import price
in Japan much more than that in Britain. First, Japanese gas supplies fully depend on
the disturbed liquefied natural gas market. The UK, on the other hand, has access to
the European pipeline grid, which is supplied by important producers such as Russia
and Norway. Thus, the UK faces an alternative market that – as opposed to the liquefied
natural gas market – is only accessible by European (and not global) competitors. In
turn, Japan has to compete globally for liquefied natural gas supplies. This translates
Chapter 2. Supply Disruptions and Regional Price Effects in a Spatial Oligopoly 37
into higher scarcity rents that Japan has to pay in order to receive liquefied natural gas
volumes.
Second, the UK is less exposed to market power than Japan. Unlike in Japan, UK profits
from price-taking domestic production and underground long-term storages (which act
as a competitive fringe), thus decreasing mark-up rents of oligopolistic players.
Third, long-term contracts limit the price increase in the UK, since they secure gas
volumes that otherwise would have been sold to the UK at higher prices. In contrast,
the price decreasing effect of long-term contracts diminishes in Japan: The blockage of
the Strait of Hormuz suspends long-term contracts between Qatar and Japan. Therefore,
Japan loses its price advantage from the Qatari long-term contracts volumes. In other
words, during the disruption, the missing volumes have to be replaced at comparably
higher prices.
However, a supply disruption does not only affect differently diverse demand regions.
Also the location of the disruption matters in a spatial market. To illustrate this effect
we simulate a fictitious 6-month blockage of Ukrainian gas transits to Europe. We find
that Italian gas prices are by far more affected in the Ukraine scenario than in the
Hormuz scenario whereas for Japan the Hormuz disruption has the most severe price
consequences.
This study investigates the regionally dispersed price effects following a supply shock in
the natural gas market. However, mainly due to computational issues, some simplifying
assumptions had to be made in our analysis. First, we assume perfect foresight, which
may be a strong simplification, particularly for storage operators. Second, we model
storage operators as price takers, despite the fact that a supply shock may allow them
to maximize profits by initially refraining from storage depletion and thereby further
increasing gas market prices. Third, we use a partial equilibrium model of the global
gas market, thus failing to consider, e.g., the interdependencies between the oil and gas
market. The interaction of substitutive fuels, such as oil and gas, could affect regional
prices differently during a supply shock. In particular, the analysis of global inter-fuel
competition using a model that accounts for strategic behavior in the respective markets
is an interesting possibility for further research.

Chapter 3
Quantity-setting Oligopolies in
Complementary Input Markets –
the Case of Iron Ore and Coking
Coal
3.1 Introduction
The research presented in this paper is inspired by an important energy source that
exhibits the characteristics of a complementary input factor: coking coal. Coking coal
is a complementary input to iron ore for steel production. Both goods are indispensable
when making crude steel using the so-called ”oxygen route”, i.e., first producing the
pig iron in a basic oxygen furnace and, second, using the pig iron in a blast furnace
to create the final product, crude steel. From an energy economics perspective, this
industry example is of particular interest because (i) the goods are complements, (ii)
each of the inputs is of little use in alternative applications (e.g., power plants typically
use coals of different quality), (iii) international trading of both commodities is highly
concentrated and (iv) only a few (large) firms are active in both input markets (parallel
vertical integration), i.e., produce both coking coal and iron ore, although none of the
firms is vertically integrated in the production of steel. Given this market setting, the
paper presented investigates the strategy of Cournot-behaving mining companies that
own both a coking coal and an iron ore division. Do these firms optimize the divisions’
output on a firm-level or according to each division separately (division-by-division)?
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In order to answer this question, our analysis comprises two steps: First, we derive a
stylized theoretical model to investigate the profitability of firm-level optimization in
a setting with two homogeneous Cournot duopolies of complementary goods. In total,
three firms are active in both duopolies: Two firms each serve solely one of the markets
and one firm serves both markets. The latter firm can either optimize both divisions’
output separately or on a firm-level. Comparing total profits of the integrated firm allows
us to answer our research question from a theoretical point of view. We consider two
cases: one with unlimited capacities and one incorporating a binding capacity constraint
on one of the divisions’ output.
The actual markets for coking coal and iron ore are, however, more complex as (i) both
markets have more than two suppliers, (ii) there are multiple firms which are parallel
vertically integrated, (iii) production costs are heterogeneous, (iv) both markets are
spatial with multiple demand and supply regions and (v) several producers face a binding
capacity constraint. We therefore, in a second step, develop and employ a numerical,
spatial, multi-input oligopoly simulation model of the coking coal and iron ore market,
calibrated with data from a unique data set for the years 2008 to 2010. We run the
model for a range of assumed demand elasticities for the complementary product (pig
iron) to assess the profits of the integrated companies in both cases, i.e., the optimization
on a firm-level or on a division-level. Furthermore, we compare the simulation results of
three specific market settings to the actual market outcomes: In addition to one perfect
competition scenario, we assess one scenario assuming division-by-division optimization
of all integrated firms and another one assuming firm-level optimization of the integrated
companies’ business units. We then assess which of these three scenarios best explains
the actual market outcomes with regard to trade flows, production volumes and prices
of the two commodities. Concerning trade flows, we use three statistical measures to
evaluate which setting provides the best fit.
The theoretical model confirms that firm-level optimization is more beneficial compared
to division-by-division optimization. However, if one of the divisions’ production capac-
ity is limited, we show that there exists a critical capacity constraint (i) below which
optimization on a firm-level and on a division-level yield indifferent results, (ii) above
which firm-level optimization is always beneficial and (iii) that becomes smaller with a
lower demand elasticity.
Applying the simulation model for the coking coal and iron ore market yields three main
findings: First, the lower the pig iron demand elasticity is, the more profitable the firm-
level optimization is compared to the division-level optimization for an integrated mining
company. However, for demand elasticities lower than -0.5 to -0.6, the benefits of firm-
level optimization tend to zero. Second, comparing simulation results and actual market
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outcomes for the years 2008 to 2010 with respect to trade flows, prices and production
volumes, the scenario assuming perfect competition, other than the two scenarios that
assume players to behave in a Cournot-manner, does not match actual market outcomes.
Third, the scenario assuming division-level optimization provides a more consistent fit
with actual market outcomes than the firm-level optimization scenario, although one
scenario does not unambiguously dominate the other. Thus, no indication is found
that mining companies integrated into coking coal and iron ore production have applied
firm-level optimization during the years 2008 to 2010.
At least two explanations for this finding are possible: First, because of capacity con-
straints, firm-level optimization only generates additional profits compared to division-
level optimization if demand for the final product (pig iron) is rather inelastic. Second,
additional management costs (increased organizational and transactional costs) that
go along with firm-level optimization may outweigh additional profits. Hence, division-
level optimization may leave sources of profits untapped but can be the profit-optimizing
strategy of a mining company integrated in both coking coal and iron ore production.
Our research is motivated by two strands of literature. The starting point is the semi-
nal publication by Cournot (1838) concerning the theory of complementary oligopolies.
More recent papers on the topic of strategic behavior and complementary goods were
inspired by Singh and Vives (1984), who develop a duopoly framework that allows for
the analysis of quantity- and price-setting oligopolies assuming goods to be substitutes,
independent or complements. Building on Singh and Vives’ finding, a whole body of
literature emerged, devoting its attention to analyzing the problem of complementary
monopolies under different setups. However, the setting in which we are interested is
different from the ones assumed in most of the papers belonging to this strand of liter-
ature: In our setting, the supply of each complement is characterized by an oligopoly,
i.e., there are few substitutes for each complement, whereas most of the papers belong-
ing to the body of literature referred to above assume each complementary good to be
produced by a monopolist. Salinger (1989) is the only one to use a similar setting as
the one presented in this paper. Second, concerning empirical literature, two analyzes
on strategic behavior on the coking coal market have inspired our research: Graham
et al. (1999) and Tru¨by (2013). Graham et al. (1999) simulate the coking coal trade for
the year 1996 for several supply- and demand-side market power cases. Tru¨by (2013)
analyzes different market structures such as Cournot or Stackelberg behavior of min-
ing companies to find evidence of non-competitive behavior. Further empirical papers
dealing with the analysis of coking coal and iron ore trading have been published (e.g.,
Labson, 1997, Toweh and Newcomb, 1991 or Fiuza and Tito, 2010). However, to the
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best of our knowledge, there has yet to be a publication that handles the strategic in-
teraction between both markets or that applies the theory of complementary inputs to
a real-world setting.
Consequently, this paper contributes to the literature in three ways: First, we add a new
dimension to the existing literature on the strategic behavior of coking coal producers
by taking into account the iron ore market and the complementarity of both goods in
pig iron production. Second, we extend the literature on resource market simulations
by developing a spatial multi-input equilibrium model that accounts for coking coal and
iron ore as complementary inputs and enables the simulation of market power on a firm-
level. Third, we assess the strategic behavior of firms that produce both coking coal and
iron ore, thereby specifically accounting for capacity constraints.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 introduces our the-
oretical framework and establishes our theoretical findings. Section 3.3 presents the
motivation for our industry example, explains the structure of the simulation model
used to model the coking coal and iron ore market and describes the numerical data
used in this study. Section 3.4 analyzes the results obtained from the model simula-
tions. More specifically, Subsection 3.4.1 analyzes, from the perspective of individual
firms, the impact of firm- versus division-level optimization on the firms’ profits. Sub-
section 3.4.2 assesses which of the three scenarios best explains the actual outcomes
of the coking coal and iron ore market. Subsection 3.4.3 briefly discusses the strategic
implications of these findings. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Quantity-setting Complementary Oligopolies
In the setting we are interested in, supply of each complement, coking coal and iron ore,
is characterized by a quantity-setting (Cournot) oligopoly. Each of the two complemen-
tary goods is considered as homogeneous. Furthermore, the setting is characterized by
the existence of a number of parallel vertically integrated firms, i.e., mining companies
which produce both coking coal and iron ore. Consequently, we model two simultaneous
Cournot equilibria both of which influence the composite good’s demand and thus the
price of the two complementary goods. The approach chosen in this paper resembles
the one in Salinger (1989), who uses a similar setting of complementary oligopolies to
investigate how different definitions of the terms ”upstream” and ”downstream” change
the impact of a vertical merger on competition. Following Salinger (1989), we assume
players active in one input market to take the price of the other complement as given,
thus we assume ∂p1∂x2 =
∂p2
∂x1
= 0.
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This assumption implies that we abstract from the ”tragedy of the anticommons” prob-
lem. The problem was first described by Sonnenschein (1968), who pointed out the
duality between a Bertrand duopoly with substitutes and a Cournot complementary
monopoly. Sonnenschein (1968) showed for a setup in which each complementary good
is produced by one monopolist and each monopolist maximizes its profit by choosing
the optimal quantity of its good, an incentive arises to undercut total output of the
other complement. In his setting an oversupply of one of the complements would cause
its price to drop to zero (or to marginal costs if they are assumed to be greater than
zero), leaving all the profits to the other complement’s supplier. In the end, this would
lead to a race-to-the-bottom in quantities. The unique Nash-equilibrium where such a
deviation is not profitable is one where no firm produces at all. This somewhat paradox
(and unrealistic) result relies heavily on the effect that even the slightest excess supply
of one of the goods lets its price drop to zero. An effect which already Sonnenschein
himself referred to as ”somewhat obscure”.24 25
In the following, we will use a stylized theoretical model to investigate the profitability
of firm-level optimization in a setting with two homogeneous Cournot duopolies of com-
plementary goods. In Subsection 3.2.1, unlimited production capacity is assumed. In
Subsection 3.2.2, we first investigate if the introduction of a binding capacity constraint
on one of the complementary goods of the parallel vertically integrated firm may change
the favourability of firm-level optimization. Second, we propose and proof three conjec-
tures characterizing the profitability of firm-level optimization and the effect of capacity
constraints.
3.2.1 A Model of Two Complementary Duopolies With Unlimited Ca-
pacities
We start out by considering a simple market of three firms producing two complementary
goods. Firm 1 holds two divisions, one (c1) produces complement C (coking coal) and the
other (i1) produces complement I (iron ore). The other two firms each are specialized
24This remark can be found in footnote 4 of Sonnenschein (1968).
25Another interesting aspect of complementary goods and Cournot competition was first brought for-
ward by Singh and Vives (1984). They develop a duopoly framework that allows to analyse quantity-
and price-setting oligopolies (Bertrand, 1883) assuming goods to be substitutes, independent or com-
plements. The two authors proof that in the case of a complementary monopoly companies prefer to
offer price instead of quantity contracts, as this maximizes their profits. Amongst other things, Ha¨ckner
(2000) shows that this finding also holds true under more general assumptions including a setting with
more firms (each producing one complementary good). In this paper both input markets are character-
ized by oligopolies with firms having production constraints. Therefore, if firms were assumed to engage
in Bertrand competition and production capacity would be unconstrained prices of each complement
would equal marginal costs and, thus profits would amount to zero. In the case of capacity constraints it
has been shown that first-order conditions for profit maximization may have a kink, such that equilibria
may not be well defined. Therefore, companies would prefer quantity contracts over price contracts in
our setting.
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and each own one division. Firm 2 solely produces coking coal (c2) and the third
firm solely produces iron ore (i2). Thus, there are N = M = 2 producers of each
complement coking coal and iron ore. For simplification of the analysis, production
costs are assumed to be zero, although this does not qualitatively alter the results.
Complements I and C may be combined in fixed proportions (here: one unit each) to
produce the composite good pi (pig iron), i.e., it holds true that xpi = xi = xc with xc =∑N
n x
n
c and xi =
∑M
m x
m
i .
In addition, we assume full compatibility among the complements and perfect competi-
tion in the market for the composite good, such that NxM composite goods exist, all of
which are available at price ppi = pi+pc. Thus each complement’s price (pi
[∑M
m x
m
i , pc
]
and pc
[∑N
n x
n
c , pi
]
) depends on the supply of the complement (
∑M
m x
m
i or
∑N
n x
n
c ) as
well as the price of the other complement. However, the price of the other complement
is perceived as a cost component due to the assumption ∂p1∂x2 =
∂p2
∂x1
= 0. We also rule out
that there is product differentiation in the composite good market, thus all N ×M com-
posite goods are perfect substitutes as well. Initially, we do not assume the composite
good’s inverse demand function to be of a specific functional form.
Assuming, that firm 1 chooses to optimize the output of divisions c1 and i1 not on a
firm-level but division-by-division, the profit functions of the four divisions are given by
Πim = pix
m
i (3.1)
Πcn = pcx
n
c . (3.2)
Taking, for example, the first partial derivate of the profit function of division i1 yields
the following first-order condition:
∂Πi1
∂x1i
= pi +
(
∂pi
∂x1i
∂x1i
∂x1i
+
∂pi
∂pc
∂pc
∂x1i
+
∂pi
∂x−mi
∂x−mi
∂x1i
)
x1i = 0 (3.3)
with x−mi being the iron ore production of the competitors. Due to the assumption that
the firms engage in Cournot competition, it holds true that
∂x−mi
∂x1i
= 0. As discussed
previously, in our model we assume that ∂p1∂x2 =
∂p2
∂x1
= 0, hence Equation 3.3 simplifies
to
∂Πi1
∂x1i
= pi +
∂pi
∂x1i
∂x1i
∂x1i
x1i = 0. (3.4)
In order to derive the market results we assume the demand function to be linear in
form, i.e., ppi = a − bxpi. The first partial derivative of the profit function of division
i1 yields the following first-order condition, which due to the assumed symmetry looks
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analogue for the other firms:
∂Πi1
∂x1i
= pi − bx1i = 0. (3.5)
Solving the resulting system of equations allows us to derive equilibrium output and
prices under division-by-division optimization:
x∗pi = x
∗
i = x
∗
c =
a
2b
, p∗c = p
∗
i =
a
4
and p∗pi =
a
2
. (3.6)
Next we now consider a setup in which firm 1 optimizes the output of its divisions
c1 and i1 simultaneously, i.e., on a firm-level. In literature, firm-level optimization is
often referred to as parallel vertically integration (PVI). To distinguish the results of
firm-level optimization to division-level optimization, we use the notation ”PVI” in the
following. In its general form, i.e., without a specific functional form of the (inverse)
demand function, the profit function is given by
ΠPV I = pix
PV I
i + pcx
PV I
c . (3.7)
Taking the first partial derivate of Equation 3.7 with respect to xPV Ii and x
PV I
c yields:
∂ΠPV I
∂xPV Ii
= pi +
(
∂pi
∂xPV Ii
∂xPV Ii
∂xPV Ii
+
∂pi
∂pc
∂pc
∂xPV Ii
+
∂pi
∂x−mi
∂x−mi
∂xPV Ii
)
xPV Ii +
∂xPV Ic
∂xPV Ii
pc = 0
(3.8)
∂ΠPV I
∂xPV Ic
= pc +
(
∂pc
∂xPV Ic
∂xPV Ic
∂xPV Ic
+
∂pc
∂pi
∂pi
∂xPV Ic
+
∂pc
∂x−nc
∂x−nc
∂xPV Ic
)
xPV Ic +
∂xPV Ii
∂xPV Ic
pi = 0.
(3.9)
We already know that pixc =
pc
xi
= 0 and
∂x−mi
xmi
= ∂x
−n
c
xnc
= 0. Keeping in mind that in this
example a factor intensity (fin) of 1 is assumed, in case of a parallel vertically integrated
firm ∂x
PV I
c
∂xPV Ii
=
∂xPV Ii
∂xPV Ic
= fin = 1. Thus, a firm-level optimizing firm knowing that an
increase in one of the complements output needs an equally large increase of the other
complement in order to increase the output of the composite good, would always find it
beneficial to increase output of both goods at the same time. Assuming a linear inverse
demand function of the composite good and using Equations 3.8 and 3.9, respectively,
the resulting first-order conditions are:
∂ΠPV I
∂xPV Ii
= a− 2bxPV Ii − bx2i + pc = pi + pc − bxPV Ii = 0 (3.10)
∂ΠPV I
∂xPV Ic
= a− 2bxPV Ic − bx2c + pi = pi + pc − bxPV Ic = 0. (3.11)
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Taking a closer look at the Equations 3.10 and 3.11, we see that due to the comple-
mentarity of the goods, in order to maximize its overall profits, the mining company
which optimizes output on a firm-level has to take into account not only the production
of its direct competitors, but also the price of the complementary good. Solving again
the resulting system equations allows us to derive equilibrium output and prices under
firm-level optimization:
x∗pi = x
∗
i = x
∗
c =
2a
5b
, p∗c = p
∗
i =
a
5
and p∗pi =
2a
5
. (3.12)
By comparing the equilibrium solutions, i.e., with (Equations 3.12) and without (Equa-
tions 3.6) firm-level optimization, we find that firm-level optimization results in higher
supply of the composite good and, therefore, of the two complementary inputs, which
in turn leads to lower prices. Hence, firm-level optimization increases consumer welfare.
Table 3.1: Market Outcomes Based on Strategy Choice of the Integrated Firm
Division-level Firm-level
Price of composite good a
2
2a
5
Price of complements a
4
a
5
Quantity (xpi = xi = xc) a2b
3a
5b
Each firm’s output xmi = x
n
c =
a
4b
xPV Ii = x
PV I
c =
2a
5b
x2i = x
2
c =
a
5b
Each firm’s profit im = cn = a
2
16b PV I =
4a2
25b i2 = c2 =
a2
25b
While consumers benefit from firm-level optimization, the specialized, i.e., not parallel
vertically integrated firms lose market share and make less profit. This is due to the
fact that firm-level optimization effectively internalizes a negative externality. The ex-
ternality is negative due to the the fact that ∂p1∂x2 =
∂p2
∂x1
= 0 (see also Salinger, 1989). If
a company, which is specialized in producing one of the complements, chooses to reduce
its output, the production of the composite good is reduced as well, thereby raising the
composite good’s price. This increases the price of the company’s complement, while
the other complement’s price is not changed (because of ∂p1∂x2 =
∂p2
∂x1
= 0). However, due
to the reduction of the composite good’s output, the output of the other complement,
too, is reduced. Consequently, reducing the output of one of the complements causes
a negative externality on the firms producing the other complement. Hence, the PVI
company, internalizing this negative externality, is willing to supply a larger amount
of both inputs, which then leads to a reduction of the output of the remaining inde-
pendent companies (see Table 3.1). Another interesting aspect is that, in contrast to
Cournot oligopoly with substitutes and no capacity constraints, there is no merger para-
dox. That is, profits of the firm-level optimizing company (which may be interpreted
as a merger situation) are always larger than the combined profits of the two divisions
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under division-level optimization (equivalent to a non-merger situation), again due to
the internalization of the negative externality.
Summing up, we recalled that a parallel vertically integrated company maximizes its
profits by optimizing output of both goods on a firm-level. Assuming unlimited pro-
duction capacity, we showed that firm-level optimization of divisions producing different
complements is always profitable, i.e., it increases overall profit of the holding.
3.2.2 Profitability of Firm-level Optimization under Constrained Ca-
pacity
As shown in Subsection 3.2.1, the profitability of firm-level optimization of a parallel ver-
tically integrated company arises from increasing the output of both complements com-
pared to the case of division-level optimization. Therefore, the question arises whether
a constraint restricting the potential output of one of the two complements may alter
the result that firm-level optimization is beneficial.
In order to do so, we need to recall from Subsection 3.2.1 that, first, an unconstrained
integrated firm behaves in a manner similar to a Stackelberg leader, i.e., by internalizing
the negative externality of the two complements, he increases his output compared to the
case of division-level optimization (see Table 3.1). Second, the integrated firm maximizes
its profit by supplying the same amount of both complements (in case of a factor intensity
of both goods of 1), i.e., it provides both complements as a bundle. However, in case
of a binding capacity constraint on one of the complements, the firm could also choose
to supply different quantities of its two goods. Consequently, one can rewrite the profit
function of the parallel vertical integrated firm from the previous subsection (Equation
3.7) as:
ΠPV I = (pi + pc)xb + pix
PV I
i + pcx
PV I
c (3.13)
with xb referring to the amount of bundled sales supplied to the market, thus it represents
at the same time sales of iron ore as well as coking coal, while xPV Ii and x
PV I
c need not be
sold at a similar ratio. Thus the firm’s total coking coal and iron ore output amounts to
xb+x
PV I
i and xb+x
PV I
c , respectively. In the following, using Equation 3.13 and a linear
demand function, we would like to investigate the profitability of firm-level optimization
in the event of a binding capacity constraint in more detail. Therefore, we propose three
conjectures that we will proof subsequently:
Conjecture 1 Given a specific linear demand function, there exists a critical capacity
limit, xb, that makes the integrated firm indifferent between firm-level and division-level
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optimization, i.e., profits are identical for both strategies. For capacity limits lower than
xb profits of both strategies remain identical as well.
Conjecture 2 Given a specific linear demand function, for every capacity limit xˆb that
fulfills xˆb > xb, firm-level optimization is profitable despite a binding capacity constraint.
Conjecture 3 The less elastic the linear inverse demand function of the composite good,
the lower becomes the critical capacity constraint, xb.
Concentrating first on Conjecture 1, we need to show that for a given linear inverse-
demand function of the composite good, there is a capacity limit to one of the com-
plements xb that causes the difference between the division-level profits, pi
1
c + pi
1
i , and
the firm-level profits, piPV I , to be zero.26 For this purpose, we start by deriving the
equilibrium profit of firm-level optimization using the first-order conditions of the three
firms (one integrated and two specialized firms):
∂ΠPV I
∂xPV Ii
= −bxPV Ii − bxb + pi = 0 (3.14)
∂ΠPV I
∂xPV Ic
= −bxPV Ic − bxb + pc = 0 (3.15)
∂ΠPV I
∂xb
= −bxb − bxPV Ic − bxPV Ii + pc + pi = 0 (3.16)
Assuming a binding capacity constraint on the iron ore output of the integrated firm
(xb), the first and third first-order conditions (Equations 3.14 and 3.16) will not be
needed as the firm’s optimal iron ore output is xb (hence, x
PV I
i = 0), otherwise the
capacity constraint would not be binding.
Knowing that the first-order conditions of the non-integrated firms remain unchanged
(see Equation 3.10) and using ppi = pi + pc as well as Equation 3.15 yields
pi =
2a− 3bxb
5
, pc =
a+ bxb
5
, xPV Ic = −
4
5
xb +
a
5b
. (3.17)
Therefore, the integrated firm’s profit function in case of a binding capacity constraint
is
piPV I =
a2 + 12abxb − 14b2x2b
25b
. (3.18)
We know from Subsection 3.2.1 that the profit of the integrated firm applying division-
level optimization amounts to 2 ∗ a216b = a
2
8b with each division supplying
a
4b (see Table
26We use xb since if the capacity constraint on one of the complements is binding, the firm will choose
to produce at least the same quantity of the other complement, hence it will supply xb bundles.
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3.1). In order to proof Conjecture 1, we thus need to show that when the capacity
constraint is xb =
a
4b profits under firm-level optimization equal the profits of division-
level optimization:
piPV I =
a2 + 12ab a4b − 14b2
(
a
4b
)2
25b
=
4a2 − 7a28
25b
=
25a2
8
25b
=
a2
8b
, (3.19)
which is the case. Now, if we consider division-level optimization with one division
being constrained in its output, e.g., the iron ore division(x2i ), the function of profits
(depending on the capacity constraint) is identical to that of firm-level optimization (see
Appendix B.1). In other words, if the capacity limit equals or is lower than the optimal
quantity of the division-level strategy, profits of the parallel vertically integrated firm
remain unchanged by optimizing on a firm-level, which is what we wanted to proof.
Regarding Conjecture 2, we need to show that for capacity constraints that are higher
than xb =
a
4b profits of firm-level optimization are higher than that of division-level
optimization. We already know that the optimal output of the unconstrained integrated
firm under firm-level optimization is 2a5b . Taking a look at equilibrium output of x
PV I
c
stated in Equation 3.17, we see that xPV Ic is zero for xˆb >
a
4b , because output in this
model is restricted to be non-negative. Therefore, total output when optimizing on a
firm-level is equal to xˆb for xˆb > xb =
a
4b . In this case, equilibrium prices and the
integrated firm’s profits are given by
pi = pc =
a− bxˆb
3
, piPV I =
2axˆb − 2bxˆ2b
3
for xˆb > xb. (3.20)
Hence, for xˆb > xb it holds true that the profits of firm-level optimization change by
∂piPV I
∂xˆb
=
2a− 4bxˆb
9
for xˆb > xb, (3.21)
with ∂pi
PV I
∂xˆb
> 0 for a4b < xˆb <
2a
5b , which proofs Conjecture 2. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
integrated firm’s profits of division-level and firm-level optimization depending on the
iron ore capacity.
Focussing now on Conjecture 3, we would like to show that the steeper the inverse
demand function is the lower the optimal quantities supplied in case of division-level op-
timization a4b (see Table 3.1) and thus the lower the critical capacity constraint becomes.
Therefore, we need to establish the relationship between the ratio of a, the maximum
willingness-to-pay, and b, the slope of the inverse demand function, and the assumed
(absolute) point elasticity . Since it can be easily shown that a and b in the linear
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Figure 3.1: Profits of the Integrated Firm Optimizing on a Firm-level versus a
Division-level Depending on the Iron Ore Production Capacity
demand case can be written as:
a = pref + b ∗ xref (3.22)
b =
pref
xref
∗ 1

with  > 0, (3.23)
with pref and xref being a reference price and demand, respectively, it holds true that
a
b
= (1 + ) ∗ xref . (3.24)
Consequently, the lower the elasticity in the reference point, , i.e., the steeper the lin-
ear inverse demand function, the lower the optimal quantities when firms optimize their
quantities separately. Thus, the less elastic the linear inverse demand function of the
composite good, the lower the critical capacity constraint, xb becomes (Conjecture 1).
The intuition behind this finding is that the steeper the demand function, i.e., the lower
the point elasticity, the lower the equilibrium output. The lower the equilibrium output
is the less restrictive is the capacity constraint. Furthermore, the less restrictive the ca-
pacity constraint of the integrated firm, the higher is the effect of firm-level optimization
(avoiding marginalization of both divisions).
3.3 A Spatial Equilibrium Model of the Global Coking
Coal and Iron Ore Market
3.3.1 Steelmaking and the Markets for Coking Coal and Iron Ore
In general, there are two main routes to produce crude steel, which is an alloy of iron and
carbon. One option, also referred to as the ”oxygen route”, is an integrated steel-making
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process involving blast furnace (BF) production of pig iron followed by a basic oxygen
furnace (BOF). Alternatively, an electric arc furnace (EAF) process may be applied (the
so called ”electric route”), which mainly uses recycled steel (steel scrap) for steelmaking,
and may also use direct reduced iron (DRI) to substitute steel scrap. Roughly 30% of
global steel supply is produced using EAFs, with the remainder relying on integrated
steel-making.
The main difference between the two production methods is that the basic oxygen steel-
making process is self-sufficient in energy, i.e., the energy is generated during the process
by the reaction of oxygen and carbon, with coke being the main source of carbon. This
is not the case with EAF steelmaking, as an EAF mainly relies on the use of electricity
for melting the steel scrap and DRI. Therefore, no coke is used in electric arc furnaces.
Against the background that coke is essentially coking coal without impurities, it is obvi-
ous that almost the entire global coking coal supply is used in coke ovens and, therefore,
in the basic oxygen steelmaking process. Furthermore, due to its chemical properties
and the existence of cheaper alternative coal types (mainly thermal coal and lignite),
coking coal is not used in electricity generation. Albeit to a lesser extent, this also holds
true for iron ore, with the reason being that the major part of total steel scrap supply is
used in EAFs, thereby reducing the need for direct reduced iron. In 2012, pig iron pro-
duction amounted to 1112 Mt, while direct reduced iron production was 71 Mt, i.e., DRI
accounted for 6% of global iron production (WSA, 2013). Consequently, coking coal and
iron ore are complementary goods needed to produce pig iron, with both inputs being
(almost exclusively) used in this single application.
Furthermore, both markets, the one for iron ore as well the one for coking coal share
two interesting characteristics: First, international trade of both commodities is highly
concentrated, as the biggest four exporting companies in the coking coal and iron ore
market were responsible for 45% and 67% of total trade volume in 2010, respectively.
Second, three global mining companies, namely BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and Anglo
American, are among the top four exporting companies in both markets. Hence, not only
are they parallel vertically integrated companies, i.e. they produce both complementary
inputs, but, in addition, they may have considerable market power. Given the setting of
complementary inputs and market concentration, integrated companies active in both
markets may have incentives to maximize their profits by on a firm-level jointly choosing
their coking coal and iron ore production volumes on a firm-level and not separately,
i.e., division-by-division.
Chapter 3. Quantity-setting Oligopolies in Complementary Input Markets 52
3.3.2 Model Logic and Formulation
The partial equilibrium model presented in this section is programmed as a mixed com-
plementary problem (MCP). The model aims at maximizing annual profits of the global
mining companies producing coking coal and iron ore subject to production constraints
and given the various costs along the supply-chain, such as seaborne and inland transport
costs. Section 3.2, albeit in a simplified setting (i.e., non-spatial market, with only one
consuming region and homogeneous players) already discusses a firm’s profit function
under independent optimization of the business units and under firm-level optimization.
Here, the discussion of the model focuses only on the first-order and the market clearing
conditions, thus we do not explicitly write down the respective profit functions. Similar
to the model presented in the previous section, we assume that the composite good’s
price (λd,y) in demand region d linearly depends on the composite good’s (pig iron) de-
mand (which is equal to pig iron production pid,y). Thus, λd,y = intd,y − slod,y ∗ pid,y.27
28
The model distinguishes the physical transports of input factor f by mining company
n in year y produced in mine m to a demand market d (trn,f,m,d,y) and the sales of a
company to a market (san,f,d,y). If the firm optimizes output on a firm-level, it can also
sell both composites as a bundle (sabn,d,y).
Transports trn,f,m,d,y are constrained by the annual production capacity capn,f,m,y of
mine m. Hence, the amount of transported volumes is subject to the following constraint
capn,f,m,y −
∑
d∈D
trn,f,m,d,y ≥ 0 ∀n, f,m, y (µn,f,m,y), (3.25)
thereby µn,f,m,y represents the value of an additional unit of production capacity at mine
m in year y, which may also be interpreted as a scarcity rent of production capacity.
For each input, the sum of transported volumes to a demand market has to equal the
sales of each company. If firm-level optimization is enabled the parameter simn is equal
to 1.
∑
m∈M(n)
trn,f,m,d,y = san,f,d,y + sa
b
n,d,y ∗ simn ∀n, f, d, y (vn,f,d,y), (3.26)
thereby vn,f,d,y can be interpreted as the physical value of the transported goods, i.e.,
the sum of production costs, scarcity rent and transport costs.
27Although all sets, parameters and variables used throughout this subsection are explained in the
text, the reader is referred to Table B.1 in Appendix B.2 for an overview of the nomenclature.
28To keep the formulae as simple as possible, all parameters used in the model description have been
adjusted for the factor intensity.
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A mining company is only willing to produce and transport a good to a market if the
sum of production costs, scarcity rent and transport costs is covered by the resulting
physical value in the market.
∂  LΠn
∂trn,f,m,d,y
=− vn,f,d,y + pcof,m,y + tcof,m,y
+ µn,f,m,y ≥ 0 ⊥ trn,f,m,d,y ≥ 0 ∀n, f,m, d, y.
(3.27)
Each mining company n maximizes its profit by selling volumes to demand region d as
long as the price of the input factor (ρf,d,y) exceeds the value of the good vn,f,d,y. In
case the company is assigned market power (which is indicated by setting the binary
parameter cvan,y equal to one), ρf,d,y must not only exceed physical delivery costs but
also the company’s mark-up, which depends on the slope of the composite good’s demand
function (slod,y) and sales volume of the company (san,f,d,y and sa
b
n,d,y ∗ simn in case of
firm-level optimization).
∂  LΠn
∂san,f,d,y
=− ρf,d,y − cvan,y ∗ slod,y ∗ (san,f,d,y + sabn,d,y ∗ simn)
+ vn,f,d,y ≥ 0 ⊥ san,f,d,y ≥ 0 ∀n, f, d, y.
(3.28)
If an integrated mining company decides to optimize its divisions on a firm-level it has
to decide additionally about the amount of bundles of complementary input factors that
it sells to each market. The price of both input factors, i.e., the bundle has to equal the
oligopolistic mark-up (see Equation 3.16) plus the physical value of both inputs.
∂  LΠn
∂sabn,d,y
=−
∑
f
(ρf,d,y)− cvan,y ∗ slod,y ∗
∑
f
(san,f,d,y) + sa
b
n,d,y ∗ simn

+
∑
f
vn,f,d,y ≥ 0 ⊥ sabn,d,y ≥ 0 ∀n, d, y.
(3.29)
Finally, in order to model an oligopoly in complementary goods the model encompases
three market clearing conditions:
λd,y = intd,y − slod,y ∗ pid,y ⊥ λd,y free ∀d, y (3.30)
pid,y =
∑
n∈N
(san,f,d,y + sa
b
n,d,y ∗ simc) ⊥ ρf,d,y free ∀f, d, y (3.31)
− λd,y +
∑
f∈F
ρf,d,y ≥ 0 ⊥ pid,y ≥ 0 ∀d, y. (3.32)
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These market clearing conditions represent three aspects: First, Equation 3.30 deter-
mines the price of pig iron (λd,y) using the inverse linear demand function. Second,
Equation 3.31 states that each input’s total sales (including bundles of input factors)
to demand region d needs to equal total pig iron demand (pid,y). This equation is used
to model coking coal and iron ore as complementary goods, with the composite good
being produced using a fixed-proportion production technology. Finally, Inequality 3.32
needs to be incorporated to establish the relationship between input factor prices (ρf,d,y)
and pig iron price (λd,y). For simplification, we assume that the pig iron price is fully
explained by the prices of coking coal and iron ore, i.e., does not include any further
marginal costs for the production process. This does not effect the results qualitatively
though as the final product’s price is of no further importance for our analysis.
3.3.3 Data and Scenario Setting
This subsection describes the data of the coking coal and iron ore market that we use
in the numerical simulation. The dataset comprises demand, production and transport
data of the years 2008 to 2010.
3.3.3.1 Demand Data
Iron ore consumption data in international statistics (e.g., World Steel Association
(WSA)) is usually specified in metric tons thereby abstracting from the iron content
in the ore (Fe-content). This however complicates our analysis: As we are interested in
iron ore consumption as an input in pig iron production, it necessitates information on
the amount of pure iron contained in the consumed ore. For example, a country has an
annual consumption of 1 million tonnes (Mt) of iron ore. It is supplied by one producer
delivering 0.7 Mt of 40% Fe and another delivering 0.3 Mt of 60% Fe. Thus, the country
consumes 0.46 Mt of pure iron. A second country also consumes 1 Mt of iron ore, but
the material has an iron content of 65% Fe. Hence the country consumes 0.65 Mt of pure
iron. Even though both countries consume 1 t of iron ore, the pure iron consumption as
an input for pig iron production is nearly 50% higher in the second country.
To cope with this problem, we use annual pig iron production data provided by WSA
as a proxy for the actual iron ore consumption, thereby assuming that 1 Mt of pure iron
is consumed to produce 1 Mt of pig iron.
Concerning coking coal we do not face this problem as we account for coking coal con-
sumption specified in energy units (IEA, 2012). However, it is necessary to define the
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factor intensity of coking coal in pig iron production. Comparing coking coal consump-
tion and pig iron production we assume a factor intensity of 70% which means that 0.7
Mt of coking coal are needed to produce 1 Mt of pig iron.
We assume that in the simulation model both coking coal and iron ore are exclusively
used for pig iron production. In reality, 6% of global annual iron ore production serves
as input for so-called direct reduced iron (DRI). Concerning coking coal, IEA statistics
suggest that some minor quantities (4% globally) of coking coal are used for power
generation as well. We correct our data for this in the following to limit complexity of
our analysis. For the same reason, we abstract from stocking of iron ore or coking coal,
which can be observed in both markets.
As stated in section 3.3, linear price-demand functions for pig iron are required in order
to simulate different market settings. To derive those country specific demand functions
we stick to an approach that has been widely used in literature on market models
programmed as a mixed complementary problem (MCP): Using a reference price, a
reference volume and an elasticity yields slope and intercept of the demand function.
We use the annual pig iron production as reference volume. The reference price, however,
is more difficult to obtain since we are not interested in the real pig iron price (containing
price elements such as labour costs) but only the part of the price that can be explained
by those input factors being in the scope of our analysis, i.e., the prices of coking coal
and iron ore. The reference price is therefore calculated as follows
ppi = pi + pc. (3.33)
The annual average prices of coking coal and iron ore are derived based on information
from BGR (2008-2011) and BREE (2011).
3.3.3.2 Production Data
We include detailed iron ore production data containing mine-by-mine production costs
and region specific iron contents (World Mine Cost Data Exchange, 2013). Concerning
coking coal we integrate the dataset of Tru¨by (2013) comprising mine-by-mine produc-
tion costs as well. The production costs have to be interpreted as free on board costs, i.e.,
inland transport costs are already taken into account. Additionally, we analyse historic
coking coal and iron ore production data of the most important export companies such
as Vale, Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton (BHPB), Anglo American/Kumba, XStrata or FMG
using their annually published production reports. Using those data sources in addition
to annual country specific production and export volumes (iron ore: WSA (2010, 2011,
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2012), coking coal: IEA (2012)), we obtain a detailed and nearly complete dataset of
both factor market’s supply side.
Figure 3.2: Coking Coal and Iron Ore FOB Cost Curves of Major Exporters in 2008
However, for two major producing countries it is difficult to access detailed mine sharp
production data in both markets: China and India. For China, World Steel Dynamics
(2011) provides us with cost and capacity information on iron ore production differenti-
ating between several cost levels. Concerning Chinese coking coal production and both
inputs in India, we use the annual iron ore production from WSA respectively the annual
coking coal production from IEA (2012), however, not differentiating between different
mines. This simplification does not severely affect our analysis as both in China and
in India there is no dominant iron ore or coking coal producer that has a significant
influence on global trade. Therefore, we assume an atomistic supply side in those two
countries, i.e., coking coal and iron ore producers from both countries are modeled as
competitive players.
Firms modeled as Cournot players are Vale, RioTinto, BHPB, FMG, Anglo American
(Kumba), CSN, LKAB and SNIM in the iron ore market and Rio Tinto, BHPB, Anglo
American and XStrata in the coking coal market. In line with Tru¨by (2013), we model
US coking coal exporters as one Cournot player (US CC), since the main export ports
and the inland transport rails are controlled by one player and market power is assumed
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to be exerted via the infrastructure. Other smaller and mostly domestic producers are
assumed to market their production volumes as competitive players.
Figure 3.2 shows the global FOB supply cost curves of major coking coal and iron ore
exporters in 2008. Note that this figure does not reflect the seaborne traded iron ore
volumes exactly since exporters also partly supply their domestic markets as well. We
observe that regarding production costs the big three iron ore exporters Vale, Rio Tinto
and BHP Billiton are for most part in the lower half of the global FOB cost curve.
3.3.3.3 Transport Data
The dataset used in this analysis comprises distances between major export and import
ports using a port distance calculator. Additionally, the dataset contains freight rates of
2008 to 2010 of bulk carrier transports on numerous shipping routes. Using freight rates
and transport distances we calculate a proxy for the seaborne transport costs. For most
of the inland transport routes, costs are already accounted for since the cost data are free
on board (FOB), i.e., the costs comprise production, inland transport and port handling
costs. The only exception is inland transports from Russia to Europe respectively China
where rail freight rates are used.
To limit model complexity, we do not explicitly account for capacity limitations of neither
port nor rail infrastructure nor ship capacities. We implicitly assume that scarce bulk
carrier capacities are already represented by the freight rates. Capacity limitations of
export port or rail infrastructure both are subsumed under the production capacity of
a production region. For example, if a production region has a capacity of 100 and the
according port only has a capacity of 80, the production capacity we use in our model
is 80.
3.4 Results of the Numerical Analysis
3.4.1 The Profitability of Parallel Vertical Integration in the Coking
Coal and Iron Ore Market
We apply our computational model to investigate whether or not firms benefit from be-
having parallel vertically integrated, i.e., optimizing output of the complementary goods
on a firm-level. Therefore, in a first step, we simulate the coking coal and iron ore market
for the years 2008 to 2010 to derive the profitability of the integrated companies Anglo
American, Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton. Since the strategy choice of the competitors may
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influence the profitability of the own strategy, we model a simple static simultaneous
game with two stages. In the first stage, each integrated company chooses between two
strategies: ”optimizing on a firm-level (FL)” and ”optimizing on a division-level (DL)”.
In the second stage, all companies in the coking coal and iron ore market (also companies
active in only one of the markets) set the production quantities, thereby knowing each
of the integrated companies’ strategy choices, FL or DL. Thus, in total we simulate 8
model runs and use each company’s total profit margin as payoff function.29
The question arises if the proposed two-stage game is a realistic representation of the
market. Is an integrated company able to credibly commit optimizing both divisions
separately and can this be observed by the other players? The commitment to division-
level optimization could be realized by incentive contracts for the division managers, e.g.,
by remuneration depending on profitability of the division. Although these contracts are
unlikely to be seen by the other players, division-level optimization could be observable
by founding a subsidiary company for, e.g., the iron ore business. Ideally, the holding
would sell minor shares of the subsidiary in order to further incentivize that each division
is optimizing itself separately. Although in reality, coking coal and iron ore businesses of
integrated companies are rather subdivisions30 than subsidiaries, the strategy DL could
per se be committed to in a credible and observable way.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the profitability of choosing FL over DL for each of the three inte-
grated companies given the other companies’ strategy choices and the assumed demand
elasticity. The profitability is derived as the difference in profit margins between option
FL and option DL. These results seem to confirm Conjecture 3 from 3.2.2: The more
inelastic the demand is, the higher is the additional benefit of choosing FL over DL.
With an increasing demand elasticity the additional benefit of FL converges to zero.31
As stated in 3.2.2, capacity constraints of at least one of the complementary goods seem
to be one explanation for the decreasing profitability of strategy FL. For BHP Billiton,
for example, the iron ore capacity is binding in all three years as soon as the demand
elasticity (in absolute terms) is higher than 0.5. Rio Tinto’s coking coal capacity is
binding in all of the scenarios and the iron ore capacity becomes binding for elasticities
of 0.3 and 0.4 and higher. This might be an explanation why the additional benefit of
strategy FL is generally higher for BHP Billiton than for Rio Tinto.
29Since we have no data about fixed costs of iron and coking coal mining, we focus on the profit
margin, i.e., price minus marginal costs times quantity sold. This is sufficient for our analysis since we
only compare differences of profit margins whereas fixed costs only change the level of the total profits.
30Interestingly, for both Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton, the head offices of the iron ore divisions are
situated in Perth, the coal divisions in Brisbane and the holdings in Melbourne.
31For BHP Billiton, we observe slightly negative values for the years 2008 and 2009. This phenomenon
can be explained by numerical issues during the solution process of the model.
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Figure 3.3: Additional Profits from Firm-level (1 = FL) vs. Division-level (0 =
DL) Optimization Depending on the Other Integrated Companies’ Strategy (b = BHP
Billiton, r = Rio Tinto, a = Anglo American)
3.4.2 A Comparison of Three Market Settings
So far, the model results revealed that FL is a beneficial strategy for integrated companies
if the demand is rather inelastic or, in other words, if the production capacity of both
complementary goods is not scarce. However, the outcomes of FL and DL are equal
when higher demand elasticities are assumed. In the following, searching for evidence
whether or not integrated players optimize their coking coal and iron ore divisions on
a firm-level, we investigate which of the strategy choices and which demand elasticities
best represent historical market outcomes. Therefore we compare model results and
historical market outcomes, i.e., prices, trade flows and production volumes.
In total, we focus on three market settings in this section: First, we investigate whether
non-competitive behavior is observed in both the iron ore and the coking coal mar-
ket. Hence, we run a scenario in which all players in the market behave in a perfectly
competitive manner (”Perfect competition”), i.e., act as price takers. Second, we run
another two model simulations each assuming Cournot behavior in both markets. One in
which Anglo American, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto each optimize output on a firm-level
(”Firm-level”) and another one in which each of those firms’ coking coal and iron ore
business units optimize their profits separately ”Division-level”). By comparing model
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Table 3.2: P-values of the F-tests (β0 = 0 and β1 = 1) for a Range of Elasticities
Coking Perfect competition Division-level Firm-level
coal 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
e = -0.1 0.01** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.08* 0.04** 0.03** 0.64 0.14 0.49
e = -0.2 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.22 0.06* 0.04** 0.39 0.08* 0.44
e = -0.3 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.46 0.12 0.14 0.37 0.11 0.33
e = -0.4 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.64 0.26 0.50 0.36 0.14 0.36
e = -0.5 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.71 0.54 0.93 0.32 0.14 0.31
e = -0.6 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.63 0.92 0.59 0.27 0.13 0.20
e = -0.7 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.41 0.92 0.20 0.19 0.11 0.10*
e = -0.8 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.26 0.56 0.08* 0.11 0.09* 0.08*
e = -0.9 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.13 0.38 0.07* 0.08* 0.05* 0.07*
e = -1.0 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.10* 0.12 0.07* 0.06* 0.04** 0.06*
Iron Perfect competition Division-level Firm-level
ore 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
e = -0.1 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.85 0.15 0.32 0.87 0.41 0.55
e = -0.2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.88 0.62 0.72 0.91 0.89 0.95
e = -0.3 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.66 0.87 0.95 0.74 0.79 0.73
e = -0.4 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.37 0.62 0.79 0.59 0.25 0.41
e = -0.5 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.18 0.13 0.44 0.42 0.03** 0.19
e = -0.6 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.09* 0.01** 0.19 0.27 0.00*** 0.09*
e = -0.7 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.04** 0.00*** 0.09* 0.17 0.00*** 0.05*
e = -0.8 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.02** 0.00*** 0.05** 0.08* 0.00*** 0.03**
e = -0.9 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.05** 0.06* 0.00*** 0.03**
e = -1.0 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.01** 0.06* 0.00*** 0.01**
Significance levels: 0.01 ’***’ 0.05 ’**’ 0.1 ’*’
outcomes to actual price, production and trade data for the time period from 2008 to
2010, we aim at identifying the setting which has the better fit with the realized values.
To compare trade flows we use three statistical tests discussed in Appendix B.3.32
Starting with the analysis of the ”Perfect competition” setting, we find that the test
statistics of the F-test allow us to reject the null hypothesis (β0 = 0 and β1 = 1) on a
99.9% level for both goods in all years and elasticities (Table 3.2). Interestingly, whereas
this result is confirmed by higher Theil’s inequality coefficients and lower Spearman rank
correlation coefficients in the case of iron ore in all years, this is not the case with coking
coal trade flows in 2008 (Figure 3.4).
However, considering prices and production in the perfect competition setting (PC) in
addition to the trade flows, we conclude that the two market settings, in which players
behave in a non-competitive manner, outperform the perfect competition setting. The
model when run with all players acting as price takers cannot reproduce iron ore prices
for most part of the elasticities that were investigated (Figure 3.5). In addition, total
32Trade flows for both commodities at all demand elasticities as well as actual trade flows in the
respective years are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 3.4: Theil’s Inequality Coefficient and Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient
Contingent on the Demand Elasticity
Chapter 3. Quantity-setting Oligopolies in Complementary Input Markets 62
production of both commodities is too high in this market setting and, more importantly,
the model cannot capture production behavior of the largest company in each market
(Figure 3.6), i.e., Vale in the case of iron ore and BHP Billiton in the case of coking coal:
For almost each assumed demand elasticity, these producers produce up to full capacity.
Figure 3.5: Coking Coal and Iron Ore Prices Contingent on the Demand Elasticity
Concerning the comparison of the FL and the DL setting, the picture is more ambiguous.
Starting out by looking at the results of the hypothesis tests for iron ore trade flows,
one may be drawn to the conclusion that both of the two Cournot settings are able to
reproduce actual trade flows, as for a large part of the range of elasticities we investigated
the hypothesis tests cannot reject the null hypothesis. Contrasting the findings of the
linear hypothesis test with Theil’s inequality coefficient and Spearman’s rho, we see
from Figure 3.4 that both non-competitive settings perform similarly well in the case of
iron ore. For coking coal, the DL setting performs better than the FL setting as Theil’s
inequality coefficient is lower and Spearman’s rho is higher than in the DL setting .
Concerning prices we observe that the FL setting generates lower coking coal prices and
higher iron ore prices than the DL setting, although the simulated iron ore prices are
very similar with the difference never exceeding 8%. Iron ore prices match the actual
market outcome for the years 2009 and 2010 for an assumed demand elasticity of -0.5 to
-0.6. In this range of elasticities for the year 2008, the simulation results overestimate
the actual iron ore prices by US$20/t (DL) and US$27/t (FL). Concerning coking coal
the DL setting fits the actual coking coal price of 2008 for an assumed demand elasticity
of -0.5 to -0.6 whereas the FL setting underestimates the price by US$35/t. In contrast,
for 2009, the FL setting is closer to the actual coking coal price than DL in the whole
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range of simulated elasticities. For a demand elasticity of -0.5 to -0.6 the differences
to the actual values are US$15/t and US$30/t, respectively. For the year 2010 and a
demand elasticity of -0.6, the FL setting seems more appropriate to represent the coking
coal price.
Finally, we take another look at the company’s production output depicted in Figure
3.6. Whereas the iron ore production is similar in both scenarios (see the example of
Vale in Figure 3.6), the coking coal production volumes differ significantly in the case
of BHP Billiton and the US coking coal player. The FL case overestimates the actual
production volumes of BHP in the whole range of elasticities in all years. In the DL
case the BHP production volume is matched at elasticities of -0.5 to -0.7 between 2008
and 2010. The US coking coal production in the FL case is always lower than in the DL
case. For lower elasticities the DL case is closer to the actual production whereas the
production volumes converge for higher elasticities in the years 2008 and 2010.
Figure 3.6: Production of Vale, BHP Billiton and US Coking Coal Producers De-
pending on the Demand Elasticity and the Market Setting
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Summing up, we found no evidence supporting the idea that players in the two com-
modity markets behave in a perfectly competitive manner. Consequently, the two non-
competitive market settings resulted in market outcomes that match actual outcomes
better than in the perfect competition case. Regarding the comparison of the case of
DL and FL optimization of the business units’ profits, we did not find overwhelming
evidence to dismiss one of the two settings. But, the results of the statistical tests and
the comparison of production and price data draw a more consistent picture in the DL
than in the FL setting, with the model performing best for elasticities of -0.5 and -0.6.
3.4.3 Strategic Implications
The comparison of actual market outcomes and model results provide an indication
that the DL setting best represents the market outcome. However, since the analysis
did not allow to unambiguously opt for one setting this subsection aims at delivering an
economic argument why the three merged companies might indeed have chosen strategy
DL over FL in reality.
If a firm decides to optimize both the coking coal and the iron ore division on a firm-
level (i.e., choosing strategy FL), a sophisticated organizational structure is required
such that the economic agents within the firm are incentivized to act in a way which
in fact leads to a global optimum. Both divisions have specialized knowledge regarding
their specific markets, they possess a high technical know how, they know their produc-
tion costs and capacities and have an idea about their own market position compared
to their competitors. However, to make both divisions act according to strategy FL,
it is required that both divisions coordinate themselves to sell the optimal combination
of coking coal and iron ore to a demand market. And even more challenging, the di-
vision managements have to be incentivized to act as such. Ho¨ﬄer and Sliwka (2012)
discuss that symmetric incentives based on the units’ performance provide incentives
for haggling within the organization whereas symmetric incentives based on the overall
profit would lead to free-rider behavior because of reduced individual responsibility for
the overall performance. The authors state that these inefficiencies become stronger
with increasing interdependencies between units. They find that asymmetric incentive
structures which make one unit dominant in the organization could reduce these ineffi-
ciencies: The dominant unit should have unit based incentives whereas the other unit
should have incentives based on the overall profit.
Although asymmetric incentive structures reduce organizational inefficiencies, simul-
taneous optimization of the divisions nevertheless incurs additional transactional and
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organizational costs. Coming back to the finding from Section 3.4.1 an integrated com-
pany will only choose FL over DL, if the additional profit from FL is sufficiently high to
overcompensate the additional transactional and organizational costs incurred by strat-
egy FL. As seen before, this is only the case if the production capacity of both goods
is sufficiently high to benefit from FL by increasing the output. The lower the demand
elasticity becomes, the less restrictive the capacity constraint. In the real world applica-
tion, we have seen that BHP Billiton is the leading company in the coking coal market
but faces a binding capacity constraint in the iron ore market the higher the assumed
demand elasticity is. Therefore, the extra benefit of FL versus DL tends to zero for
higher elasticities whereas it can become significant for lower demand elasticities. The
simulation model, however, reproduced market results more consistently when simulat-
ing elasticities of -0.5 to -0.6 where the benefit of firm-level optimization was converging
to zero.
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the strategic behavior of quantity-setting mining com-
panies that are relevant players in the both the coking coal and the iron ore market.
This setting is of particular interest in the analysis of energy and resource markets since
(i) both goods are complementary inputs for steel production, (ii) both goods have little
alternative use, (iii) both goods exhibit high supply-side concentration and (iv) some
of the biggest producers are active on both markets. Given these characteristics, this
paper investigated whether the integrated mining companies optimize their output on a
firm-level or on a division-level.
We first assessed the profitability of firm-level optimization in a theoretical model of two
homogeneous Cournot duopolies of complementary goods that interact with each other.
We considered two cases: one with unlimited capacities and one with a binding capacity
constraint on one of the divisions’ output. Firm-level optimization is always profitable
if capacities are unlimited. However, we proved three conjectures for the case in which
one of the divisions faces a binding capacity constraint. There exists a critical capacity
constraint (i) below which the parallel vertically integrated firm is indifferent between
firm-level and division-level optimization, (ii) above which firm-level optimization is
always beneficial and (iii) that becomes smaller with a lower demand elasticity.
Next, we investigated whether these findings also hold for a real-world application. The
markets for coking coal and iron ore are more complex than the theoretical model as
(i) there are more than two suppliers in each market, (ii) there are more than one
firm that are parallel vertically integrated, (iii) production costs are heterogeneous,
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(iv) both markets are spatial markets and (v) most of the producers face a binding
capacity constraint. Therefore, we developed a numerical spatial multi-input equilibrium
model of both markets based on a unique data set. Assessing the profitability of the
integrated companies, the results from the theoretical model were confirmed in the
simulation. The coking coal market leader BHP Billiton generates additional profits
from firm-level optimization under low elasticities because, in this case, the iron ore
capacity is not binding. With increasing demand elasticity, the benefits of simultaneous
optimization tend to zero. Lastly, we compared the model results of one simulation
assuming division-level optimization and one assuming firm-level optimization to the
actual price, trade flow and production data for the years 2008 to 2010. Although no
scenario is dominant, the scenario assuming division-level optimization fitted the actual
market outcomes slightly better. Hence, the simulation did not reveal any evidence of
firm-level optimization over the respective years.
Apart from the arguments made within this analysis, there may be other economic
reasons for division-level optimization that were not the main focus of this paper and
could be interesting for further research. For example, the firm-level optimization of two
business units could create inefficiently high organizational costs. Furthermore, it may
therefore be challenging to create incentives for both divisions to not optimize the divi-
sion but rather to optimize on a firm-level. Since this analysis focused on a comparison
of historic and model-based market outcomes, it may be insightful to further assess the
strategic investment of companies in a prospective analysis. The decision whether to
grow in one or the other complementary factor market, thereby altering the own strate-
gic position or the one of the competitor, may be another interesting sequel to this paper.
Chapter 4
CO2 Abatement Policies in the
Power Sector under an
Oligopolistic Gas Market
4.1 Introduction
The European Union and its member states have established a variety of policies to fos-
ter carbon dioxide (CO2) abatement in the electricity sector. One EU-wide instrument
is the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS), which defines an emissions
quota and forces CO2-intensive industries such as electricity generation, cement, paper
or iron and steel production to buy allowances to emit CO2. Besides the EU-ETS, there
are various national CO2 reduction policies in place such as numerous subsidy regimes
for renewable (RES) power generation or a coal tax levied in the Netherlands. Emis-
sions quota systems such as the EU-ETS are considered to be a cost efficient instrument
to achieve a defined CO2 abatement target (see, e.g., Bo¨hringer and Rosendahl, 2011).
Given a fixed CO2 emissions quota, additional policies such as RES subsidies or taxes
have no effect on CO2 reduction but cause deviations from the cost-efficient CO2 reduc-
tion. Hence, given constant fuel costs for different policies, it can be shown analytically
that taxes or subsidies increase the costs of the power system.
However, there are good reasons to claim that fuel costs, at least for natural gas, are not
constant but rather influenced by climate policy interventions: First, climate policies
affect the gas demand of the power sector. The EU-ETS or a coal tax, for example,
fosters fuel switching from coal to gas. RES subsidies, on the contrary, have a negative
impact on power generation from natural gas. Second, natural gas supply in Europe is
highly concentrated. In 2012, the European OECD member countries purchased roughly
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70% of their total gas demand from Russia, Norway, Algeria or the Netherlands. In
each of these countries, one state-owned gas company manages almost the entirety of
gas sales. Given the high market concentration, changing gas demand functions through
policy intervention can influence gas prices significantly. In this context, Newbery (2008)
has shown analytically that the EU-ETS reduces the price elasticity for gas consumption
in the electricity sector, strengthens the market power of gas suppliers and increases gas
prices. Increasing gas prices imply higher power system costs.
The overall power system cost effect of combining other carbon reduction policies such
as a coal tax or a fixed bonus for RES with the EU-ETS seems unclear: On the one
hand, combining the EU-ETS with additional policies causes efficiency losses (e.g., tax
distortions). On the other hand, policies and their effects on gas demand may cause a
gas price reaction in the oligopolistic gas market. However, the direction of the change
in gas price and therefore the overall effects on power system costs are ambiguous.
Thus, this paper aims at answering the question as to how carbon reduction policies
in combination with the EU-ETS affect the power system costs and therefore the costs
of CO2 abatement, thereby accounting for gas market effects. This research focuses on
two carbon reduction policies which I introduce in addition to the EU-ETS: A location-
and technology-independent fixed bonus RES subsidy and a coal tax. The analysis is
conducted following four hypotheses:
1. A coal tax increases gas prices, a fixed RES bonus decreases gas prices. (H1)
2. A coal tax increases power system costs compared to an EU-ETS-only regime.
(H2)
3. A fixed RES bonus reduces power system costs compared to an EU-ETS-only
regime. (H3)
4. Higher market power in the gas market amplifies the outlined effects. (H4)
In order to assess these hypotheses, a stylized theoretical model is used to analyze the
interaction of gas and electricity markets given the respective policies and the EU-ETS.
From this theoretical analysis, I identify three effects of a policy intervention on power
system costs. First, applying the example of a RES subsidy, I find that the direct
impact of a subsidy on the power generation depends on the fuel type. Gas generation
decreases, whereas coal and RES generation increases. This direct effect of a subsidy
on power system costs is always positive, i.e., in the first step system costs increase
due to the subsidy. However, secondly, if the subsidy affects gas price and demand, the
changing gas price leads to a different equilibrium on the power market. This effect is
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denoted as indirect quantity effect. Third, the subsidy changing the gas price affects the
costs of each unit of gas purchased by the power sector. This effect is denoted as the
indirect price effect. Both indirect effects of a subsidy can be positive or negative. If
they are negative, the effects may overcompensate the direct cost effect. Thus, a climate
policy such as a RES subsidy can, in theory, reduce power system costs.
To quantify these effects and to verify the hypotheses for a real-world example of the
European power and gas markets, I develop a calibrated simulation tool which models
the long-term interaction of both markets by combining a power market and a gas market
simulation model. The approach that is commonly used to simulate electricity markets
in partial analyses is large-scale linear dispatch and investment simulation models. In
this analysis, the model DIMENSION is applied (see Richter, 2011). Partial analyses
concerning market power on the natural gas market are often conducted using mixed
complementarity problem (MCP) models, enabling the simulation of Cournot oligopolies.
In this study, I apply the long-term global gas market model COLUMBUS (see Hecking
and Panke, 2012 or Growitsch, Hecking, and Panke, 2014). Both models are integrated
as follows: The power market model is used to derive a gas demand function, which is
then applied in the gas market model. The resulting gas price is then fed back into the
power market model.
The integrated simulation model is applied to three scenarios for the years 2015, 2020,
2030 and 2040. The scenarios include an EU-ETS only scenario as a reference, an
EU-ETS plus coal tax scenario and third, an EU-ETS plus fixed RES bonus scenario.
Concerning H1, I find from the simulation that a coal tax has ambiguous effects on gas
prices whereas for each fixed RES bonus scenario, the gas prices decrease. H2 holds,
i.e. a coal tax increases power system costs. Furthermore, the results reveal that a
fixed bonus RES subsidy can decrease overall costs of the power system (H3): In the
simulated cases the indirect price effect overcompensates the increasing costs incurred
by the sum of the direct and indirect quantity effect. The simulation also confirms H4,
i.e., that higher gas market power amplifies the effects outlined above.
The policy implications of these findings should not suggest that CO2 abatement be-
comes more efficient through a fixed RES bonus. The results should only reveal that
the costs of the European power system decrease. Decreasing costs of the power system
result from decreasing purchase costs for natural gas. Therefore, lower power system
costs imply lower revenues for natural gas suppliers. Hence, one motive for introduc-
ing a fixed bonus RES subsidy could be to redistribute welfare from non-European gas
suppliers to European power utilities or end users.
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This research is based on literature on the economic effects of overlapping climate poli-
cies33. This strand of literature traces back to Tinbergen (1952), who argues that the
number of policies should equal the number of policy objectives. In other words, if
the sole objective was to reduce CO2 emissions, only one policy should be used. Sijm
(2005), for example, concludes that in the presence of a CO2 emissions quota system,
the CO2-reduction effect of any other policy becomes zero. In this light, Bo¨hringer et al.
(2008) show that additional CO2 emission taxes for sectors covered by the EU-ETS
have no effect on CO2 reduction but increase overall costs. Concerning RES-E subsi-
dies, Bo¨hringer and Rosendahl (2011) argue that, combined with the EU-ETS, these
policies increase CO2 abatement costs without affecting CO2 reduction.
However, literature also provides economic justifications in favor of interacting policies
(see, for example, Sorrell and Sijm, 2003)34: Additional policies may correct market fail-
ures with respect to technology innovation and market penetration, raise fiscal incomes,
redistribute welfare, reduce other environmental externalities or reduce the import de-
pendence on oil and gas imports. Lastly, some argue that additional policies could
improve the static efficiency of the EU-ETS, i.e., correct market failures other than the
negative externality of CO2 emissions such as supply-side concentration. Bennear and
Stavins (2007), for example, state that market power plus environmental externalities
can create the need for multiple policies. Whereas Bennear and Stavins (2007) focus on
market power and externalities in the same market, Newbery (2008) takes into account
market power in the upstream market. According to Newbery (2008), the EU-ETS,
internalizing CO2 emissions in the power sector, fosters market power in the upstream
fuel market (natural gas) thereby increasing CO2 abatement costs.
In this light, this research contributes to the existing literature on overlapping climate
policies in the electricity sector by assessing two policies in combination with the EU-
ETS, thereby explicitly accounting for oligopolistic behavior in the gas market. It ex-
tends the current debate on overlapping regulations by showing that policy interventions
do not only affect the regulated market but also have feedback effects on upstream mar-
kets and potential market power, as seen in the gas market. Furthermore, this research
shows that the policies in focus are capable of redistributing welfare between market
participants across different markets.
Additionally, this research contributes to the literature on modeling electricity and gas
market interaction in three dimensions: First, the model developed in this paper com-
bines the high level of detail of LP power market simulations with the oligopolistic
behavior of the MCP gas market models. Second, the electricity sector’s inverse gas
33For a detailed overview see Fischer et al. (2010) or del R´ıo Gonza´lez (2007).
34However, it is important to stress that analyzing the effectiveness and efficiency of currently applied
policies with respect to these justifications is beyond the scope of this paper.
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demand functions are derived endogenously during the simulation. Third, the model
enables the simulation of gas market power on power utilities.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 4.2, I show the interactions between
policies, the gas market and the power market and the resulting cost effects in a stylized
theoretical analysis. Section 4.3 presents the methodology used in this paper, i.e., the
combining a LP power market model with a MCP gas market model in a numerical
analysis. The model parameterization and the scenario design are discussed in Section
4.4. Section 4.5 assesses the hypotheses of this paper by applying the integrated power
and gas market model for a case study of 11 European countries. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 A Stylized Model of Carbon Reduction Policies Affect-
ing Power System Costs
In this section, the interactions between carbon reduction policies, power generation by
fuel type and power system costs are analyzed using a stylized model. In a first step,
a fixed gas price (i.e., no interaction with the gas market) is assumed. In a second
step, the reaction of the gas market to changing gas demand from the power sector is
included. Thirdly, a graphical analysis of the interaction is presented. The modeled
electricity market is equipped with three technologies: coal C, gas G and renewables
R. Let xC , xG and xR denote the amount of electricity supplied by each technology,
respectively. K denotes the total power system costs. The power generation of each
technology depends on the fixed bonus subsidy for renewables35 s and the specific full
costs of power generation g, c and r, i.e., long-run marginal costs.36 Variables c and r
are assumed to be constant, whereas the gas generation costs g are affected by changing
gas prices. Subsidies for renewables affect gas demand and, therefore, gas prices. Thus,
the gas-specific generation costs g depend on the subsidy s. This yields the following
power system costs:
K(xR(s, g(s)), xC(s, g(s)), xG(s, g(s)), g(s)) =
(r − s)xR(s, g(s)) + sxR(s, g(s)) + cxC(s, g(s)) + g(s)xG(s, g(s)).
(4.1)
Electricity demand D is inelastic and equals the sum of the generated power of all three
technologies,
D = xR + xC + xG. (4.2)
35In the following, the fixed bonus subsidy for renewables becomes the central focus of this analysis.
The effects of a coal tax are similar.
36The full costs of power generation comprise capital costs, fixed operation and maintenance costs and
fuel costs. The specific full costs represent the full-costs per unit, i.e., long-run marginal costs.
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There is a cap E on CO2 emissions. Total emissions depend on the specific CO2 emissions
per technology, eC , eG and eR. The renewable emissions eR are assumed to be zero, and
eC > eG. Total emissions are given by:
E = eCxC + eGxG. (4.3)
For a situation in which c < g < r and s = 0. Let x0C , x
0
G and x
0
R denote the equilibrium
power generation and DR the residual demand. Assume x0C > 0 and x
0
G > 0. Then,
DR = D − x0R = x0C + x0G. (4.4)
4.2.1 Cost Effects Given Fixed Gas Prices
In the following, I derive the cost effects of a fixed bonus RES subsidy on power system
costs, given that gas prices are not affected by the subsidy.
Proposition 1: Assuming a constant gas price and, hence, constant generation costs
g, a subsidy s increases power system costs K.
Although this is implied already by the first welfare theorem, the following proof turns
out to be instructive for the further discussions in this section.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Differentiating the power system costs K with respect to the subsidy s yields:
dK
ds
=
∂K
∂xR
dxR
ds
+
∂K
∂xC
dxC
ds
+
∂K
∂xG
dxG
ds
=
∂K
∂xR
∂xR
∂s
+
∂K
∂xC
∂xC
∂s
+
∂K
∂xG
∂xG
∂s
= r
∂xR
∂s
+ c
∂xC
∂s
+ g
∂xG
∂s
.
(4.5)
Next, two Lemmata are needed to proceed the proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma 1: Subsidy s increases coal-fired generation xC , whereas it decreases gas-fired
generation xG, i.e.,
∂xC
∂s > 0 and
∂xG
∂s < 0.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Equations 4.3 and 4.4 yield the equilibrium quantities x0C and x
0
G, respectively, i.e., the
equilibrium given the residual demand and emission constraint:
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x0C =
E − eGDR
eC − eG (4.6)
x0G =
eCDR− E
eC − eG . (4.7)
Let subsidy s have a positive impact on renewable generation or, put differently, decrease
residual demand DR, that is:
∂DR
∂s
= −∂xR
∂s
< 0. (4.8)
Thus, assuming a constant CO2 cap E and using Equations 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 yields:
∂xC
∂s
=
∂DR
∂s
−eG
eC − eG > 0 (4.9)
∂xG
∂s
=
∂DR
∂s
eC
eC − eG < 0. (4.10)
This proves Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 implies that increasing generation of renewables through a subsidy in combi-
nation with a CO2 quota system increases coal-fired generation whereas gas-fired gen-
eration, i.e., the more expensive but less CO2-intensive technology, decreases.
Hence, from Equations 4.5, 4.9 and 4.10, the total cost effect of a renewable subsidy can
be derived to equal:
dK
ds
= r
∂xR
∂s
+ c
eG
eC − eG
∂xR
∂s
− g eC
eC − eG
∂xR
∂s
=
∂xR
∂s
(r +
ceG − geC
eC − eG ). (4.11)
Since the generation of renewables xR increases with the subsidy, a subsidy increases to-
tal power system costs if and only if the term in brackets becomes positive. Rearranging
Equation 4.11 yields:
g < r(1− eG
eC
) + c
eG
eC
. (4.12)
Lemma 2: g < r(1− eGeC ) + c
eG
eC
is equivalent to x0G > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Assume that Condition 4.12 does not hold, i.e.,
g = gˆ + h > r(1− eG
eC
) + c
eG
eC
= gˆ , h > 0. (4.13)
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Thus, the power system costs K0 in the equilibrium become:
K0 = (gˆ + h)x0G + rx
0
R + cx
0
C = r(1−
eG
eC
)x0G + c
eG
eC
x0G + rx
0
R + cx
0
C + hx
0
G. (4.14)
Assume another situation with x1G = 0 and system costs K
1. Zero gas-fired generation
results allows for more available emission allowances compared to the situation in which
x0G > 0, thus:
x1C = x
0
C +
eG
eC
x0G. (4.15)
Since power demand is assumed to be constant and eGeC < 1, generation of renewables
has to increase in order to compensate for the decreasing gas-fired generation:
x1R = x
0
R + (1−
eG
eC
)x0G. (4.16)
Thus, the power system costs K1 become:
K1 = rx0R + r(1−
eG
eC
)x0G + cx
0
C + c
eG
eC
x0G < K
0, since h > 0. (4.17)
Hence, x0G > 0 and g > r(1− eGeC ) + c
eG
eC
would not be a cost-efficient equilibrium. This
proves Lemma 2.
From Lemmas 1 and 2 it follows that, given x0C > 0, x
0
G > 0, a binding CO2 cap,
c < g < r and fixed gas price, i.e., fixed generation costs g , a positive subsidy for
renewables s increases power system costs K. This proves Proposition 1.
The economic interpretation of Proposition 1 is that a subsidy for renewables has the
same effect as the exchanging of one unit of gas-fired generation for a more expensive
unit of a bundle of renewable generation and coal-fired generation, which is an equally
CO2-intensive option as gas-fired electricity generation.
4.2.2 Cost Effects Accounting for a Gas Market Reaction
The section before has shown that a RES subsidy increases power system costs, given
that the gas price is constant. In the following section, the power system costs are
derived given the assumption that the gas price is affected by the RES subsidy.
Proposition 2: Assuming that the subsidy s affects the gas demand function and
therefore the equilibrium gas price and the gas generation costs g, the overall effect of a
subsidy s on power system costs K is ambiguous.
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Proof of Proposition 2:
Differentiating K with respect to s yields:
dK
ds
=
∂K
∂xR
(
∂xR
∂s
+
∂xR
∂g
∂g
∂s
)
+
∂K
∂xC
(
∂xC
∂s
+
∂xC
∂g
∂g
∂s
)
+
∂K
∂xG
(
∂xG
∂s
+
∂xG
∂g
∂g
∂s
)
+
∂K
∂g
∂g
∂s
.
(4.18)
Thus, the subsidy affects electricity generation of each fuel type directly. Since the
subsidy also affects the gas price and therefore gas generation costs, a subsidy also
affects the electricity generation indirectly via g. Rearranging Equation 4.18 yields:
dK
ds
= r
∂xR
∂s︸︷︷︸
(+)
+c
∂xC
∂s︸︷︷︸
(+)
+g
∂xG
∂s︸︷︷︸
(−)
(direct effect)
+
r ∂xR∂g︸︷︷︸
(+)
+c
∂xC
∂g︸︷︷︸
(+)
+g
∂xG
∂g︸︷︷︸
(−)
 ∂g∂s︸︷︷︸
(?)
(indirect quantity effect)
+ xG
∂g
∂s︸︷︷︸
(?)
. (indirect price effect)
(4.19)
The direct effects of a subsidy have been discussed in the previous section: Subsidy
s decreases xG but increases both xC and xR. The direct cost effect is positive (see
Proposition 1). When taking into account the gas market reaction, a subsidy s can
increase or decrease the gas price and therefore gas generation costs g.37 Hence, the
sign of ∂g∂s is ambiguous. A subsidy has two indirect effects on total power system costs.
First, the indirect price effect is quite intuitive: If the subsidy s increases/decreases the
gas price, i.e., gas generation costs g, the costs of gas purchased by the power sector
increase/decrease. Second, the indirect quantity effect is more complex, as explained by
Lemma 3:
Lemma 3: The indirect quantity effect becomes negative if and only if ∂g∂s < 0, i.e., if
and only if a subsidy decreases the gas price.
37Gas generation costs g comprise constant fix costs and fuel costs. Latter are proportional to the
gas price depending on the gas plant’s degree of efficiency. Therefore gas price changes are in a positive
linear relation to changes of gas generation costs g.
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Proof of Lemma 3:
It is sufficient to show that τ = r ∂xR∂g + c
∂xC
∂g + g
∂xG
∂g > 0.
Increasing gas generation costs g increase generation of renewables xR.
38 Given a con-
stant total power demand D, the effect on the residual demand DR is negative, i.e.,
∂DR
∂g
= −∂xR
∂g
< 0. (4.20)
Given a constant CO2 cap E and applying the same proof as Lemmas 1 and 2 shows
that τ > 0. This proves Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 implies that decreasing gas generation costs g induce an exchange of one unit
of a bundle of xC and xR for one unit of xG, which is cheaper and equally CO2 intensive.
Vice versa, an increasing gas generation costs g imply an exchange of one unit of xG for
one unit of a bundle of xC and xR, which is more expensive and equally CO2 intensive.
Summing up, a RES subsidy s that increases the gas price and therefore gas generation
costs g has a positive cost effect since, besides the positive direct cost effect, both
indirect effects are positive. However, if a RES subsidy s decreases the gas price and
gas generation costs g, both indirect cost effects become negative such that they may
overcompensate the direct cost effect. Hence, the overall effect of a subsidy s on power
system costs K can become negative. This proves Proposition 2.
4.2.3 Graphical Analysis
In the following, the effects of the stylized model are discussed in a graphical analysis.
Therefore, Figure 4.1 illustrates the effects discussed before: The figure contains 10
diagrams numbered by roman numerals. Diagrams I to III show the relation between
subsidy s and quantities xR, xC and xG, respectively. The blue lines illustrate the
equilibrium (0), i.e., the reference case with s = 0. The variables x0C , x
0
G and x
0
R are the
cost-efficient quantities. A subsidy would decrease xG and increase xR and xC . Note
that summing up xR(s), xC(s) and xG(s) horizontally would result in a vertical line,
i.e., a subsidy would not affect power demand.
38This theoretical model focuses on the long-run marginal costs. Therefore, increasing gas price implies
higher long-run marginal costs of gas-fired power plants. Thus, renewables become more competitive
compared to gas-fired generation, and xR increases.
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Figure 4.1: Effects of a Fixed Bonus RES Subsidy on the Power Market, the Gas
Market and Power System Costs
Assume a subsidy s = S0 leads to a new equilibrium (1) with x
1
C , x
1
G and x
1
R, illustrated
by the blue dashed lines. Assume further that in this case, there is no interaction between
the gas and the power market, i.e., ∂xG∂g = 0 and
∂g
∂s = 0. The latter is illustrated as
a vertical line in Diagram IV. Diagrams V to VII illustrate the cost effects of changing
subsidies. Since r and c are constant, the cost increases from coal and renewables are
depicted by the respective rectangles in Diagrams V and VI. Since x1G < x
0
G and g0 is
assumed to be constant, the costs incurred by gas consumption decrease. However, the
overall cost effect (direct cost effect) is positive for the reasons discussed in Section 4.2.1.
Assume next a case (2a) in which the power market interacts with the gas market but
gas prices are still constant, i.e., ∂xG∂g < 0 and
∂g
∂s = 0 (illustrated by the red solid lines).
The gas market equilibrium is given by a price leading to generation costs of g0 and a
quantity x2aG . This situation can occur if, for example, the gas demand function of the
power sector is inelastic or if the gas supply equals gas demand at that particular price.
The relationship x2aG > x
1
G and a constant g0 results in an outwards shift of xG(s) in
Diagram III. Accordingly, xR(s) and xC(s) shift inwards (since the sum of all three terms
is constant). The new equilibrium quantities, x2aG , x
2a
C and x
2a
R , are located between the
equilibrium quantities of case (1) and case (0). Therefore, the power system costs in
case (2a) are lower than those in case (1) and higher than those in reference case (0).
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This situation illustrates what was referred to as the indirect quantity effect in Equation
4.19.
Assume next a case (2b) in which the gas price and gas generation costs g are affected
by the subsidy, i.e., ∂g∂s < 0 but
∂xG
∂g = 0 (red dashed lines). Therefore, x
2b
G = x
1
G.
The equilibrium gas price in case (2b) implies different gas generation costs denoted as
g1. Diagram VII illustrates the indirect price effect of Equation 4.19. Total costs are
reduced compared to case (1) since each unit of gas costs less.
Case (3), illustrated by the green lines, assumes ∂g∂s < 0 and
∂xG
∂g < 0. This is the case
that will most likely occur during the simulations in the numerical analysis. A subsidy
S0 leads to a direct quantity effect, which strictly increases costs. Since the gas demand
function changes due to the subsidy, the gas market equilibrium changes. If ∂g∂s < 0, i.e.,
the subsidy s decreases the gas price and generation costs decrease from g0 to g1, the gas
consumption of the power sector increases further (assume to x3G = x
2a
G ). The indirect
quantity effect therefore reduces the cost increase incurred by the direct effect. However,
both effects in sum are still positive. But, if the subsidy causes a sufficient decrease in
the gas price, the indirect price effect can lead to a reduction of power system costs as
a result of the subsidy.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the cost effects once more, assuming that a RES subsidy decreases
gas prices. R0, C0 (additional costs) andG0 (cost savings) are depicted by blue lining and
represent the direct effect. The terms R1, C1 (cost savings) and G1 (additional costs)
represent the indirect quantity effect (red lines) and G2 (cost savings) represents the
indirect price effect (green lines). As previously discussed, R0+C0+G0+R1+C1+G1 >
0, i.e., the direct and indirect quantity effects increase power system costs. However, a
sufficiently large G2 can lead to a subsidy for renewables decreasing overall power system
costs.
Figure 4.2: Cost Effects of a Fixed Bonus RES Subsidy
The magnitude of the effects discussed depend, among others, on the gas market reaction,
i.e., how the subsidy affects gas demand and therefore the gas market equilibrium. If
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there is a high degree of supply-side market power in combination with a gas demand
function that has become less elastic from the subsidy, the gas price may even increase
as a result of the subsidy, i.e. ∂g∂s > 0. In that case, overall power system costs strictly
increase.
This stylized model shows that the cost effects of subsidies (or similarly, of taxes) depend
on the fuel switching characteristics of the respective electricity market. Therefore, I
develop an integrated simulation model for both the power and the gas market in the
next section.
4.3 Modeling the Interaction of Power and Gas Markets
This research aims at assessing the power system costs of climate policies combined
with the EU-ETS, thereby accounting for the interactions between the electricity mar-
ket and the oligopolistic gas market. Lienert and Lochner (2012) assess the importance
of modeling the interdependencies between the power and gas market. In doing so, they
develop a linear simulation model combining two LP models: a dispatch and investment
power market model and a gas infrastructure model.39 Abada (2012) develops a gas
market MCP model that is able to simulate market power and to incorporate demand
functions accounting for fuel substitution. Although this approach implicitly models
fuel substitution in the power sector, the author does not explicitly model the electric-
ity sector. In a recent paper by Huppmann and Egging (2014), the authors develop a
MCP model that integrates different fuel markets (e.g., gas, coal, oil) as well as fuel
transformation such as the electricity sector. Fuel suppliers exert market power against
exogenous linear demand functions of energy end users such as the industry, residential
or transport sectors. However, fuel producers do not exert market power on the elec-
tricity sector. A common modeling approach seen in the literature on climate policy is
the use of computed general equilibrium models (CGE). This class of models seeks to
derive a Walrasian equilibrium of different sectors of an economy, which are represented
by demand and supply functions. Obviously, CGE could be one possible method of
modeling the interactions between the gas and power market.
However, this research develops a different methodology by combining a linear European
electricity market model with a MCP global gas market model accounting for strate-
gic gas producers. Both aspects enable a highly detailed and therefore more realistic
representation of the respective markets as discussed below and in Sections 4.3.1 and
4.3.2.
39See Lienert and Lochner (2012) for a detailed overview of this branch of literature.
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The model developed in the following accounts for the interdependency of gas and elec-
tricity markets in an integrated framework and is suited to i) conduct long-term simula-
tions of dispatch and investment decisions in the electricity market, ii) derive annual gas
demand functions of the power sector and iii) simulate market power in the gas market.
Electricity markets are often modeled as linear cost minimization models (see Figure
4.3), an approach which implicitly assumes a perfectly competitive electricity market.
LP electricity market models, such as the DIMENSION model (Richter, 2011) applied in
this analysis (see Section 4.3.1), derive the cost-minimal amount of power plant dispatch
and investment, from which additional information such as fuel demand or CO2 emissions
can be computed. Because of the high level of detail and to limit model complexity,
many power market models are partial equilibrium model, i.e., the interactions with
other markets are not modeled. Gas prices, for example, are exogenous inputs into
the model. Gas demand from the power sector is a model outcome but does not have
feedback effects on the gas market or gas prices.
Figure 4.3: Inconsistencies of Partial Analytical Electricity and Gas Market Models
A common approach to model resource markets (and global gas markets in particular)
are partial equilibrium models formulated as mixed complementarity problems (MCP).40
MCP models, like the COLUMBUS gas market model applied in this analysis (see Sec-
tion 4.3.2), allow for the simulation of strategic behavior of oligopolistic gas exporters.
This requires the representation of the demand side such as, e.g., gas demand by the
electricity sector using the inverse demand functions in an analytical form. The spec-
ification of the demand function is exogenous to the model. Often, demand functions
are derived from historical or, for the future, from assumed price/demand combinations
plus an assumption about the demand elasticity. The model outcome is a gas market
equilibrium of production volumes, trade flows, demand and prices. However, since
40See, for example, Tru¨by and Paulus (2012) for steam coal, Tru¨by (2013) for coking coal, Hecking
and Panke (2014) for the interaction of iron ore and coking coal or Gabriel et al. (2005) for natural gas.
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the demand functions are exogenous to the model, the model does not account for any
interaction with other markets such as the electricity market.
Consequently, with respect to the research question, both models used standalone would
yield inconsistent results (see Figure 4.3). Therefore, I present a new approach to inte-
grate both models. Since natural gas is an input factor for power production, or vice
versa the power sector is an end consumer of natural gas, the core idea is to link both
market simulations by the demand functions. The demand functions represent the end
users’ (i.e., the power generators’) demand for natural gas. A four-step procedure links
both market models consistently (see Figure 4.4):
1.) Create n random samples of gas prices and run the DIMENSION electricity market
model for each sample. Each simulation yields annual gas demands.
2.) Use the derived price/demand samples to approximate annual inverse demand func-
tions p(x) in an analytical form. The resulting demand functions are therefore outputs
of the power market model.
3.) Use the demand functions as inputs of the COLUMBUS gas market model to derive
the oligopolistic gas market equilibrium.
4.) Use the gas market equilibrium prices as inputs of the DIMENSION model and
derive the power market outcome.
Figure 4.4: Integration of LP Power Market and MCP Gas Market Model
In the following, the simulation models DIMENSION and COLUMBUS as well as the
model integration approach are explained in greater detail.
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4.3.1 The Linear Electricity Market Model DIMENSION
The linear electricity market model DIMENSION41, developed by the Institute of En-
ergy Economics at the University of Cologne, is designed for long-term analyses of the
European power system up to 2050. As such, DIMENSION and its predecessor DIME
have been backtested and applied in numerous long-term power market studies both in
research (see, e.g., Hagspiel et al., 2014) and policy advising (see, e.g., Fu¨rsch et al.,
2012).
The model minimizes power system costs by deriving the cost-optimal power plant dis-
patch and investment. The power system can be subdivided into different geographical
units such as countries, which are connected by net transfer capacities. Assumptions on
annual power demand are broken down to hourly load patterns of typical days differen-
tiated by, e.g., weekend/weekday or summer/winter. The hourly load is assumed to be
inelastic and has to be met by the supply side, i.e., by conventional power plants and
renewables. The hourly feed-in of renewables with zero variable costs such as wind or
solar PV is exogenous to the model and also derived from typical days. The dispatch
of conventional power plants is endogenous to the model and depends on the variable
costs, flexibility and capacity of the power plants. The initial capacity of the generating
units is exogenous to the model, but the model endogenously optimizes investment in
new power plants and renewables, depending on investment costs, future power plant
utilization rates and a discount factor.
The DIMENSION model is a useful tool to simulate the effects of different power market
policies in long-term analyses. The EU-ETS, for example, can be modeled by setting
annual CO2 boundaries. If such a boundary is binding, CO2 allowances are scarce,
which fosters power generation by more expensive but less CO2-intensive power plants.
A coal tax can be modeled by increasing the exogenously given coal price, and a fixed
RES bonus can be modeled by reduced or negative variable costs of renewables. For each
parameterization, the model yields the cost-optimal power plant dispatch and investment
decisions, from which other information such as the annual gas demand can be derived.
4.3.2 The MCP Gas Market Model COLUMBUS
The MCP gas market model COLUMBUS42 simulates the global gas market up to 2040.
It has been backtested with historic market outcomes in Growitsch, Hecking, and Panke
(2014). The model represents the spatial structure of worldwide supply, infrastructure
41For a detailed model description, see Richter (2011) or Ja¨gemann et al. (2013).
42For a detailed model description, see Hecking and Panke (2012) or Growitsch, Hecking, and Panke
(2014).
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and demand by a node-edge topology. COLUMBUS derives a market equilibrium by
optimizing the dispatch and investment decisions of several gas market actors such as
exporters, traders or operators of LNG infrastructure or pipelines. Initial production
and infrastructure capacities as well as cost parameters are inputs into the model. Actors
can, however, also invest in production and infrastructure at certain investment costs.
Concerning the demand side, the model distinguishes all important demand countries
by sector (power, industry, residential), each represented by annual inverse demand
functions. In the basic COLUMBUS version, demand functions are exogenously defined
by historical or, for the future, by assumed price/demand combinations and assumed
price elasticities.
COLUMBUS enables the simulation of Cournot behavior of gas exporters, i.e., the sim-
ulation of a spatial oligopoly. Modeling a Cournot oligopoly in a MCP requires an
analytical representation of the price reaction towards changing output. The functions
are common knowledge to all modeled Cournot players. In order to integrate the DI-
MENSION power market model with COLUMBUS, the annual inverse demand functions
of the power sector are derived by DIMENSION and used in COLUMBUS. The details
of this approach are presented in the next section.
4.3.3 Integrating Power and Gas Market Simulations
Since this study aims at assessing policies with respect to their long-term effects on
power system costs up to 2040, the integrated simulation of electricity and gas market
is conducted for the sample years 2015, 2020, 2030 and 2040.43 Both DIMENSION and
COLUMBUS are inter-temporal models that simulate the investment in power plants
and gas assets, respectively. In particular, there is an important inter-temporal depen-
dency between gas prices and power sector gas demand, illustrated in Figure 4.5: The
gas prices pi have a direct impact on the dispatch Xi, i.e., the gas consumption of gas-
fired power plants. Additionally, the investment Ii in new gas-fired capacity depends
not only on the future gas prices pi′,(i≤i′) but also on the future utilization of gas-fired
plants Xi,(i≤i′). In turn, the utilization Xi depends on the past investments Ii′,(i≥i′).
43In order to avoid end effects, the simulation is continued until the year 2070. However, only the
model results up to 2040 are important for this analysis.
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Figure 4.5: Inter-temporal Dependency of Gas Prices and Gas Demand in the Power
Sector
To limit complexity but to nonetheless cope with the inter-temporal dependency, the
model implicitly assumes full gas price certainty in the power market. In other words,
gas exporters play a one-shot Cournot game setting all quantities for future exports up
to 2040. Power generators regard the resulting equilibrium gas prices as certain. This
can be interpreted as a long-term gas contract or a forward purchase of gas. Besides
certainty on gas prices, all players in the gas and the power market have perfect foresight
on the future of both markets. In order to simulate the Cournot oligopoly in the gas
market, the COLUMBUS model requires an inverse demand function that accounts for
the hidden inter-temporal relation of gas prices and demand for discrete time steps:
f : R4 → R4
p2015
p2020
p2030
p2040
 = f

X2015
X2020
X2030
X2040
 .
(4.21)
4.3.3.1 Power Market Simulations of Gas Price Samples
Due to the complex interactions between gas prices, investments in gas-fired power
plants and gas demand, it is virtually impossible to trace the relation between prices and
demand over time in an analytical functional form. Therefore, we simulate n gas price
samples (p1, p2, p3, p4){i,i∈1...n} derived from a uniform distribution of prices between
15 and 50 EUR2010/MWhth. For each sample of gas prices, we run the DIMENSION
model and derive a vector of annual amounts of gas consumption by the power sector
(X1, X2, X3, X4){i,i∈1...n}. The resulting point cloud represents the hidden relation of
gas prices and demands for the years 2015, 2020, 2030 and 2040, indexed by 1, 2, 3
and 4, respectively. In particular, it contains information on how the gas price in one
year reacts to the changing output of a Cournot gas exporter in the same or a different
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year. The simulation of a gas market Cournot oligopoly requires the approximation of
the point cloud by an analytical representation.
4.3.3.2 Deriving an Inverse Gas Demand Function
The COLUMBUS model requires a continuous and differentiable inverse demand func-
tion, as in Equation 4.21. The function consists of different additive components fij ,
representing the partial price effect of changing demand Xj on price pi:
p1
p2
p3
p4
 = f

f11(X1) + f12(X2) + f13(X3) + f14(X4)
f21(X1) + f22(X2) + f23(X3) + f24(X4)
f31(X1) + f32(X2) + f33(X3) + f34(X4)
f41(X1) + f42(X2) + f43(X3) + f44(X4)
 . (4.22)
It is crucial to the consistency of model results that the inverse demand function has a
high fit with the point cloud. Therefore, the point cloud is approximated by a function
using a least-squares approach. A variety of test runs indicate that most of the variation
in price pj can be explained by the Xj of the same year j. This is economically intuitive
since the power plant dispatch is strongly related to the fuel prices of the same time
period. A low demand Xj therefore implies a high pj . Unfortunately, a linear function
does not properly represent the point cloud in most of the simulations. Among a va-
riety of functional forms, the inverse tangens hyperbolicus, also used by Abada (2012)
performs best in modeling the component fjj . Furthermore, part of the price variation
is also related to gas demands of other years: The demand Xj′,(j 6=j′), representing the
inter-temporal relation, also affects pj because of power plant investment. I choose a
linear function for each component fjj′,(j 6=j′).
This yields the following inverse demand function:44
p1
p2
p3
p4
 =

f11(X1) + β12X2 + β13X3 + β14X4
β21X1 + f22(X2) + β23X3 + β24X4
β31X1 + β32X2 + f33(X3) + β34X4
β41X1 + β42X2 + β43X3 + f44(X4)
 (4.23)
44Due to non-linearities, it is beyond the scope of this paper to focus on the mathematical details
of the function. During the simulation, the derived function leads to consistent results for the gas and
power market and has a good solvability using the PATH-solver in GAMS. Therefore the method of
modeling the inter-temporal relations of gas prices and gas demand is used in this paper. Also, the
inter-temporal approach is presented here since this topic has been hardly addressed in the literature
thus far.
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with
fii(Xi) = αi +
1
γi
ath(
δi −Xi
δi
) (4.24)
and αi, βij , γi, δi as parameters. The parameter values are optimized in a non-linear
problem with the objective of deriving the demand function that best fits the point cloud
of samples. Therefore, the sum of squared deviations between modeled and sampled
prices is minimized.
4.3.3.3 Implementing the Inverse Gas Demand Function in COLUMBUS
The inverse demand function is used to model a Cournot oligopoly in COLUMBUS. We
assume that there are kk∈K oligopolistic gas exporters supplying a total of Xi in period
i. The term xki is the output of each player k and C
k
i (x
k
i ) is the respective cost function.
Each player maximizes the following profit function for ii∈1...4 time periods:
max
xki
Πk =
4∑
i=1
pix
k
i − Cki (xki ), with pi = pi(X1, . . . , X4) and Xi =
∑
k∈K
xki . (4.25)
Taking the first derivative with respect to xki yields the following first-order condition
(FOC), with λki (x
k
i ) being marginal supply costs, i.e., the player-specific costs of trans-
port, production and infrastructure scarcity rents:
∂Πk
∂xki
= pi +
∑
j∈1...4
∂pj
∂xki
xki − λki (xki ). (4.26)
Thus, the FOC takes into account the changing output xki affecting the prices pj of all
time periods. For the specific inverse demand function used in this simulation (Equation
4.23), the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition is implemented in the model:
−pi − x
k
i(
δi−Xi
δi
)2 (− 1γiδi
)
−
∑
i 6=j
βjix
k
i + λ
k
i (x
k
i ) ≥ 0 ⊥ xki ≥ 0. (4.27)
Besides including the output decision of each player in COLUMBUS, it is necessary to
include the inverse demand function. Two equations are required. The first one balances
the firm-individual output xki and the total output Xi. The total output can also be
interpreted as total demand since in COLUMBUS total annual demand and supply have
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to be equal. Therefore, the dual variable is the price pi,∑
i
xki = Xi ⊥ pi free . (4.28)
The second equation balances the price variable pi and the price function depending on
Xj , (j ∈ 1 . . . 4). The dual variable is Xi,
pi = αi +
1
γi
ath(
δi −Xi
δi
) +
∑
j,j 6=i
βijXj ⊥ Xi free . (4.29)
4.3.3.4 Deriving the Consistent Market Outcome
Running the COLUMBUS model using the inverse demand function derived from DI-
MENSION yields equilibrium gas prices (p1, p2, p3, p4)
∗ and equilibrium gas demand
(X1, X2, X3, X4)
∗. The equilibrium gas prices are henceforth used as input fuel prices
for the DIMENSION model. Running DIMENSION yields the total power sector gas
demand (Xˆ1, Xˆ2, Xˆ3, Xˆ4). The higher the fit between the gas demand from the COLUM-
BUS and the DIMENSION models, the more consistent the model results with respect to
the interaction of gas and power markets will be. If the fit is insufficient, the procedure
described can be rerun with a higher level of detail, i.e., by simulating more samples
(step 1) in a smaller price range around the equilibrium gas prices. If the fit is sufficient,
the DIMENSION market outcome can be assumed to be consistent to the COLUMBUS
outcome and model results such as the power system costs can be interpreted.45
4.4 Assumptions and Scenarios
4.4.1 Assumptions on the Numerical Analysis
The numerical analysis is conducted with a special focus on 11 European countries46
for the time range between 2013 and 2040. Whereas the COLUMBUS model, which
accounts for the entire global gas market, is only run once per scenario, the electricity
market model DIMENSION has to be run once for each gas price sample, i.e., 1000
45Appendix C.1 provides an assessment of the convergence of the COLUMBUS and the DIMENSION
models and shows how the outlined mechanism, i.e., simulating more samples in a smaller price range,
improves the convergence of both models.
46These countries include Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and Switzerland. The choice of these 11 countries was made
because of their importance concerning European CO2 emissions, their location in the center of Europe
and their high gas market integration.
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times per scenario.47 In order to reduce the complexity of DIMENSION and decrease
computation time, the number of simulated countries is hence limited to 11. In total,
these countries make up for 75 % of current CO2 emissions of the European power
sector and half of the current EU-ETS allowances. Since this study focuses on the
power sector, other EU-ETS sectors such as cement production are not included in
the modeling. Thus, this approach implicitly assumes the same marginal costs for the
proportional CO2 reduction of other EU-ETS sectors. Although this is clearly a strong
assumption, it does not qualitatively change the main messages of this analysis.
In this analysis, the DIMENSION model assumes an emissions quota of roughly 200 mil-
lion CO2 allowances for the power sector of the 11 countries in 2050, which equals a 80%
CO2 reduction compared to 2012. The number of allowances is reduced proportionately
over time between 2012 and 2050. The analysis assumes implicitly that emissions certifi-
cates can be traded among those 11 countries. The quota must be achieved for each year,
i.e., the possibility of “banking and borrowing” is excluded. In the basic configuration
of this research, any other climate policy such as national RES subsidies or RES targets
are, in contrast to the current regulation, not included in the simulation. Concerning
the power plant and renewables data, this analysis uses the large-scale database of the
Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne, which contains information
on ca. 4700 power plants – almost the entire European generation capacity including
renewables. The database includes a variety of power plant parameters such as age,
lifetime, efficiency, ramp-up times and current investment and operational costs. Con-
cerning future investment costs, the assumption is made that the investment costs for
mature technologies are constant, whereas costs decrease for new technologies such as
certain renewables. Future investment costs are mainly based on IEA (2013b).
Concerning fuel prices, this analysis is consistent with to the assumptions made in Fu¨rsch
et al. (2012), with the exception of gas prices which are modeled endogenously. In con-
trast, coal prices are exogenous to the model for three reasons: First, there is currently
no dominant player active on the global thermal coal market. Thus, a polypolistic coal
market can be assumed (see, e.g., Tru¨by and Paulus, 2012 or Haftendorn and Holz,
2010). Second, whereas for many natural gas exporters the only sales opportunity is
Europe via pipeline, coal trade via ship or train is much more flexible concerning the de-
mand side. Third, due to the huge mining capacities in China (in particular), the global
coal supply curve is rather flat. If European coal imports were to decline, traditional
coal exporters such as Colombia or Russia could easily shift their exports to China or
India, where they would crowd out domestic production. Although European coal prices
47The number of samples is set to 1000 in this analysis, with results achieving consistent results of
gas and power market models.
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would decrease after a demand drop, the price effect would be negligible compared to
natural gas.
The gas market model COLUMBUS accounts for all major production and demand re-
gions worldwide. The above-mentioned 11 countries are regarded as one demand region.
Therefore, an implicit assumption is made that there is a full gas market integration
among these countries, which is reasonable considering the well-built transport infras-
tructure, in particular, of the Northwest European gas market. The annual exogenous
demand of these 11 countries, which is composed of the sectoral demand for power,
heat and industry, is corrected for the power demand. The power demand is modeled
by the demand functions derived through DIMENSION. The heat and industry gas de-
mand functions are assumed to be exogenous. These assumptions as well as the future
demand for other countries worldwide follow the IEA (2013b) and IEA (2013a). Pa-
rameters on existing infrastructure and production capacities are identical to those of
Growitsch, Hecking, and Panke (2014), in which the authors provide a calibration of
the model based on historic data. Future production and infrastructure capacities are
derived endogenously in the model. However, to account for political or geographical
limitations or the resource endowment of supply countries, potential investment in pro-
duction and infrastructure assets are limited, in line with the future projections of IEA
(2013b). Two assumptions are of particular importance for the degree of competition
in Europe: First, potential LNG exports from the USA and Canada amount to 60 bcm
for 2020 and 200 bcm for 2040.48 Second, gas trade from Iran and Iraq via Turkey to
Europe is excluded.49 More detailed information concerning model parameters of the
DIMENSION and COLUMBUS models are provided in Appendix C.3.
4.4.2 Scenario Setting
To investigate the hypotheses H1 to H3, this study assesses three scenarios of different
climate policy regimes in the European power sector. In the scenario “Reference”, the
only active carbon abatement policy is the EU-ETS. In particular and in contrast to
the current real-world regulation, there are no additional RES subsidies such as national
feed-in-tariffs in place. The scenario “Coal Tax (CT)” assumes the presence of a coal tax
in addition to the EU-ETS. The coal tax is raised for each thermal megawatt-hour of hard
48The parameter “potential LNG exports” is an upper boundary on the capacity of LNG export
terminals. Hence, this parameter does not necessarily match the exports derived by the model since the
model could regard investment or LNG exports to be uneconomical. Furthermore, LNG exports from
North America would not necessarily affect the European gas market, since they could also be attracted
by Asian importers.
49Even though Iran and Iraq are endowed with substantial natural gas resources, future gas sales to
Europe are highly uncertain due to the current political situation and the need for transport infrastruc-
ture.
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coal burned to generate power. The tax is identical for each of the countries considered.
A tax of 10 EUR2010/MWhth and a tax of 20 EUR2010/MWhth are simulated. The
scenario “Fixed RES Bonus (FB)” assumes a fixed bonus subsidy that is paid to the
operator of a renewable power plant for each megawatt-hour of electricity generated.
The fixed bonus is independent of technology and location. Fixed bonus subsidies of 5,
10, 20 and 30 EUR2010/MWhel are simulated.
In order to examine hypothesis H4, each of the three scenarios is derived in an additional
variant that assumes a different market structure of the gas market: In a fictitious case,
I assume a cartel of Norway and Russia. Even though this assumption is not necessarily
realistic from a gas market point of view, the sole purpose of this setting is to assess the
effects of a higher degree of market power.
4.5 Results of the Numerical Analysis
The simulation results are discussed in four parts: First, I focus on the effects of climate
policies on the power market gas demand functions and the resulting equilibrium gas
prices. Secondly, the policy effects on power generation by fuel type are discussed.
Thirdly, I compare the overall power system costs of the different scenarios with a special
focus on the cost effects as discussed in Section 4.2.3. Fourth, I analyze the effects of
changing gas market power on the power system costs.
4.5.1 Gas Demand Functions and Equilibrium Gas Prices
Figure 4.6 shows the effects of renewable subsidies on gas demand functions for the
years 2015, 2020, 2030 and 2040. “REF” labels reference scenario and “FB10” and
“FB20” label a fixed bonus payment of 10 EUR2010/MWhel and 20 EUR2010/MWhel,
respectively. The point clouds illustrate gas price/demand combinations simulated by
the power market model DIMENSION. The black lines show the approximated demand
functions.50 The yellow square shows the equilibrium gas price/demand combination
for the respective year and scenario resulting from the gas market simulation by the
COLUMBUS model.
50Since the demand function for each scenario is four-dimensional, the dimensionality has to be reduced
in order to show it graphically. For the year 2015, for example, the function drawn shows the relation
between the gas price and the quantity of the year 2015. In this figure, the other quantities for the years
2020, 2030 and 2040 are set to the resulting gas market equilibrium quantities.
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Figure 4.6: Gas Price/Demand Samples, Demand Curves and Gas Market Equilibria
for the Fixed RES Bonus Scenarios
The figure shows a similar effect for all four years. Increasing the renewable subsidy shifts
the gas demand function inwards. In other words, increasing competition by cheaper
renewables decreases the willingness-to-pay for natural gas of the power sector. The shift
in the demand curve changes the resulting gas market equilibrium. An increasing fixed
bonus for renewables increases the equilibrium gas demand and decreases gas prices.
This effect is unambiguous for all subsidy scenarios and all years although the price
decrease is very weak for the year 2020.
Figure 4.7 is identical to figure 4.6 but illustrates the effects of a coal tax on the gas
demand functions and the resulting gas market equilibria. “CT10” and “CT20” label
coal tax scenarios of 10 EUR2010/MWhth and 20 EUR2010/MWhth, respectively. In
particular for the years 2015 and 2020, fuel competition between coal and natural gas
becomes more intensive because of the coal tax. For this reason, in CT10 and CT20,
the power sector becomes very sensitive with regard to natural gas prices. Even though
gas demand in equilibrium increases substantially, the gas price decreases. This can be
explained by lower oligopoly markups of gas producers because of the less steep and
more price elastic demand function induced by the coal tax. For the years 2030 and
2040 the elasticity is not affected as much. Thus, the gas market equilibria show that
gas consumption and gas prices increase with the coal tax.
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Figure 4.7: Gas Price/Demand Samples, Demand Curves and Gas Market Equilibria
for the Coal Tax Scenarios
With regard to hypothesis H1, the results confirm the intuition that renewable subsidies
cause a decrease in gas prices. Concerning the coal tax the picture is more diffuse.
Although in 2030 and 2040 a coal tax causes an increase in gas prices, the example of
the year 2015 has provided a valuable exception: If a policy significantly changes the
gas demand elasticity, the resulting price effect can contradict to H1 because of the
oligopolistic gas market structure.
4.5.2 Effects of Climate Policies on Power Generation
Figure 4.8 depicts the effects on power generation by fuel type when a fixed bonus
of 20 EUR2010/MWhel for renewables is introduced. As shown in Section 4.2, such a
subsidy has both a direct effect (labeled “Dir.”) and an indirect effect (labeled “Ind.”)
on power generation. The direct effect is derived by comparing the power generation
of the Reference scenario xREF (gREF ) with the power generation of the fixed RES
Bonus scenario (FB), but applying the equilibrium gas prices of the Reference scenario
(xFB20(gREF )). Thus,
xdir = xFB20(gREF )− xREF (gREF ). (4.30)
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The indirect effect, which is induced by a changing gas market price, is derived by
comparing xFB20(gREF ) to xFB20(gFB20). Thus,
xind = xFB20(gFB20)− xFB20(gREF ). (4.31)
Figure 4.8: Effects of a Fixed RES Bonus on Power Generation by Fuel Type
As expected from the stylized model described in Section 4.2, the direct effect of a
subsidy under the EU-ETS is an increasing generation of renewables and cheap, but
CO2-intensive, coal and lignite. Gas-fired generation decreases. As discussed in Section
4.5.1, gas prices in equilibrium decrease when a subsidy is introduced. Therefore, the
indirect effect of a subsidy via the gas price is an increasing gas-fired generation, whereas
generation from renewables, coal and lignite decreases. However, the overall effect is a
decreasing gas-fired generation.
Figure 4.9 illustrates the effects of a 10 EUR2010/MWhth coal tax on power generation.
The direct effect of a coal tax is a fuel switch from coal to gas. It can be observed that
renewable generation also decreases, for example in 2020. Since coal-fired generation is
replaced by gas, the CO2 emissions price decreases, which causes gas to replace renewable
generation. The indirect quantity effect is in line with the observations of Section 4.5.1.
In 2015, the decreasing gas price leads to another increase in gas-fired generation. From
2020 onwards, the indirect effect is very weak because of the low price effect (2020, 2030)
and the low demand elasticity (2040).
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Figure 4.9: Effects of a Coal Tax on Power Generation by Fuel Type
4.5.3 Power System Cost Effects of Climate Policies
The power system costs are defined as the relevant costs for dispatch and investment
decisions, i.e., fuel costs, fixed operation and maintenance costs and investment costs
for new power plants. Subsidy expenses are added to the costs, and tax revenues are
subtracted. In this analysis, the costs are summed up for the time range between 2013
and 2040 at a discount rate of 10%.51
Figure 4.10 illustrates the cost effects of the fixed bonus RES subsidy and coal tax
scenarios. As shown in Section 4.2, the cost difference between the two scenarios can
be subdivided into a direct quantity effect (Cdir), an indirect quantity effect (C
q
ind) and
an indirect price effect (Cpind). In the example of the scenario FB20, the direct quantity
effect is derived by comparing the costs of scenario FB20 with the Reference scenario,
with both scenarios assuming the gas price of the Reference scenario, gREF :
Cdir = CFB20(gREF )− CREF (gREF ). (4.32)
The sum of the indirect quantity effect and the indirect price effect is derived by
comparing the costs of the FB20 scenario using the price of the Reference scenario,
51Clearly, the discount rate is crucial for results of the numerical simulation in Section 4.5. Although
the assumed discount rate affects the magnitude of the simulation results, the effects derived in Section
4.2 remain qualitatively the same. To provide the reader some insight on the sensitivity of the discount
rate on the simulation results, Appendix C.2 presents an analysis assuming a discount rate of 3%.
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CFB20(gREF ), to the costs of the FB20 scenario using the gas price of the FB20 sce-
nario, CFB20(gFB20). Thus,
Cxind + C
p
ind = CFB20(gFB20)− CFB20(gREF ). (4.33)
The indirect price effect is derived as the gas price difference between scenario FB20
and the Reference scenario multiplied by the gas consumption of the power sector in the
FB20 scenario, xFB20G :
Cpind = (gFB20 − gREF )xFB20G . (4.34)
As discussed in the previous section a coal tax in the power sector causes a deviation from
the cost efficient power generation under the no-tax case. Hence, the direct cost effect
of a coal tax is positive, as Figure 4.10 illustrates. In the CT10 scenario, where a coal
tax causes gas prices to both increase and decrease (depending on the year), the indirect
quantity effect is positive. In other words, changing gas prices forces power generation
to deviate from the cost-optimal generation even more than seen in the direct effect.
However, the costs of gas purchases decrease, i.e., the indirect price effect reduces costs.
Yet, in total, power system costs in the CT10 scenario are higher than in the reference
case. In the CT20 scenario, except for the year 2015, gas prices increase. Therefore,
a higher gas price increases the costs of gas purchased by the power sector, i.e., the
indirect price effect is positive. Hence, these numerical results confirm hypothesis H2:
A coal tax increases overall power system costs.
Figure 4.10: Power System Cost Effects of Different Levels of Coal Taxes and RES
Subsidies
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With regard to fixed bonus RES subsidies, Figure 4.10 reveals that the direct cost effect
of such a subsidy is positive and increases with the subsidy. However, since the subsidy
causes the gas price to decrease, the indirect quantity effect reduces the additional costs
incurred by the direct quantity effect. Nonetheless, the sum of both the direct and
indirect quantity effect is positive. However, the indirect price effect of a subsidy, i.e.,
decreasing costs of gas purchased by the power sector, overcompensates the quantity
effects. Therefore, this numerical simulation of the European power and gas market
confirms hypothesis H3: A fixed bonus RES subsidy may decrease overall power system
costs because of the gas price reaction.
4.5.4 Cost Effects of Supply-side Concentration on the Gas Market
A higher supply side concentration on the gas market is simulated by a fictitious cartel
of Norway and Russia. For the scenarios FB20 and the CT10, Figure 4.11 compares
the gas price reaction (i.e., the price differences to the respective REF scenario) under
the standard gas market structure (STANDARD) with the cartel (CARTEL).52 The
gas price reduction in the FB20 scenario is higher in the case of the cartel than in the
standard case for each year. In the Coal Tax scenario CT10, the gas price reduction in
the cartel case is lower in 2015 than in the standard case, whereas the gas price increase
in the years 2020 and 2030 is higher.
Figure 4.11: Effects of Higher Market Power of Gas Suppliers on Gas Prices
52For the other scenarios, the results are qualitatively the same.
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These price reactions explain the cost effects when different gas supply-side structures
are assumed (see Figure 4.12). In the RES subsidy scenarios, the higher price decrease
causes a higher indirect price effect such that the overall power system cost reduction
is higher in the CARTEL case than in the STANDARD case. In the coal tax scenarios,
the opposite holds. To sum up, with regard to hypothesis H4, a higher market power in
the gas market amplifies the discussed effects.
Figure 4.12: Effects of Higher Market Power of Gas Suppliers on Power System Costs
4.6 Conclusions
This research has discussed how a coal tax and a fixed bonus RES subsidy in combination
with a CO2 emissions quota affects power system costs. Since climate policies influence
gas demand of the power sector and hence, gas prices, this research explicitly accounts
for the interactions between the power and the gas market. In a stylized theoretical
model using the example of a fixed bonus RES subsidy, I have identified three effects of
the subsidy on power system costs. First, a subsidy directly affects power generation by
fuel type and therefore system costs (direct effect). Second, since the subsidy affects gas
prices, it also affects power generation by fuel type via the gas price, an effect referred
to as the indirect quantity effect. The subsidy affecting gas prices also causes an indirect
price effect, i.e., changing gas prices affect the purchase costs per unit of natural gas
consumed by the power sector.
Applying a numerical simulation model and integrating the power and gas market in a
case study for 11 relevant European countries, I draw 4 main findings. First, a coal tax
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influences gas prices ambiguously, depending on the effect of a coal tax on gas demand
elasticity. On the contrary, a fixed bonus RES subsidy decreases gas prices for each
of the simulated subsidy levels. Second, a coal tax results in tax distortions, i.e., it
increases power system costs even at constant gas prices (direct effect). Since a coal
tax affects gas prices ambiguously, the overall power system costs increase, even when
accounting for the indirect quantity and price effects. Third, the simulation results
reveal that a fixed bonus RES subsidy can decrease overall power system costs: On the
one hand, the subsidy increases costs given fixed gas prices (direct effect); yet, on the
other hand, the subsidy decreases gas prices such that the indirect quantity and price
effects overcompensate the direct effect. Fourth, when a higher level of market power of
gas suppliers is assumed, the overall effect of higher market power on power system costs
is amplified. Concerning a coal tax, the simulation results show that a higher degree
of market power further increases costs, whereas, concerning a RES subsidy, it further
decreases costs. The assumed discount rate of future costs has proven to be a crucial
parameter, which affects these results quantitatively, however not qualitatively.
This analysis has focused solely on the effects of climate policies on the power system
costs of 11 select European countries. In particular, decreasing power system costs
through a fixed RES bonus do not imply that this subsidy makes CO2 abatement more
efficient. The reason for decreasing power system costs are the decreasing expenditures
of power utilities for the gas purchased, which come at the disadvantage of gas suppliers,
whose revenues decline. In other words, introducing the subsidy redistributes welfare
from players in the gas market to players or end consumers in the power market, as well as
to suppliers of coal or renewable technologies. Even though the discussed subsidy would
cause an inefficient allocation of primary energy use in the power sector and, hence,
higher CO2 abatement costs, European policy makers could have a sound motivation
to establish a fixed RES bonus subsidy: in order to redistribute welfare from the most
important gas suppliers such as Russia, Norway, Algeria or Qatar to market participants
of the European power market, i.e., power producers or end users.
This research has pointed out that the evaluation of climate policies in the power sector
should take into account the upstream markets and their market structure. The main
focus was a discussion of the power system cost effects of climate policies in due consid-
eration of the interdependencies of the power and gas market. Yet, it is important to
stress that this study does not provide a comprehensive assessment of climate policies,
for several reasons. First, the sole objective of this study is to determine the minimal
power system costs. Regarding the coal tax, the tax could aim at further objectives
other than efficient CO2 abatement. Other policy objectives could justify higher costs
from a coal tax. Second, this research only assesses two policies and simulates a set-
ting in which there are no other climate policies in place. In reality, there is a variety
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of (national) climate policies which could affect gas prices differently or interact with
other policies. In particular, the study does not say that the current regime of national
technology-specific RES subsidies decreases power system costs. Third, even though
the study reveals cost reduction potentials of a technology-neutral and location-neutral
RES subsidy, it remains an open question whether there may be another policy regime
that further decreases gas prices and, therefore, power system costs. As such, an EU
energy union is often discussed as a mean to decrease gas purchasing costs. However,
the main flaw of such a measure, the threat of downstream cartelization, is avoided by a
RES subsidy. Fourth, the dynamic effects of climate policies, such as a higher or lower
technological progress because of a subsidy, are not investigated in this research. Fifth,
efficiency gains and losses in other related markets such as the gas, coal or renewables
market have not been assessed. All of the five outlined aspects could motivate interesting
extensions to this paper.

Chapter 5
Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost
Curves of the Residential Heating
Market – a Microeconomic
Approach
5.1 Introduction
The social costs of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as a global externality are more
and more spotlighted in the worldwide public discussion. Since the UNCED53 in Rio de
Janeiro 1992, but latest since the Stern Review (Stern, 2007) and the IPCC report on
climate change in 2007 (IPCC, 2007), politicians, engineers, ecologists and economists
argue about optimal strategies of GHG avoidance. Consequently, national objectives
and policies for GHG abatement have been introduced in the last years. Besides the
emissions produced by major polluters such as the power sector, a significant part of
overall emissions stem from small emittents such as households.
In particular, heat provision in residential buildings can play a major role for GHG abate-
ment. Besides enhancing thermal insulation, the replacement of inefficient and carbon
intense heating systems holds a huge potential of GHG emission reduction. However,
GHG abatement in the residential sector is challenging as the total GHG emissions is
the aggregated result of millions of households’ individual decisions on heating systems
and building insulation. Each household faces a different investment decision: Monetary
53United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
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costs of the heating system in terms of initial investment, maintenance or fuel consump-
tion are an important factor, yet not the only one; the household utility from a heating
system is driven as well by its habits and preferences. Thus, besides monetary costs
there is a variety of non-observable factors which influence the investment decision in a
heating system.
In order to incentivize GHG reduction in the residential sector, subsidies and carbon
taxes are two prominent policy measures to affect the monetary costs and thus the
investment decision of a household. However, these policy measures impose costs: not
solely monetary for technical equipment, but also in terms of welfare losses due to tax
and subsidy distortions. To quantify total social costs of emission reduction, our paper
aims at deducing a welfare-based GHG abatement cost curve of the residential heating
sector, thereby accounting for costs, characteristics and preferences of households.
Our methodology comprises three steps: First, we develop DIscHEat, an economic mi-
crosimulation model of the German heat market for the years 2010 to 2030. The model
is an innovate approach since it combines a dynamic bottom-up model (see, for instance,
Stadler et al., 2007) with a discrete choice model. The evolution of heating systems in
German residential buildings over time is simulated in a bottom-up model. The bottom-
up model itself includes a discrete choice model which derives probabilities for heating
system choices of households based on the costs of heat provision and household char-
acteristics. Second, we derive analytically how the adoption of technologies takes place
based on heating costs and household characteristics in a theoretical discrete choice
framework.54 We show how this diffusion process is affected by public policies and its
impact on GHG abatement. The discrete choice approach further enables us deriving
different welfare measures such as the compensating variation and excess burden (Dia-
mond and McFadden, 1974, McFadden, 1999, Small and Rosen, 1981), which we use to
develop welfare based GHG abatement curves. Third, we apply DIscHEat to investi-
gate the impact of different GHG abatement policies on newly installed heating systems
and GHG abatement until 2030, namely a carbon tax and a subsidy regime. A carbon
tax, for example, increases the monetary costs of carbon intense technologies, thereby
c.p. reducing their installations and consequently curbing carbon emissions. From that
we deduce welfare-based GHG abatement curves of the investigated policies, thereby
accounting for household individual characteristics.
To conduct our analysis, we choose Germany as an exemplary case for two reasons: first,
the insulation level of domestic buildings is already very high and further insulation is
very cost-intense in terms of GHG abatement compared to the installation of new heating
54See for example Train (2003) for an overview of discrete choice approaches on which we base our
framework.
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systems (Buildings Performance Institute Europe (BPIE), 2011, IEA, 2011a). Second,
since more than 90% of all residential buildings are heated decentrally, the households’
individual heating system decisions have a strong impact on the total GHG emissions.
Both aspects underline the importance to account for the household individual decisions
on investment in heating systems.55
Several studies have already adressed pollution abatement curves based on welfare ef-
fects of environmental taxes using a general-equilibrium approach (Ballard and Medema,
1993, Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996). In addition to these studies on the macro-level,
among the analyses on the micro-level most studies are mainly technical thereby focus-
ing on the technical equipment costs (Kavgic et al., 2010, Swan and Ugursal, 2009). One
example of such technology-based approach is a recently published study by McKinsey
& Company, Inc. (2009), which identifies significant energy savings with low costs for
society. Huntington (2011) discusses the overestimation of the reduction potential in
the McKinsey & Company, Inc. (2009) study, which results from assuming adoption
rates of technologies of 100%. In an aggregated approach Huntington (2011) shows that
accounting for the households’ behavior and their reactions on policy measures would
revise the GHG abatement curves downwards as well as by including policy costs. There
are microeconomic analyses that investigate the impact of environmental policies: Tra
(2010) evaluates the benefits of air quality improvements in a discrete choice locational
equilibrium model that accounts for welfare impacts of policy interventions in a mi-
croeconomic context. However, to date there are few attempts to derive microeconomic
GHG abatement curves that account for household individual investment decisions. Our
paper fills this gap.
In the light of current literature, our paper contributes to energy economics and its ana-
lytical and numerical literature in two ways: First, it extends earlier work by analytically
deriving a GHG abatement cost curve based on household preferences and welfare losses
on externalities in a microeconomic setting. Second, the paper extends the literature by
developing a numerical microsimulation combining a bottom-up approach with an em-
pirical discrete choice estimation. Our paper thus combines the strengths of analytical
and numerical approaches.
Our results, first, confirm the implications of Huntington’s paper suggesting that welfare-
based GHG abatement curves run above technical cost curves. Thus, accounting for
household specific characteristics and their reactions on policy measures implies greater
costs for society than pure technical equipment costs. Second, our results suggest that
55Because GHG abatement costs for insulation measures are so high in Germany, for simplification,
we exclude the households’ decisions on thermal insulation from our analysis.
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in most cases a carbon tax causes less welfare losses than subsidies on technology invest-
ments. However, third, in case that households are not utility maximizers, subsidies on
investments might be reasonable.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section provides a brief overview of previous
research. In Section 5.3, we present the microsimulation model DIscrHEat. In Section
5.4 we derive microeconomic GHG abatement cost curves in a theoretical approach.
Section 5.5 presents our results, first, in Section 5.5.1 on the effects of the policies on
GHG abatement and the diffusion of technologies. Second, Section 5.5.2 presents the
welfare impacts of the different policies to lastly derive GHG abatement cost curves
numerically. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Previous Research
There are two strands of literature which are related to our paper. The first strand is
on energy demand modeling in general. There are a variety of studies that model the
energy demand of the private sector and that identify drivers of energy consumption and
energy efficiency. Swan and Ugursal (2009) and Kavgic et al. (2010) give an overview
of different bottom-up models and models to analyze residential energy consumption,
i.e. mainly technology-based energy demand modeling approaches. These bottom-up
models are based on extensive disaggregated data and components that influence energy
demand on an individual detailed level. This model type is often applied to identify
cost-efficient technology options for achieving certain GHG emission abatement targets.
There are also a variety of top-down models that focus on rather macroeconomic rela-
tionships. These models use aggregated empirical data to investigate the interrelation
of the energy sector and the economy as a whole by variables like GDP, income, temper-
ature and prices of energy carriers. Mansur et al. (2008) analyze the impact of climate
change on energy demand and welfare in the US applying a discrete-continous model of
fuel choice and energy consumption. They find a potential increase of American energy
expenditures and welfare losses caused by temperature rise. Madlener (1996) provides an
overview of the different time-series based methodologies applied to analyze residential
energy demand. Rehdanz (2007) examines the determinants of household expenditures
on space heating and hot water supply in Germany based on panel data and covers a
number of socio-economic characteristics of households along with dwelling character-
istics. Braun (2010) examines building, socio-economic and regional characteristics in
a discrete choice model focusing on space heating technologies applied by households
but not on the heating system choice in terms of new heating system installations.
Michelsen and Madlener (2012) conduct a survey about heating system installations to
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analyze the influence of preferences about residential heating system specific attributes
on the adoption decision in a discrete choice estimation.
The second strand of related literature focuses on numerical approaches to the deduction
of GHG abatement costs. The literature on GHG abatement modeling can be categorized
into general equilibrium modeling approaches and technical models. Bovenberg and
Goulder (1996) develop an emission abatement curve based on marginal welfare costs in
a general equilibrium setting. Nordhaus (2011) and Pearce (2003) determine different
social damage costs of GHG. Morris et al. (2008) apply a general equilibrium model to
compute marginal abatement costs and marginal welfare costs for different GHG prices.
They argue that the marginal abatement costs in their model reflect the shadow prices
on the GHG constraint on certain countries or sectors. This is interpretable as a price
that would be obtained under an allowance market that developed under a cap and trade
system. They come to the conclusion that these marginal abatement costs are not closely
related to the marginal welfare costs. The marginal abatement costs of their model vary
over countries and are sometimes above and sometimes below the marginal welfare costs
and therefore they conclude that they should not be used to derive estimates of welfare
change.
A recent study on GHG abatement curves on the micro-level has been published by
McKinsey & Company, Inc. (2009) which establishes a cost-efficient GHG abatement
curve for different energy efficiency measures. Huntington (2011) discusses how the
McKinsey & Company, Inc. (2009) study might overestimate the reduction potential.
According to Huntington (2011), McKinsey & Company, Inc. (2009) neglect the actual
investment decisions of private households assuming adoption rates of technologies of
100%. In reality, a new technology might not be cost-efficient for everyone even if it
is cost-efficient for the average consumer. In addition, the adoption and diffusion of
technologies proceeds slowly in general. Huntington (2011) also mentions the exclusion
of the households’ reactions to the introduction of policy measures and the exclusion of
policy costs in the McKinsey & Company, Inc. (2009) study. Introducing basic assump-
tions to these additional costs and impacts on the GHG abatement curve, Huntington
(2011) revises the curve to highlight implications for policymakers if they base their
decisions on a what he calls ”out-of-pocket” technology based cost curve.
5.3 DIscrHEat – a Microsimulation of the Heating Market
In the following, we develop DIscrHEat (DIscrete choice HEat market simulation model)
which is a dynamic simulation model for the German heat market of private households.
It simulates the development of installed heating systems and insulation levels of German
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dwellings until 2030. This approach contributes to literature by combining a dynamic
bottom-up model with a discrete choice approach. The development of residential build-
ings and their heating systems is modeled in a bottom-up model in discrete time periods
(see Section 5.3.1). The change of the heating systems in residential buildings, i.e. the
households’ choice for a certain heating technology is derived by a discrete choice model
(see Section 5.3.2), which has been estimated using a unique dataset (see Section 5.3.3).
5.3.1 A Dynamic Bottom-up Model of the Heating Market
The set of residential buildings, or dwellings, Dy evolves in discrete periods of time
y (y ∈ {1, ..., Y }). The set of residential buildings comprises a complete-disjunctive
subset of dwellings D˜n,j,y differing by heating technology j (j ∈ {1, ..., J}), i.e., oil-,
gas-, pellet-heaters and heat pumps, and household categories n (n ∈ {1, ..., N}) (e.g.,
single dwellings built between 1900 and 1920), and:
Dy =
⋃
n,j,y
D˜n,j,y (5.1)
The number of dwellings being element of D˜n,j,y is labeled dn,j,y. In each period y,
some of the dn,j,y dwellings have to modernize their heating system, defined by the
exogenous modernization rate rn,y. Those dwellings are represented by d
−
n,j,y, whereas
those dwellings, which do not modernize their heating system, are represented by dˆn,j,y,
i.e.:
d−n,j,y = rn,y ∗ dn,j,y (5.2)
and
dˆn,j,y = (1− rn,y) ∗ dn,j,y (5.3)
.
The dwellings d−n,i,y, replace their old heating technology i (i ∈ {1, ..., J}) by a new
technology j according to a dwelling-category specific probability rate Pn,j,y. E.g., an
old gas-heater can be replaced by a new gas-heater or a household may choose a heat
pump instead. The probability rate, i.e., the technology choice is derived in a discrete
choice model (discussed below). After modernizing, the dwellings are grouped by d+n,j,y,
i.e.:
d+n,j,y = Pn,j,y ∗
∑
i∈J
d−n,i,y (5.4)
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Now, we are able to model the process for each dwelling category dn,j,y, i.e. the changing
of the household/technology stock from y to y + 1:
dn,j,y+1 = dˆn,j,y + d
+
n,j,y − d−n,j,y (5.5)
5.3.2 Modeling the Technology Choice
As stated before, the probability Pn,j,y, i.e. the heating technology choice is derived in
a discrete choice approach. The probability Pn,j,y is a function of the annual heating
system costs cn,j,y
56 and some specific characteristics zn for each household category:
Pn,j,y = f(cn,j,y, zn) (5.6)
The annual system costs cn,j,y are a function of the investment costs in,j,y, the energy
consumption en,j,y, the energy price pj,y. All parameters depend on the time period of
installation y to account for technological progress affecting investment costs as well as
efficiency (i.e., energy consumption). Concerning the energy price, we further assume
that each household has no knowledge about future energy prices and expects them to
be constant over time.57 Hence total life-cycle costs Cn,j,y (net present value) over the
future utilization time periods s of the technology are:
Cn,j,y =
s+l∑
s
(in,j,y ∗ ar,l + en,j,y ∗ pj,y) 1
(1 + r)s
(5.7)
with ar,l being the annuity factor depending on the discount rate r and the economic
lifetime l being identical for each technology.
Investment costs and energy consumption are fixed for the future utilization and future
energy prices as households expect them to be constant. Thus, life-cycle costs Cn,j,y
simplify to:
Cn,j,y = cn,j,y ∗ l ∗
s+l∑
s
1
(1 + r)s
(5.8)
56We do not consider the impact of policy measures on the number of investments, but only on
the structure of heating system choices. Therefore, the annual heating system costs, accounting for
investment costs and future energy savings, are relevant for the heating system choices. However the
split of investment costs and future energy savings is irrelevant. Based on IWU / BEI (2010), we argue
that households only change their heating system when it is broken. Finding explanations for this
behaviour is open for further research.
57We assume households to not have perfect foresight and that they have bounded rationality. Hence,
only current energy prices are included in their considerations and future energy price developments are
not accounted for.
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with cn,j,y = in,j,y ∗ ar,l + en,j,y ∗ pj,y. Assuming an identical economic lifetime for each
technology, the life-cycle cost ratio of two technologies is, hence, fully explained by the
ratio of annual heating costs.
For the further analysis, cn,j,y also depends on two policy measures that we model (which
are constant over time) – Pigovian carbon taxes Tj , increasing the energy price pj,y, and
subsidies on the investment Sj , decreasing in,j,y.
58 Thus:
cn,j,y = f(in,j,y, en,j,y, pj,y, Tj , Sj) (5.9)
In the following discussion we leave out the time index y to reduce complexity of no-
tations. However, all decisions modeled depend on the time y when the decision is
made.
Based on the alternative-specific conditional logit model, first presented by McFadden
(1976, 1974), the indirect utility Un,j of each household of category n that chooses
between different technologies j is given by:
Un,j = Vn,j + n,j (5.10)
Vn,j is the observable utility of a household of category n, which installs technology j,
whereas n,j captures further factors that influence the utility but are not in Vn,j . Vn,j
is:
Vn,j = αj + βcn,j + γjzn (5.11)
with αj being an alternative-specific constant that give an extra value to each technol-
ogy. β represents the negative total annual system cost impact and γj is a vector of
technology-specific impacts on the household characteristics. We get:
Un,j = αj + βcn,j + γjzn + n,j (5.12)
The choice of a household of category n can be described as a dummy variable yn,j :
yn,j =
1, if Un,j > Un,i ∀i 6= j0, else (5.13)
58For more details, Appendix D.1 shows a more detailed specification of the annual heating costs cn,j,y
and the impact of Tj and Sj .
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The choice probability that determines the diffusion process of a technology is defined
as:
Pn,j = Prob(yn,j = 1) = Prob(Un,j − Un,i > 0, ∀i 6= j)
= Prob(n,i − n,j < Vn,j − Vn,i ∀i 6= j) (5.14)
where n,i, n,j ∼ iid extreme value, n,i − n,j has a logistic distribution59 and only
the difference between two utility levels has an impact on the choice probability and not
the absolute utility level.
The probability that a household of category n chooses alternative j is60:
Pn,j =
eVn,j∑
i e
Vn,i
=
eαj+βcn,j+γjzn∑
i e
αi+βcn,i+γizn
(5.15)
This determines the proportion of installations of technology j among the new systems
chosen by household type n.
Own cost changes and those of alternative heating systems affect the choice probabilities
of a heating system. These cost impacts on the choice probability of a heating system can
be described in terms of elasticities. The elasticity of a household’s choice probability
with respect to heating costs of the system j that he chooses is given by:
∂Pn,j
∂cn,j
cn,j
Pn,j
= β(1− Pn,j)cn,j < 0 (5.16)
which is negative because of the negative cost impact β < 0.
The elasticity of a household’s choice probability for j with respect to heating costs of
an alternative system i is given by:
∂Pn,j
∂cn,i
cn,i
Pn,j
= −βPn,icn,i > 0 (5.17)
with i 6= j.
The effects of the model are ceteris paribus and allow for the computation of own and
cross cost elasticities on the diffusion rates of the different technologies, i.e. the choice
probabilities of an alternative, keeping all values fixed. The changes in the total GHG
emission level are determined by the diffusion process.
59The logit model with its elasticities is a standard approach to model the diffusion of technologies.
See for instance Geroski (2000).
60For detailed mathematical derivations and explanations of logit and conditional logit models see
McFadden (1974) and Train (2003).
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The elasticities account for the cost effect β on the technology choice. An advantage of
the inclusion of Pn,j in the elasticities is that changes of Pn,j depend on the current level
of Pn,j .
61 The restricted substitution pattern of the choice probability holds on the indi-
vidual level and is much more flexibel on the aggregated level over all household types.
On the aggregated level, the substitution pattern also accounts for the heterogeneity of
households.
5.3.3 Estimating the Discrete Choice Model
Using data on the structure of newly installed heating systems in Germany in 2010, we
estimate a discrete choice model to identify the effects of the annual costs and further
building characteristics (being a proxy for household income and preferences) that have
an impact on the heating choice of a household.
We thus assume that the probability Pn,j that a representative household n adopts a
heating system characterized by the energy carrier j is a function of the annual heating
system costs and some building characteristics zn: Pn,j = f(cn,j , zn).
62 We addition-
ally define alternative-specific, i.e., energy carrier based variables that could have an
impact on the choice of a specific energy carrier based heating system. We assume the
probability of installing a specific heating system to be different in single and double
than in multiple dwellings and in buildings stemming from different vintage classes63.
Therefore, we include the dummy variable ’single’ z1,n, with 1 for single and double and
0 for multiple dwellings and the variable ’heatdemand’ z2,n, serving as a proxy for the
vintage class64. αj are the alternative-specific constants. β represents the impact of
total annual heating cost per kilowatt hour (kWh) cn,j . γ1,j , γ2,j identify the effects of
the alternative-specific variables.
The indirect utility of household n of the chosen heating system j is:
Vn,j = αj + βcn,j + γ1,jz1,n + γ2,jz2,n (5.18)
61Analyzing the development of the German heat market over the last 60 years indicates that this is
a realistic assumption and that changes resulting from the cost advantages of new heating systems take
place only inertially and based on the number of heating systems of that type that are already installed
BDH (2010), IWU / BEI (2010). The inertia of the heating system stock results from the long life spans
of the heating systems and the fact that heaters are only exchanged when they are broken. Adoption
rates of heating systems that already have a large market share are much higher. The proportional
substitution pattern of conditional logit models is often criticized. In the case of the homogenous good
heat, it seems however to be appropriate. See for instance Train (2003) for a detailed discussion of the
substitution patterns of logit models.
62We use the annual heating costs per unit of heat demand in kilowatt hour (kWh) cn,j because we are
interested in a normalized impact of costs on the choice of a heating system irrespective of the different
dwellings’ total heat demand. As such, we can make them comparable for all buildings. We further
assume that all households of category n have the same dwelling characteristics.
63See Appendix D.4
64By tendency, newer buildings c.p. have a lower heat demand.
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with the choice probability being:
Pn,j =
eVn,j∑
i e
Vn,i
=
eαj+βcn,j+γ1,jz1,n+γ2,jz2,n∑
i e
αi+βcn,i+γ1,iz1,n+γ2,iz2,n
(5.19)
As only the differences of the utilities are of importance for the estimation of the impacts,
we define as base alternative ’gas’ for which γ1,gas, γ2,gas = 0.
Table 5.1 the results of our discrete choice estimation. The cost impact is significant at a
10%-level and as expected the cost impact is strongly negative. 65 All alternative specific
constants are significant at a 1%-level and have a negative impact. Only the biomass
constant is not significant. The negative impact of the alternative specific constants
indicates that the probability to choose either a heat pump, a biomass or oil heater is
less probable than choosing a gas-fueled heating system. This seems realistic because the
market share of gas heaters in Germany is above 50% since the last years and households
tend to have a preference for well-established systems.
Table 5.1: Estimation Results
Number of observations = 11052 Wald chi2( 7) = 303.59
Number of cases = 2763
Log likelihood = -2471.1913 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
choice coef. std. err. z P> |z|
heatingsystem
costs -26.7651 15.7391 -1.70 0.089
biomass
single 1.0193 0.4400 2.32 0.021
heatdemand -0.0167 0.0051 -3.30 0.001
constant -0.7025 0.7290 -0.96 0.335
gas (base alternative)
heatpump
single 1.9561 0.4129 4.74 0.000
heatdemand -0.0203 0.0037 -5.44 0.000
constant -1.3075 0.4355 -3.00 0.003
oil
single -0.4750 0.1514 -3.14 0.002
heatdemand 0.0202 0.0028 7.17 0.000
constant -2.6533 0.6660 -3.98 0.000
Including just dwelling characteristics, we only cover systematic differences of heating
system installations in our model, which however mainly explain the diffusion of heating
systems (see also Braun, 2010). These serve as proxies for the unobservable costs or
65The significance of the cost estimate is only at 10% because the estimation is based on our own
dataset including simplified cost assumptions. For some specific households, additional costs apart
from heating system costs (e.g. switching costs such as costs for network connections etc.) may be
of importance. Data on these costs is not available. Braun (2010) estimates a more detailed discrete
choice model for the German heating market, however, only focusing on household characteristics. Our
paper’s focus is not on the estimation itself. If better data were available, the same approach of deriving
marginal CO2 abatement curves could be implemented based on improved and more detailed choice
estimations.
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other impacts that vary across dwelling types such as additional switching costs or
financing costs66. The results in Table 5.1 show that the choice probability of non-fossil
heating systems biomass and heat pumps is higher in buildings with better insulation
and thus lower heat demand, which usually belong to younger vintage classes. The
choice probability of these heating systems is also significantly higher for single and
double dwellings than for multiple dwellings.
5.4 Deriving Greenhouse Gas Abatement Curves of Poli-
cies
Energy efficiency and GHG abatement policies can have different impacts and purposes.
They can either try to influence the number of low emission investments made by trying
to incentivize the household to invest earlier or more often; or they try to make the
household investing in less greenhouse-gas-intense technologies. For deriving greenhouse
gas abatement curves in this research, we focus on the latter. First, we specify the policies
analyzed in this study (Section 5.4.1). Second, we derive analytically the welfare effects
of a policy in terms of the excess burden (Section 5.4.2) and lastly, we derive analytically
the greenhouse gas abatement curves of policies (Section 5.4.3).
5.4.1 Policy Specification
We use the DIscrHEat model (see Section 5.3) to analyze the diffusion process of newly
installed heating systems until 2030. We distinguish four technologies, i.e., gas-, oil-
and biomass-fired burners as well as heat pumps. Beside a reference case without any
policies, we simulate three policies: A carbon tax and two subsidy regimes.
The first policy to investigate is a Pigovian carbon tax.67 We increase the carbon tax
gradually to achieve higher levels of GHG abatement.68 We consider a carbon tax
Tj in EUR/kWh which equals a carbon tax τ in EUR/t of CO2-equivalents times a
technology-specific conversion factor CFj that converts τ into Tj accounting for the
amount of CO2-equivalents in the different energy carriers. In case of a carbon tax all
households of the stock that have a heat pump, a gas- or an oil-fired heater are thus
affected by such a tax and not only the households that have to make the decision on
their heating system, i.e. have to modernize it. However, our analysis is limited to those
66For instance, Dieckho¨ner (2012a) shows that households with higher income rather live in single
dwellings.
67The carbon tax is a hypothetical policy which is not implemented currently.
68For the assumed emissions of the energy carriers, see Table D.3. We assume that no tax is levied on
biomass.
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households, which exchange their heating system. Thus, in terms of the welfare changes
of a tax only the households who modernize their heating system are relevant.
In addition, we simulate two different subsidy regimes, which both provide subsidies
Sj on newly installed heating systems reducing the investment costs of the respective
systems. For the first subsidy scenario (subsidy I), we implement a simplified version of
the German subsidy system with subsidies on heat pump and biomass heaters. Thereby,
subsidies on biomass are significantly larger.
The second subsidy scenario (subsidy II) is a hypothetical policy scenario. It provides
the same level of subsidies on heat pumps as on biomass heaters and additionally a low
subsidy on gas heating systems. We choose this parametrization subsidizing heat pumps
and natural gas heaters relatively more than in the German system because marginal
abatement costs of biomass heaters are the highest. Contrarily, biomass heaters are
highly subsidized in the German system. Like this we aim to generate a subsidy based
GHG abatement curve that generates lower welfare losses for the first major part of
abatement units (see Table D.6 for the subsidy levels). For both subsidies we increase
these subsidy rates proportionally to effectuate higher GHG abatement.
5.4.2 Welfare Effects of Greenhouse Gas Abatement Policies
The aggregated net utility in our model over all households that change their technology
and install a new one in period (year) y ∈ 2010, ..., 2030 is defined as follows:
Uaggr. =
N,J∑
n,j=1
dn,j ∗ (C + Vn,j) (5.20)
C is a constant positive utility level that is assumed to be the same for all household
types n and indicates the minimum utility of a new technology. C ≥ |Vn,j | by definition
because a new technology needs to be installed when the old one is broken and thus
is assumed to imply a higher utility than costs. The utility Vn,j is negative because it
indicates the cost impact of the essential new systems on the aggregated utility. As for
the welfare analysis only the differences between two aggregated utilities with different
policies are of importance, we can neglect the constant C from now on.
When we introduce a carbon tax which increases the costs of greenhouse-gas-intense
systems to incentivize investments into the lower-emission technologies, the relative an-
nual costs of the different heating systems change. This leads to different investment
decisions. The introduction of such policies, which are not lump-sum, cause welfare
losses even if the tax revenues are redistributed lump-sum. The households that have
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to modernize their systems are elastic but not completely elastic as presented in the
previous section. For simplification, we assume that the supply function for heating
technologies is completely elastic.69 Then, the welfare loss, i.e. the excess burden, is
the difference between the tax revenue and the aggregated compensating variation over
all households. The compensating variation of the introduction of a tax indicates how
much the government needs to pay the households to compensate the resulting cost
increase and keep their original utility level. For a subsidy, the compensating variation
reflects the willingness to pay of the households to keep the subsidy. Therefore, for both
cases, the tax revenue, which could be redistributed to the respective households and
the subsidy expenditure of the government which could be collected from consumers via
a lump-sum tax, must be compared with the respective compensating variation.
The compensating variation CVn for each household of category n is determined for
each period t by an equation based on McFadden (1999) which is a generalization of the
compensating variation of logit models introduced by Small and Rosen (1981).70
To determine the difference in consumer surpluses of the two scenarios with and without
policy measures, we get:
∫ V policyn,j
V no policyn,j
Pn,jdVn,j =
ln∑
j
eαj+βcn,j+γjzn
β
V
policy
n,j
V no policyn,j
(5.21)
The amount of money that is needed to keep the utility level before the policy measures,
i.e., the compensating variation CVn, is then computed as follows:
ln
∑
j
eαj+β(c
policy
n,j −CVn)+γjzn
β
= ln
∑
j
eαi+βc
no policy
n,j +γjzn
β
(5.22)
where cpolicyn,j indicates the respective total annual heating costs of a household of category
n with heating system j including a tax or subsidy and cno policyn,j describes these costs
without any policy measures.
69This assumptions leads to an underestimation of the excess burden. It means that the investment
costs of heating systems and energy prices are not influenced by demand changes of the residential
heating sector. We assume that the residential sector demand is too small to have an impact on energy
prices. The producers of heating systems in Germany sell all types of heaters. Thus, they do not depend
on a specific system and would adapt their product composition according to the changing demand
conditions.
70Tra (2010) provides an application of this discrete choice equilibrium framework to the valuation of
environmental changes.
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Rearranging with respect to CVn yields the formula derived by Small and Rosen (1981)
71:
CVn =
1
β
ln∑
j
exp(V policyn,j )− ln
∑
j
exp(V no policyn,j )

We have to account for the number of households belonging to the same group with
the same building characteristics (
∑
j d
−
n,j,y) which have to install a new heating system.
Thus, aggregating the compensating variation (net future value) of these households
which modernize in period y is:
CV =
Y∑
y
∑
n,j
d−n,j,y ∗ CVn,y ∗ (1 + r)Y−y (5.23)
Finally, we define the overall excess burden EB following Diamond and McFadden
(1974):
EBtax = CV tax − T (5.24)
where T indicates the overall tax income in this period with:
T =
Y∑
y
∑
n,j
d−n,j,y ∗ Pn,j ∗ Tj ∗ (1 + r)Y−y (5.25)
We consider a carbon tax Tj which equals a carbon tax τ in Euro per tons greenhouse-
gas-equivalent times a conversion factor that converts τ into Tj accounting for the GHG
emissions of the different systems.
The excess burden of a subsidy is determined similarly:
EBsub = S − CV sub (5.26)
71See Appendix D.4 for a more detailed derivation. Income effects are not accounted for because Braun
(2010) shows that the marginal effects of income are low in the German heating market controlling for
further household characteristics. The marginal effects are not even significant for all heating system
choices. Moreover, income is highly correlated with the dwelling type. Dieckho¨ner (2012a) shows that
households with higher income rather live in single dwellings than in multiple dwellings. In addition, she
shows that households with higher income spend more on insulation and thus live rather in dwellings with
lower heat demand. Hence, controlling for the dwelling type approximates the impact of differences in
income. This approach assumes a constant marginal utility of income denoted by 1
β
. Torres et al. (2011)
investigate the sensitivity of mistaken assumptions about the marginal utility of income and their impacts
on the welfare measures in Monte Carlo experiments. They find that mistaken assumptions about the
marginal utility of income can amplify misspecifications of the utility function. However, throughout all
misspecification cases analyzed, they find an underestimation of the compensating variation (referred
to as ’compensating surplus’ in their paper). Thus, the analysis conducted in this paper assuming a
constant marginal utility of income is conservative and might even underestimate the compensating
variation (and excess burden).
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with
S =
Y∑
y
∑
n,j
d−n,j,y ∗ Pn,j ∗ Sj ∗ (1 + r)Y−y (5.27)
The presented welfare analysis is based on the households’ utility function that is derived
from empirical household choices. Thus, it is assumed that household choices have been
utility maximizing. However, there may be reasons for households not to make utility
maximizing choices. Households may be faced with financing constraints and do not
get a credit. Or they misoptimize because of imperfect information on alternatives or
inattention because they are distracted by specific characteristics of the product.72 In
this case, measuring welfare by using the households’ utility is an erroneous approach.
The real utility cannot be observed. Then, a better approximation of welfare effects
may be based on technology costs.73
Therefore, we also compute total heating system cost differences that result from the
introduction of GHG abatement policies. We take the total heating costs C over all
households and heating systems and time periods, discounted to a net future value:
C =
Y∑
y
∑
n,j
d−n,j,y ∗ Pn,j ∗ cn,j ∗ (1 + r)Y−y (5.28)
In case of a carbon tax, the total heating system cost differences (CD) are the following:
CDtax = (Cpolicy − Cno policy)− T (5.29)
Again, we assume that the tax income is redistributed lump-sum.
For a subsidy we get:
CDsub = S − (cno policy − cpolicy) (5.30)
5.4.3 Microeconomic Greenhouse Gas Abatement Curves
The excess burden EB changes with different tax rates Tj (equivalentely for changes in
the subsidy levels Sj). dEB covers the changes in welfare losses of an additional unit
72See Allcott and Greenstone (2012). There are further typical barriers in the heating market that
constrain utility maximizing behavior of households such as the landlord-tenant problem.
73The utility maximizing approach to model the diffusion process is still appropriate as long as the
household choice pattern is not be affected by public policies. However, in case of household misopti-
mizing the evaluation of the compensating variation does not reflect real consumer losses and society’s
costs.
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increase of the tax rate (or subsidy):
dEBtax =
∑
n∈N,j∈J


∂EB
∂CVn︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
∂CVn
∂V policyn,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
∂V policyn,j
∂cn,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
∂cn,j
∂Tj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
− ∂T
∂Tj︸︷︷︸
(+/−)
 dTj
 (5.31)
The signs in brackets below the derivatives indicate their direction such that (+) indi-
cates a positive and (−) a negative derivative.
∂T
∂Tj
=
∑
n∈N,j∈J
HnPn,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+
∂Pn,j
∂cn,j
∂cn,j
∂Tj
HnTj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
 (5.32)
The first part of the equation indicates the positive impact of the increasing tax rate
on the total tax income T whereas the second part displays the negative impact of the
decreasing tax base. Hence, ∂T∂tj is positive for the increasing part of the Laffer curve
and decreasing for the decreasing part. ∂T∂tj <
∂EB
∂CVn
∂CVn
∂V policyn,j
∂V policyn,j
∂cn,j
∂cn,j
∂tj
(see Auerbach,
1985). Thus, dEB > 0 when the tax rates are increasing (dtj > 0).
For the change of total subsidy spending in Sj , we would have:
∂S
∂Sj
=
∑
n∈N,j∈J
HnPn,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+
∂Pn,j
∂cn,j
∂cn,j
∂Sj
HnSj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
 (5.33)
as the subsidy increases the costs decrease (
∂cn,j
∂sj
< 0) and the installation rate Pn,j of
the technology j increases through decreasing costs. Adapting Equation 5.31 accounting
for Equation 5.26 we would get dEBsub > 0 for dSj > 0.
In the case that households are not utility maximizing, the changes in the total annual
heating costs might be more appropriate to be considered than dEB:
dCDtax =
∑
n∈N,j∈J

∂cn,j∂tj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
− ∂T
∂Tj︸︷︷︸
(+/−)
 dtj
 (5.34)
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The amount of GHG emissions CO2n,j that is consumed by household n who installs a
new technology is determined by the proportion of installations Pn,j .
CO2n,j = fj(Pn,j) (5.35)
where f(Pn,j) is a linear function that transfers the energy consumed by the chosen
technology into GHG emissions. Besides the new technologies, the technology stock (i.e.
the currently installed heating systems) ST also emitts GHG. Thus, the aggregated
GHG emissions over all households sum up to:
CO2 =
∑
n,j
fj(Pn,j) + ST (5.36)
We analyze the impact of a carbon tax and investment subsidies on the diffusion process
and on GHG abatement. We assume that the emissions of the stock are not targeted
by the policies. Introducing a new policy Tj , Ti ∀i 6= j (or Sj , Si ∀i 6= j) thus leads
to the following change of total GHG emissions:
dCO2 =
∑
n,j

∂fj(Pn,j)∂Pn,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
∂Pn,j
∂cn,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
∂cn,j
∂Tj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
 dTj +∑
i
∂fj(Pn,j)∂Pn,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
∂Pn,j
∂cn,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
∂cn,i
∂Ti︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
 dTi

(5.37)
and equivalently for Sj , Si with
∂cn,j
∂Sj
< 0 and
∂cn,i
∂Si
< 0 ∀i 6= j.
The marginal GHG abatement dX = −dCO2 is positive for an increasing tax rate
dTj > 0 (or with a decreasing subsidy dSj < 0) of the carbon-intense system j. The
marginal GHG abatement dX is negative with the increasing tax rates dTi > 0 (or the
decreasing subsidy dSi < 0) of the alternatives i. Setting a Pigovian tax τ with
dTi
dTj
being constant would therefore lead to dX < 0.
∂f(Pn,j)
∂Pn,j
,
∂cn,j
∂Tj
and
∂cn,i
∂Ti
are constants due to the respective linear relations. Thus, the
changes in the total GHG emission level are determined by the impact of the cost changes
on the diffusion of technologies
∂Pn,j
∂cn,j
< 0 and
∂Pn,j
∂cn,i
> 0.
Finally, we are able to derive the marginal GHG abatement cost curve g(X) that ac-
counts for the reaction of households and the resulting diffusion process of technologies
as well as marginal welfare losses. We define the marginal GHG abatement cost curve
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as:
g(X) =
dEB
dX
(5.38)
In the case that households are not maximizing utility dCD might be considered instead
of dEB.
5.5 Results of the numerical analysis
5.5.1 Greenhouse Gas Abatement Policies and Diffusion of Heating
Systems
To evaluate the three policy scenarios, we first investigate the diffusion process of the
newly installed heating systems in this section. Figure 5.1 presents the relationship be-
tween a carbon tax and the total GHG emissions. This underlines how the DIscrHEat
model works. Higher taxes increase heating costs of carbon-intensive technologies, im-
plying lower diffusion rates of these technologies and more GHG abatement.
We accumulate GHG abatement until 2030 and see that about 300 million tons of GHG
abatement are already achieved in the reference scenario at a tax of zero. This amount
of GHG reduction corresponds to a decrease from an annual 134 to an annual 105
million tons of GHG emissions between 2010 and 2030 in the reference scenario without
policy measures. These reductions are achieved because of the assumed increases in
annual use efficiencies of the heating systems over time, the diffusion of the recent non-
fossile heating technologies heat pump and biomass, the demolition of old insufficiently
insulated buildings and the construction of well-insulated new buildings.
Additional GHG abatement then requires policy intervention. The additional GHG
avoidance achieved by a carbon tax is slightly increasing with the proportional increase of
the tax rate. At levels between 700 and 800 million tons of accumulated CO2-equivalent
(CO2-eq.) additional abatement of GHG requires a steep increase of taxes.
Chapter 5. Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curves 120









        	 	
	 






Figure 5.1: Tax Rate and Resulting GHG Abatement
Figure 5.2 presents the effects on the government’s budget of introducing introducing
each of the three individual policies separately. For abatement levels above 500 million
tons of accumulated CO2-eq. expenses for the subsidies increase overproportionally and
are significantly higher than the tax revenue that is generated by a carbon tax. At
about the same abatement level, the tax revenue starts to decrease indicating the falling
part of the Laffer curve. This is where the shrinking tax base, i.e. mainly fossile heating
systems disappearing in the building stock, reduces the revenue more than the increasing
tax rate adds to the revenue.
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Figure 5.2: Tax Revenue and Subsidy Expenditure
The diffusion of heating systems and the resulting accumulated amounts of GHG abate-
ment until 2030 in the three policy scenarios are illustrated in Figure 5.3. We observe
the intuitive result that both a carbon tax and subsidies on biomass heaters and heat
pumps decrease the installation of oil- and gas-fired heaters. The diffusion of biomass
heaters and heat pumps varies in both subsidy scenarios. In subsidy I, subsidies on
biomass heaters are remarkably higher than subsidies on heat pumps. Therefore, in-
stallation rates of heat pumps in the subsidy I are very low. The subsidy II scenario
assumes a constant relative subsidy level for heat pumps and biomass heaters. In this
scenario diffusion of heat pumps is higher than for biomass heaters. For all of the three
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scenarios, we observe that subsidies and carbon taxes decrease the market share of oil-
and gas-fired heaters, implying GHG abatement.
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Figure 5.3: Installed Heating Systems in 2030 Depending on GHG Reduction and
Policy Measures
5.5.2 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we compare different welfare measures of the three policies in relation to
the accumulated GHG abatement. We compute the excess burden and heating system
cost differences accumulated for the years 2010 to 2030, i.e. their net future values, given
a discount rate of 6%.74
Figure 5.4 presents two different welfare measures, i.e., the excess burden and (total)
heating system cost differences of the three policy measures. The excess burden is on a
significantly higher level than the heating system cost difference and the increase of the
excess burden is steeper.
The carbon tax implies a significantly lower excess burden for all levels of GHG reduction
than the subsidies on investments and is therefore the more efficient policy. If we cannot
observe all costs and impacts determining the heating system choice of households, the
determination of an investment subsidy that is equivalent to a Pigovian carbon tax is
impossible and thus always leads to larger distortions on the household choice. Thus, a
subsidy on the heating investment causes a higher excess burden than a carbon tax as
it affects the price of emitting GHG directly. We could therefore identify the first best
74In Appendix D.3, we provide a sensitivity analysis assuming a discount rate of 3%.
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carbon tax as the lower bound for CO2 abatement costs. Assuming that administration
costs would be the same or even higher, other policy measures would lead to higher
distortions and welfare costs. However, in case of an energy efficiency gap, Allcott and
Greenstone (2012) point out that if investment inefficiencies exist, subsidies for energy
efficient capital stock might have greater benefits than costs. Applied to GHG abatement
in our case, this could mean that in case of financing constraints, a subsidy as a second
best policy could help to reduce this problem and incentivize households to invest in less
CO2-intense heating systems. Thus, in reality welfare losses of optimal GHG abatement
policies might lay somewhere between the first best Pigovian tax and the subsidy curve.
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Figure 5.4: Excess Burden of Different Scenarios Depending on GHG Reduction
The curves representing heating system cost differences are significantly lower than those
representing the excess burden. Note, that the curves on heating system cost differences
are based on the same diffusion process of the heating systems as before. However, they
neglect the losses in consumer utility and focus on pure heating system costs spent.75
A comparison of the curves in Figure 5.4 suggests, that a plain heating system cost
consideration underestimates costs that incur for households and thus society. The cost
differences caused by the subsidies are even below those of the carbon tax.
We further analyze different welfare measures relative to the GHG abatement level
achieved by a Pigovian carbon tax and subsidies on heating system investments to
investigate the marginal costs of GHG abatement. We define the following measures
based on Auerbach (1985), Baumol (1972), Mayshar (1990):
• The average costs of public funds in Figure 5.5 equal the compensating variation of
a policy measure relative to the tax revenue T generated: ACPF = CVT . 1−ACPF
thus indicates the level of excess burden caused in percent of tax revenue.
• The marginal costs of public funds are the marginal compensating variation per
marginal additional tax revenue T generated: MCPF = ∆CV∆T . MCPF measures
75Technology based approaches to determine GHG abatement curves would imply even lower costs
since they neglect household characteristics and therefore household preferences.
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the additional welfare loss in raising the total tax income. 1−MCPF thus indicates
the marginal level of excess burden caused in percent of an additional tax revenue
unit. The different levels of MCPF for different CO2 abatement levels are shown
in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5: Marginal and Average Cost of Public Funds Depending on GHG Reduc-
tion
The ACPF are increasing slighty whereas the MCPF first increase slowly, but getting
closer to an abatement level of 450 million t CO2-eq., the MCPF increases significantly.
At this abatement level, the slope of the tax revenue curve is already close to zero in
Figure 5.4 indicating that the tax base, i.e. mainly the oil and gas heaters, is decreasing
significantly. This is also shown in Figure 5.3. Further GHG abatement is thus very
costly for society because large amounts have already been reduced and additional wel-
fare losses are comparetively high relative to the additional tax revenue generated. Up
to a level of 430 million t of accumulated CO2-eq. abatement, the MCPF remains below
1500% and the ACPF below approximately 120%. Thus, at this point the excess bur-
den of an additional accumulated GHG reduction of 130 million t CO2-eq. amounts to
approximately 20% of the total tax revenue generated and the generation of a marginal
tax income unit causes additional welfare losses of 1500% of the additional tax revenue
generated. In summary, accounting for the quantity effects or the decreasing tax base
of the carbon tax, i.e. the decreasing number of oil and gas heaters, the MCPF indicate
that the additional welfare losses relative to tax revenue generated increase significantly
for accumulated abatement levels of 450 t CO2-eq. until 2030 or total annual GHG
emissions of 92 million tons in 2030. Hence, referring to Figue 5.1 we can conclude that
tax rates above 350 per t CO2-eq. cause immense marginal costs of public funds and
thus seem politically rather unrealistic.
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5.5.3 Welfare-based Greenhouse Gas Abatement Curves
As stated in Section 5.4.3, we use the marginal excess burden to derive GHG abatement
curves. The results are presented in Figure 5.6. To derive a GHG abatement curve based
on welfare losses in our partial analysis, we compute the marginal excess burden per
additional unit of GHG reduction X as derived in Section 5.4.3: MEB = g(X) = dEBdX .
The marginal excess burden of the carbon tax is significantly lower than the marginal
excess burden of the subsidy throughout all realistic abatement levels up to 450 million
t CO2-eq.
76 The MEB of subsidy I is decreasing at very high abatement levels because
multiple dwellings mainly start switching their heating systems at very high subsidy
levels in this policy regime.
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Figure 5.6: Marginal Excess Burden of Greenhouse Gas Reduction
The marginal cost difference curves (MCD = dCDdX ), which include solely the monetary
heating system costs instead of the utility, are also displayed in Figure 5.6. These
marginal cost difference curves reflect the additional heating system costs of a unit of
GHG reduction at the different abatement levels already achieved. The curves indicate
that the cost based curves are again significantly below the welfare loss based curves.
The marginal heating system cost differences of subsidy I are also significantly higher
than those of a carbon tax (for abatement levels up to 700 million t CO2-eq.). Contrarily,
the marginal cost difference of subsidy II are lower indicating, that in cases for which a
utility-based measure is not appropriate, subsidies can in general be effective. However,
Figure 5.2 indicates that such a policy requires a large budget to finance the subsidy
expenses. A policy that changes household behavior could then be more appropriate.
In general, the welfare based GHG abatement curve might overestimate the abatement
costs assuming that households do not change their behavioral patterns until 2030. If
one assumes that the households’ cost elasticities might change over time and that more
76The paper’s results to be underestimates of the true efficiency gains from using a carbon tax. In
reality, households are more heterogeneous than in the presented simplified approach.
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households might switch to a less carbon intense heating system over time, thereby
bearing less non-observed costs, the abatement curve might be somewhere between the
cost-based and utility-based abatement curves. However, in comparison to pure tech-
nology based curves, these curves account for households’ reactions to policy measures
and policy costs that society would have to bear.
5.6 Conclusions
Analytically, we derive a welfare based GHG abatement curve, thereby taking into ac-
count household investment decisions and cost effects of policy measures. We implement
the theory into the micro-simulation heat market model DIscrHEat. The model is an
innovate approach since it combines a bottom-up model with a discrete choice model.
The bottom-up model projects the evolution of heating systems in German residential
buildings up to 2030. The bottom-up model includes a discrete choice model which de-
termines the heating system choices of households based on the costs of heat provision.
We apply DIscrHEat to derive an abatement curve based on household preferences and
welfare losses for the German residential heating market: we simulate the diffusion
of heating systems until 2030 with and without policy measures to finally derive the
compensating variation, excess burden and heating system cost differences in relation to
GHG abatement. In comparison to technology-based abatement curves, this approach
takes household investment in heating technologies into account as well as welfare costs
of policy measures.
Our microeconomic analysis provides a partial analysis of welfare based GHG abatement
costs in the context of optimal abatement strategies. Analyzing these costs and options
of GHG abatement is of major importance in the residential heat market and also holds
for other sectors, where the individual decisions of economic agents affect the GHG
reduction potential and the implied welfare costs. Implementing certain policies to
provide incentives for GHG reduction needs to account for the individual decisions of
economic agents. Their elasticities determine the welfare costs and thus the costs that
society would have to bear in order to achieve certain abatement objectives.
Based on our model results for the German residential heating market we conclude that
a carbon tax is more efficient than subsidies on heating system investments in most
cases. A subsidy on investments may cause lower abatement costs if assuming that
households do not maximize utility. However, this policy requires very high subsidies
(and lump-sum taxes) and precise information on household investment decisions into
heating systems. Hence, such a policy seems rather not implementable in reality. The
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subsidy regime currently implemented by the German government subsidizes expensive
biomass heaters to a large extent and reflects a suboptimal design: For the first, i.e.,
affordable section of GHG abatement units, the cost curves of this policy regime run
above those of a carbon tax and those of an alternative subsidy regime. The alternative
subsidy regime promotes heat pumps and natural gas systems more than the German
regime. In summary, regarding policies, which change heating system choices through
relative costs, a carbon tax is optimal. However, if financing constraints for households
exist, subsidies on new heating system installations might be reasonable. Our paper
gives rise to several interesting research sequels. First of all, a discrete choice estimation
on the heating system choice enriched with household income data would strengthen
the quality of the simulation model. Further, in our model, household preferences and
cost elasticities remain constant over time and the policy measures, which we introduce
are assumed to not affect the preferences. There are alternative policy measures, which
might change the household decisions over time and might impact abatement curves.
These could be information campaigns for households that compare their energy behavior
with others. The evaluation of the GHG abatement potential and costs of such policy
measures remains open for further research as well. The partial analysis of the paper does
not cover additional welfare effects of the policy measures caused by cutting other taxes
at the same time (see the analyses of the double dividend hypothesis for Bovenberg
and de Mooij, 1994, Goulder, 1995 and Fullerton and Metcalf, 1998). In addition,
environmental policies might have redistributive effects which might need to be included
in the welfare analysis of different policy measures if equity or equality are highly valued
by society. (See Cremer et al., 2003 and Llavador et al., 2011). This type of analyses
are beyond the scope of our paper and are as well open for further reasearch.
The results of our paper have implications to policy makers: Understanding how house-
holds react to different policies to derive micro-economic GHG abatement curves is
crucial for developing targeted policies and for achieving abatement objectives.
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A.1 Details of the Model
The model’s spatial structure is formulated as a directed graph consisting of a set N
of vertices and a set A ⊂ N × N of edges. The set of vertices can be subdivided into
sources and sinks, where gas production facilities are modeled as sources and importing
regions as sinks. The model’s time structure is represented by a set T ⊂ N of points
in time (months). This time structure is flexible and can be customized by the user,
which means any year (y) until 2050 can be simulated with up to 12 months per year.
An overview of all sets, decision variables and parameters can be found in Table A.1.
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Table A.1: Model Sets, Variables and Parameters
Sets
n ∈ N all model nodes
t ∈ T months
y ∈ Y years
p ∈ P ∈ N producer / production regions
e ∈ E ∈ N exporter / trader
d ∈ D ∈ N final customer / importing regions
r ∈ R ∈ N regasifiers
l ∈ L ∈ N liquefiers
s ∈ S ∈ N storage operators
Primal
Variables
pre,p,t produced gas volumes
fle,n,n1,t physical gas flows
tre,d,t traded gas volumes
sts,t gas stock in storage
sis,t injected gas volumes
sds,t depleted gas volumes
Dual
Variables
λe,n,t marginal costs of physical gas supply by exporter e to node n in time period t
σs,t (intertemporal) marginal costs of storage injection
βd,t marginal costs / price in node n in time period t
µe,p,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of production capacity
φn,n1,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of pipeline capacity
s,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of storage capacity
ρs,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of storage injection capacity
θs,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of storage depletion capacity
ιt marginal benefit of an additional unit of LNG transport capacity
γr,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of regasification capacity
ζl,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of liquefaction capacity
χe,n,y marginal costs of delivery obligation
Parameter
capn,t/n,n1,t monthly infrastructure capacity
trcn,n1,t transport costs
(m)prcn,t (marginal) production costs
opcn,t operating costs
mdoe,n,t minimal delivery obligation of exporter e
distn,n1 distance between node n and node n1 in km
LNGcap initial LNG capacity
speed speed of LNG tankers in km/h
cfs conversion factor used for storage injection & depletion capacity
Appendix A. Supplementary Material for Chapter 2 129
A.1.1 Remaining Capacity Constraints
In Section 2.2.2, we skipped a few capacity constraints in order to keep the description
of our model as brief as possible. These are listed in the following. Along the lines of
Inequality 2.17, Inequality A.1 states that the sum over all transport flows (decided on
by the traders) through the liquefaction terminal, i.e., all natural gas that is liquefied,
has to be lower than the respective liquefaction capacity.
capl,t −
∑
e∈E
∑
n∈A·,l
fle,n,l,t ≥ 0 ∀l, t (ζl,t). (A.1)
The same holds true for the restriction of gas volumes that are regasified and then
transported to a demand node d in month t:
capr,t −
∑
e∈E
∑
d∈Ar,·
fle,r,d,t ≥ 0 ∀r, t (γr,t). (A.2)
Finally, we account for a limitation of available LNG tankers. Hence, the sum of all
gas volumes transported between liquefaction terminal l and regasification terminal r in
month t is restricted by the available LNG transport capacity:
(LNGcap) ∗ 8760/12 ∗ speed−
∑
e∈E
∑
l∈L
∑
r∈R
2 ∗ (fle,l,r,t ∗ distn,n1) ≥ 0 ∀t (ιt) (A.3)
where speed is defined as the average speed of a LNG tanker (km/h), distn,n1 as the
distance in km between node n and node n1 and LNGcap as the number of existing
LNG tankers times their average size in the initial model year. By using Inequality
A.3, we take into account that each LNG tanker that delivers gas to a regasification
terminal has to drive back to a liquefaction terminal in order to load new LNG volumes.
Therefore, we simplify the model by assuming that each imaginary LNG tanker drives
back to the liquefaction terminal from where it started.
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A.1.2 First-order Conditions of the Model
A.1.2.1 Physical flows
Taking the first partial derivative of Equation 2.16 with respect to fle,n,n1,t and account-
ing for the Inequalities (capacity constraints) 2.17, A.1, A.2 and A.3 results in:
∂LeII
∂fle,n,n1,t
= −λe,n1,t + λe,n,t + trcn,n1,t + opcn,t
+ φn,n1,t + ζl,t + γr,t
+ ιt ∗ 2 ∗ distl,r ≥ 0 ⊥ fle,n,n1,t ≥ 0 ∀e, n, n1, t. (A.4)
A.1.2.2 Production
The first-order condition for production is derived from the payoff function Πp(pre,p,t)
defined as
max
pre,p,t
Πp(pre,p,t) =
∑
t∈T
(λe,p,t ∗ pre,p,t − prce,p,t(pre,p,t)) (A.5)
where pre,p,t is the corresponding decision vector of p. The set of feasible solutions
for pre,p,t is restricted by the non-negativity constraint pre,p,t ≥ 0. The first-order
conditions of the producer’s problem consists of Constraint 2.15 as well as the following
partial derivative of the Lagrangian Lp:
∂Lp
∂pre,p,t
= −λe,p,t +mprce,p,t(pre,p,t) + µe,p,t ≥ 0 ⊥ pre,p,t ≥ 0 ∀p, t (A.6)
A.1.2.3 Storage utilization
The following derivatives derived from Equations 2.18 and 2.19 (as well as the respec-
tive capacity constraints) constitute the first-order conditions of the storage operator’s
optimization problem:
∂Hs
∂sds,t
= −βd,t + σs,t + θs,t ≥ 0 ⊥ sds,t ≥ 0 ∀s, t (A.7)
∂Hs
∂sis,t
= −σs,t + βd,t + ρs,t ≥ 0 ⊥ sis,t ≥ 0 ∀s, t (A.8)
− ∂Hs
∂sts,t
= s,t = ∆σs,t = σs,t+1 − σs,t ≤ 0 ⊥ sts,t ≤ 0 ∀s, t. (A.9)
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A.2 Data
Table A.2: Nodes in the Model
Total
number of
nodes
Number
of coun-
tries
Countries with
more than one
node
Countries aggre-
gated to one node
Demand 84 87
Russia and the
USA
Baltic countries and
former Yugoslavian
republics
Production 43 36
China, Norway,
Russia and the
USA
-
Liquefaction 24 24 - -
Regasification 27 25 - -
Storages 37 37 - -
A.2.1 Production
For the majority of nodes, see Table A.2, we model gas production endogenously. Only
for very small gas producing countries and those with little exports do we fix production
volumes to limit model complexity. Concerning endogenous production, we face the
problem that there are only sources with data on historical production (i.e., IEA (2011c)
but no single source that provides information about historical or current production
capacities. We collect information from various sources listed in Table A.3. For the major
LNG exporters (Qatar and Australia), we derive possible production capacities from the
domestic demand assumptions and liquefaction capacities. In total, we assume a global
production capacity of 3542 bcm in 2010 and 3744 bcm in 2012. Of that capacity, 12-
13% is assumed to be fixed production. The usage of the remaining production capacity
(87%) is optimized within the model.
Table A.3: Assumptions and Data Sources for Production
Assumptions Sources
Production
Exogenous production of small countries in 2010 IEA (2011c)
Forecast on exogenous production of small-scale
producing countries
ENTSOG (2011),
IEA (2011c,d)
Estimates of future production capacity in the USA IEA (2011b)
Development of production capacities in Norway
and Russia
So¨derbergh et al.
(2009, 2010)
Forecasts for Saudi-Arabia, China, India, Qatar
and Iran
IEA (2011c)
Information which allow us to get an idea of pro-
duction capacities in Africa, Malaysia, Indonesia
and Argentina
IEA (2011d)
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Concerning production costs, we follow an approach used in Golombek et al. (1995,
1998).77 For the exporting countries, we estimate Golombek production functions by
OLS regression, using various data sources such as Seeliger (2006) and OME (2001), or
information on costs published in the Oil and Gas Journal.
A.2.2 Infrastructure
We consider the global gas infrastructure data aggregated on a country level. To reduce
complexity, we bundle LNG capacities to one representative LNG hub per country. The
same applies for storages and pipelines, although, e.g., Russia and the Ukraine are
connected via multiple pipelines in reality, we bundle pipeline capacity into one large
pipeline “Russia-Ukraine”. The Institute of Energy Economics at the University of
Cologne (EWI) has its own extensive pipeline database that serves as the major source
for current pipeline capacities and distances. New pipeline projects between 2010 and
2012 are based on publicly available data. The distances of the 196 LNG routes were
measured using a port to port distance calculator78.
Table A.4: Assumptions and Data Sources for Infrastructure
Assumptions Sources
Infrastructure
Current and future capacities of LNG terminals GIIGNL (2010), IEA
(2011d)
National storage capacities (yearly working gas
volumes)
Benquey and Lecar-
pentier (2010), IEA
(2011c)
Underground storage capacities of China, Japan
and South Korea
IGU (2003),
Yoshizaki et al.
(2009), Yuwen
(2009)
Onshore/offshore pipelines transportation costs
(US$16/kcm/1000 km and US$26/kcm/1000
km)
Jensen (2004),
Rempel (2002),
Van Oostvoorn et al.
(2003)
LNG liquefaction and regasification costs add up
to US$59/kcm
Jensen (2004)
Variable operating costs for storage injection of
US$13/kcm
CIEP (2008)
We account for LNG transport distances by LNG tanker freight rates of US$78000/day
(Jensen, 2004). Based on our costs assumptions shown in Table A.4, the break-even
77Please refer to Section 2.2.2 for more details on the Golombek production function, in particular on
the marginal cost function (its first derivative) that is used in our model.
78Please refer to http://www.searates.com/reference/portdistance/
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Figure A.1: Actual and Simulated Average Prices (in US$/kcm)
distance between onshore pipelines and LNG transport is 4000 km, and around 2400 km
for offshore pipelines79. This is in line with Jensen (2004) and Rempel (2002).
A.3 Cournot Setting vs. Perfect Competition
The objective of this section is to justify our decision to model the gas market as an
oligopoly. Therefore, we compare two market settings – perfect competition and Cournot
competition with a competitive fringe – with respect to how well these simulations fit
to the actual market outcomes in 2010. These two settings were chosen because, on
the one hand, global gas markets are characterized by a relatively high concentration
on the supply side, while on the other, because of cost decreases in the LNG value
chain, regional arbitrage has become a viable option, thereby potentially constraining
the exercise of market power.
We start out by analyzing the model outcomes of the perfect competition scenario.
Figure A.1 compares the observed average prices in US$/kcm with the resulting average
market clearing prices in the different market settings. Simulated prices in the perfect
competition scenario are significantly lower than the actual prices in 2010 in almost
every country depicted in Figure A.1, except for the USA.
Figure A.2 displays the deviation of simulated total demand from actual demand realized
in 2010 for the two different model settings. The deviation is shown as a percentage of
the actual demand figures in 2010. Figure A.2 shows that endogenous demand in the
perfect competition scenario strongly deviates from reality. The largest deviations were
observed for Asia/Oceania and Europe, where the modeled demand exceeds the actual
realized demand in 2010 by 3.7% and 9.7%, respectively. In contrast, simulated demand
in North America resembles the actual demand quite well.
79We assume that the average speed of a typical LNG vessel amounts to 19 knots and that the average
capacity lies at ca 145000 cbm.
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Figure A.2: Deviation of Demand under Different Settings (in % of actual demand
in 2010)
Figure A.3: Annual Production and Capacities in Four Selected Countries in the
Different Market Settings (in bcm)
Figures A.3 and A.4 display production capacity (indicated by the bars), simulated pro-
duction volumes and actual production in 2010 for five selected countries. Concerning
the perfect competition case, the simulated production of the five producing countries
exceeds production volumes observed in 2010 (see Figures A.3 and A.4). From Figures
A.1 to A.4, we conclude, that except for the North American natural gas market, the
assumption of perfect competition does not fit well with actual market data. Therefore,
we model the eight most important LNG exporting countries and the three most im-
portant pipeline exporters as Cournot players, thus allowing them to exercise market
power by means of production withholding. All countries have almost all of their ex-
ports coordinated by one firm or consortium, e.g., Gazprom (Russia), Statoil (Norway)
or Sonatrach (Algeria).
In comparison with the perfect competition setting, model results in the Cournot setting
(i.e., demand, production and prices) seem to represent reality more accurately. Because
the Cournot setting with a competitve fringe provides the closer fit to actual production,
demand and price data such a setting is used for our analysis presented in Section 3.4.
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Figure A.4: Annual Russian Production and Capacities in the Different Market Set-
tings (in bcm)
A.4 Sensitivity Analysis
We analyze three alternative settings for the IP sector’s demand elasticity, since this
elasticity assumption is most important in determining overall demand elasticity in
almost all countries. For example, we conduct one sensitivity analysis in which the
elasticity in all countries is 50% higher (labeled “High”), i.e., -0.15 and -0.6 respectively,
one in which it is 50% lower (“Low”) and one in which the IP sector’s demand elasticity
is -0.4 in all countries (“Same”).
We find that elasticity assumptions (“Basic”) used in our analysis provide the best fit
with actual data. While prices in the sensitivity scenario “Low” substantially exceed
actual prices (see Figure A.5, in particular in Japan and Korea), prices in the sensitivity
scenario “High” undershoot prices in almost all countries (with the exceptions of Korea
and the Netherlands). If we take a closer look at the scenario “Same” (Figure A.6),
we see that by assuming the same demand elasticity in all countries, regional price
differences are much lower than in reality (or in the scenario “Basic”). Therefore, given
Figure A.5: Sensitivity Analysis I: Comparison of Prices in Selected Countries with
Varying Elasticity Assumptions
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Figure A.6: Sensitivity Analysis II: Comparison of Prices in Selected Countries with
Varying Elasticity Assumptions
the elasticity assumptions used in this paper, we are able to obtain a reasonably good
fit to the actual prices in 2010 and conclude that no other combination of elasticities
could improve the accuracy of our model.
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B.1 Oligopolistic Market with a Binding Capacity Con-
straint on one Firm’s Output
We are interested in a setting where the integrated firm optimizes output on a division-
level. However, this time we introduce a binding capacity constraint on one of the
division’s output, e.g., x˚1i . The first-order conditions of the divisions with no capacity
limit are equivalent to Equation 3.5. Using the first-order conditions and inserting them
in the price formulas yields:
pc = a− bx1c − bx2c − pi = a− pc − pc − pi
⇔ pc = a− pi
3
(B.1)
and
pi = a− bx˚1i − bx12 − pc = a− bx˚1i − pi − pc
⇔ pi = a− bx˚
1
i − pc
2
.
(B.2)
Using Equations B.1 and B.2 yields:
pi =
3a− 3bx˚1i − a+ pi
6
⇔ pi = 2a− 3bx˚
1
i
5
(B.3)
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and
pc =
a
3
− 2a− 3bx˚
1
i
15
=
a+ bx˚1i
5
(B.4)
as well as
bxnc =
a+ bx˚1i
5
⇔ xnc =
a
5b
+
x˚1i
5
.
(B.5)
This allows us to derive the profit of the integrated firm optimising output division-by-
division (i1 and c1) and one division has a binding capacity constraint, contingent on
x˚1i :
pii1+c1 = x˚1i
(
2a− 3bx˚1i
5
)
+
(
a
5b
+
x˚1i
5
)(
a+ bx˚1i
5
)
=
2ax˚1i − 3b
(
x˚1i
)2
5
+
a2 + abx˚1i
25b
+
ax˚1i + b
(
x˚1i
)2
25
=
10abx˚1i + abx˚
1
i − 15b2
(
x˚1i
)2
+ b2
(
x˚1i
)2
+ a2 + abx˚1i
25b
=
a2 + 12abx˚1i − 14b2
(
x˚1i
)2
25b
.
(B.6)
Therefore, the profit of division-level optimization is identical the profit of firm-level
optimization form Equation 3.18.
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B.2 Model Overview
Table B.1: Model Sets, Variables and Parameters
Sets
y ∈ Y years
f ∈ F factor inputs
n ∈ N mining companies
m ∈M ∈ N mines
d ∈ D ∈ N importing regions
Variables
pid,y pig iron demand / production in import region d
trn,f,m,d,y transport of input f from mine m to import region d
san,f,d,y sales of input f to import region d
sabn,d,y sales of a bundle of inputs to import region d
λd,y price of pig iron in import region d
ρf,d,y price of factor input f in import region d
vn,f,d,y
physical value of input f for company n to produce and to
transport in import region d
µn,f,m,y
marginal benefit of an additional unit of production capacity
of input f at mine m
Parameter
capn,f,m,y annual production capacity of input f at mine m
finf,d,y
factor intensity of input f in crude steel production in import
region d
pcof,m,y free-on-board costs of input f produced in mine m
tcof,m,d,y
seaborne transport costs of input f (produced in mine m) to
import region d
cvan,y company n’s conjectural variation
slod,y slope of linear pig iron demand function
intd,y intercept of linear pig iron demand function
simn
binary parameter indicating whether integrated company n op-
timizes on a firm-level
B.3 Statistical Measures
In order to assess the accuracy of our model, we compare market outcomes, such as
production, prices and trade flows, to our model results. In comparing trade flows, we
follow, for example, Kolstad and Abbey (1984), Bushnell et al. (2008) and more recently
Tru¨by (2013) by applying three different statistical measures: a linear hypothesis test,
the Spearman rank correlation coefficient and Theil’s inequality coefficient. In the fol-
lowing, we briefly discuss the setup as well as some of the potential weakness of each of
the three tests.
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Starting with the linear hypothesis test, the intuition behind the test is that in case
actual and model trade flows had a perfect fit the dots in a scatter plot of the two data
sets would be a aligned along a line starting at zero and having a slope equal to one.
Therefore, we test model accuracy by regressing actual trade flows At on the trade flows
of our model Mt, with t representing the trade flow between exporting country e ∈ E
and importing region d ∈ D, as data on trade flows is available only on a country level
(see Subsection 3.3.3.3). Using ordinary least squares (OLS), we estimate the following
linear equation:
At = β0 + β1 ∗Mt + t. (B.7)
Modeled trade flows have a bad fit with actual data if the joint null hypothesis of β0 = 0
and β1 = 1 can be rejected on typical significance levels. One of the reasons why this
test is applied in various studies is that it allows hypothesis testing, while the other
two tests used in this paper are distribution-free and thus do not allow such testing.
However, there is a drawback to this test as well, since the results of the test are very
sensitive to how good the model is able to simulate outliers. To improve the evaluation
of the model accuracy regarding the trade flows we apply two more tests.
The second test we employ is the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, which, as
already indicated by its name, can be used to compare the rank by volume of the
trade flow t in reality to the rank in modeled trade flows. Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient, also referred to as Spearman’s rho, is defined as follows:
rho = 1−
T∑
t
g2t /(n
3 − n) (B.8)
with g being the difference in the ranks of the modeled and the actual trade flows
and T being the total number of trade flows. Since Spearman’s rho is not based on a
distribution hypothesis testing is not applicable, but instead one looks for a large value
of rho. However, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient does not tell you anything
about how well the predicted trade flows compare volumewise to the actual trade flow
volumes, since it could be equal to one despite total trade volume being ten times higher
in reality as long as the market shares of the trade flows match.
Finally, we apply the normed-version of Theil’s inequality coefficient U , which lies be-
tween 0 and 1, to analyse the differences between actual and modeled trade flows. A U
of 0 indicates that modeled trade flows perfectly match actual trade flow, while a large
U hints at a large difference between the two data sets. Theil’s inequality coefficient is
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defined as:
U =
√∑T
t (Mt −At)√∑T
t M
2
t +
√∑T
t A
2
t
(B.9)
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C.1 Convergence of the Power and the Gas Market Model
In order to assess the convergence of the power market model and the gas market model,
equilibrium gas prices and gas demand of both models are compared in this section. Since
the equilibrium gas prices of the gas market model are used as an input to the power
market model, gas prices are identical in both models. Therefore, the convergence of
both models is assessed by comparing the equilibrium gas demand of the power market
model and the gas market model.
Table C.1 lists the deviation of gas demands of both models for different scenarios. The
deviation d is derived as follows: d = xdimxcol − 1, with xdim being the equilibrium gas
demand derived by the DIMENSION model and xcol being the equilibrium gas demand
derived by the COLUMBUS model. The worst convergence of both models is observed
for the years 2015 and 2020 and the scenarios FB20 and FB30 with deviations of up to
10%.
One approach to improve the consistency of both models could be to use a different
functional shape of the inverse demand function for a certain year, e.g., a hyperbolic
function. Another approach could be to focus the range of gas price samples to a
smaller interval, i.e., increasing the fit in the region of prices that were relevant during
the gas price simulation. Consequently, instead of sampling gas prices between 15 and
50 EUR2010/MWhth for all years, I limit the price range to 15 to 25 EUR2010/MWhth
for the year 2015, to 20 to 30 EUR2010/MWhth for the year 2020 and to 25 to 40
EUR2010/MWhth for the years 2030 and 2040. The gas demand function is estimated
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Table C.1: Deviation of Gas Demands between Power Market Model and Gas Market
Model
Scenario 2015 2020 2030 2040
REF 5% -2% -1% 0%
FB5 3% -1% -2% 1%
FB10 0% -1% -2% 1%
FB20 -5% -3% -4% 1%
FB30 -5% -10% -7% 3%
CT10 5% -2% 3% 1%
CT20 5% 2% 1% -1%
once more based on the restricted set of samples, and new equilibria of both models are
derived. Table C.2 lists the resulting gas demand deviations between both models. The
results reveal that the outlined approach has improved the convergence of both models.
The results of the numerical analysis change slightly, but are generally robust to this
approach. In particular, none of the main messages of this study is affected qualitatively.
Table C.2: Deviation of Gas Demands between Power Market Model and Gas Market
Model with a Focused Price Range
Scenario 2015 2020 2030 2040
REF 0% -2% -1% 0%
FB5 -1% 0% -1% 0%
FB10 -3% 0% 0% -2%
FB20 -2% 1% -2% -2%
FB30 -2% -2% -3% 1%
CT10 -1% 0% 2% -1%
CT20 2% 1% 0% -1%
C.2 Sensitivity Analysis of the Discount Rate
The following section of the Appendix analyzes, how a discount rate of 3% instead of
10% affects the model results. First, Figure C.1 illustrates the gas price/demand samples
for two Fixed Bonus scenarios given a 3% discount rate. Note that the samples spread
out more than the samples for which a 10% discount rate is assumed (see Figure 4.6).
Thus, the inter-temporal components of the demand function have a higher relevance
the lower the discount rate gets. This finding does not surprise, since future costs have
a higher weight if a lower discount rate is assumed. This also explains why gas prices
and gas demand are c.p. lower given a 3% discount rate instead of a 10% discount rate.
Assuming a lower discount rate lets renewables become more competitive since future
fuel costs of, e.g., natural gas have a higher impact on generation costs.
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Figure C.1: Gas Price/Demand Samples, Demand Curves and Gas Market Equilibria
for the Fixed Bonus Scenarios at a Discount Rate of 3%
Figure C.2 depicts the cost effects of the Fixed Bonus and Coal Tax scenarios when
assuming a discount rate 3%. Similar effects as in the 10% discount rate case can be
observed, i.e., the overall cost effect of a coal tax is positive and (except for the FB30
scenario) it is negative for the Fixed Bonus scenarios. However, effects strongly differ in
magnitude due to the lower discount rate of 3%.
Figure C.2: Power System Cost Effects of Different Levels of Coal Taxes and RES
Subsidies at a Discount Rate of 3%
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C.3 Data
Table C.3: Fuel Costs for Power Generation
EUR2010/MWhth 2015 2020 2030 2040
Nuclear 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.3
Lignite 1.4 1.4 2.7 2.7
Coal 9.1 10.1 10.9 11.9
Oil 42.5 47.6 58.0 69.0
Table C.4: Gross Electricity Demand
TWhel 2015 2020 2030 2040 CAGR 2015-40
AT+CH 131.8 140.0 149.4 158.1 0.7%
BE+NL 212.9 226.3 241.7 255.9 0.7%
DK 40.6 43.1 46.0 48.7 0.7%
FR 493.6 523.6 558.3 590.0 0.7%
DE 598.8 618.8 636.5 637.0 0.2%
GB 395.2 419.4 447.4 473.0 0.7%
IT 354.8 387.4 443.6 506.1 1.4%
CZ+PL 214.6 233.9 260.5 289.1 1.2%
Table C.5: Power Plant Parameters
Fixed Operation and Generating Own
Maintenance costs efficiency [%] consumption [%]
(EUR2010/kW)
CCGT 23-28 48-60 3
Coal 36-55 37-50 8
Lignite 43-70 35-46,5 6
Gas turbine 17 35-40 3
Oil turbine 27 35-40 5
Wind onshore 13 100
Wind offshore 93 100
PV roof 17 100
PV base 15 100
Biomass solid 165 30
Biomass gas 120 40
Coal CHP 55 23 8
Gas CHP 40 36 2
Lignite CHP 45 23 6
Biomass solid CHP 175 25
Biomass gas CHP 130 27
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Table C.6: Investment Costs of New Power Plant Capacity
EUR2010/kW 2015 2020 2030 2040
CCGT 675-725 675-725 675-725 675-725
Coal 1500-2350 1500-2250 1500-2000 1500-1850
Lignite 1500-2000 1500-1950 1500-1900 1500-1850
Gas turbine 375 375 375 375
Oil turbine 450 450 450 450
Wind onshore 1250-1290 1200-1255 1150-1190 1100-1130
Wind offshore 3500-3850 3200-3520 2800-3080 2650-2915
PV 1600-1700 1600-1650 1500-1550 1400-1450
Biomass solid 3300 3300 3300 3300
Biomass gas 2400 2400 2400 2400
Hydro storage 2300 2300 2300 2300
Pump storage 1200 1200 1200 1200
Table C.7: CO2 Cap of the 11 European Countries
2012 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Million tons of CO2 945.3 886.5 788.5 592.5 396.5 200.4
Table C.8: CO2 Factors of Primary Energy Combustion
tCO2/MWhth
Lignite 0.399
Coal 0.339
Oil 0.266
Gas 0.201
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Supplementary Material for
Chapter 5
D.1 Specification of Annual Heating Costs and Cost Im-
plications of Policies
As stated in Section 5.3.2, annual heating costs of a household of category n and a tech-
nology j, modernized in period y are a function of the investment costs in,j,y, the energy
consumption en,j,y, the energy price pj,y, plus, in the case of policies being introduced,
a tax payment Tj or a lump-sum subsidy Sj :
cn,j,y = f(in,j,y, en,j,y, pj,y, Tj , Sj) (D.1)
The total annual heating costs are derived as follows,:
cn,j,y = (in,j,y − Sj) ∗ ar,l + on,j,y + en,j,y ∗ (pj,y + Tj) (D.2)
with on,j,y being the fixed operation and maintenance costs of a technology and ar,l being
the annuity factor.
Thus, a lump-sum subsidy Sj > 0 decreases annual heating costs cn,j,y by decreasing
the costs of the initial investment. A tax payment Tj > 0 for each unit of consumed
energy increases annual heating costs. The tax payment per unit of energy consumed
Tj is derived from the carbon tax τ times technology-specific conversion factor CFj , i.e.,
Tj = τ ∗ CFj .
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The energy consumption en,j,y, e.g. gas consumption, is derived from the heating demand
Hn, which varies by household category, and the technology specific use efficiency n,j,y.
The use efficiency depends on technology j, the household category n and the time of
installation y (to account for technological progress). Thus:
en,j,y =
Hn
n,j,y
(D.3)
Therefore, the lower the efficiency and the higher the heating demand, the higher is the
energy consumption.
D.2 Assumptions and Data
Starting point of the model calculations in DIscrHEat is a detailed overview of the
current German building stock of private households in 2010. We distinguish single and
multiple dwellings and six vintage classes. Each of those building classes has an average
net dwelling area and a specific heat energy demand (kWh/m2a). Additionally, we
include data on the distribution of heating systems in each building class.
To simulate the future development of the German building stock (i.e. the installed
heating technologies and the buildings’ insulation level), DIscrHEat accounts for new
buildings and demolitions. Furthermore, we assume that a certain percentage of build-
ings has to install a new heating system. Those modernization rates are given exoge-
nously. IWU / BEI (2010) show that in Germany, investments into new heaters mostly
take place when mendings or replacements need to be done. Therefore, we assume that
heater replacements only take place according to empirical rates of the last years based
on IWU / BEI (2010).
The estimation of the discrete choice model is based on data on the distribution of
energy carriers chosen by a number of building type categories in 2010, characteristics
of these building types and the heating system costs. The dwelling stock comprises
six different vintage classes, differentiates between single/double and multiple dwellings
and three different insulation levels (heat demand levels) per house type vintage class
combination. Due to a lack of data for the diffusion of energy carriers per insulation
level, we include the average heat demand per dwelling category in our discrete choice
estimation. However, we account for the different insulations in our simulation model.
Thus, our data comprises twelve different representative dwelling types with different
heat demand, heating system costs and distributions of heating systems chosen in 2010.
Out of this aggregated data, we generate our data set which represents the number of
buildings that changed their heating system in 2010 differentiated by dwelling type with
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the respective characteristics. Heating system costs are derived using the data listed in
the tables below. Additionally, a fixed interest rate of 6% and an assumed household’s
planning horizon of 15 years determine the annuity factor.80 An overview of all data
sources is provided in Table D.1.
Table D.1: Data and Sources
Input data Specification of parameters Sources
dwelling stock in 2005 Destatis (2008),Destatis (2010b)
extrapolation until 2010 IWU / BEI (2010)
new buildings and demolitions Destatis (2010c),Destatis (2010a)
costs capital costs
except for micro chp IE Leipzig (2009)
micro chp own
assumptions
distribution of new distribution of decentral
heaters installed heating systems BDH (2010)
in 2010 distribution in new buildings Destatis (2010b)
distribution in buildings with
different construction years IWU / BEI (2010)
greenhouse gas emissions of different
emissions energy carriers O¨ko-Institut e.V. (2011)
modernization rates rates for dwellings with
for heating systems different construction years IWU / BEI (2010)
and insulation
Table D.2: Energy Prices
Euro/kWh 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
biomass 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07
natural gas 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09
heating oil 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12
electricity 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23
Own assumptions.
In addition, an annual fixed charge of 120 Euro has to be paid for natural gas.
Table D.3: CO2 Emissions of Energy Carriers
Energy carrier g CO2-eq./kWh
biomass 26
natural gas 242
heating oil 324
electricity 350
Based on O¨ko-Institut e.V. (2011).
80In Appendix D.3, we provide a sensitivity analysis assuming a discount rate of 3%.
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Table D.6: Subsidies on Heating System Investment
Heating system single dwelling (Euro) multi dwelling (Euro)
subsidy I subsidy I
biomass 2500 2500
heat pump 900 1200
subsidy II subsidy II
gas 500 500
biomass 900 1200
heat pump 900 1200
Table D.7: Heat Demand per Insulation Level
in (kWh/m2a) no low average
single 1900 - 1918 227 197 167
single 1919 - 1948 238 209 175
single 1949 - 1978 222 200 166
single 1979 - 1990 161 152 125
single 1991 - 1995 132 123 111
single 1996 - 2000 116 106
single 2001 - 2004 99 97
single 2005 - 2010 92 85
multi 1900 - 1918 189 163 140
multi 1919 - 1948 194 166 143
multi 1949 - 1978 178 157 138
multi 1979 - 1990 136 125 110
multi 1991 - 1995 121 113 104
multi 1996 - 2000 116 108
multi 2001 - 2004 105 104
multi 2005 - 2010 96 90
Table D.8: Modernization Rates
dwelling construction year 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
1900 - 1918 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3%
1919 - 1948 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3%
1949 - 1978 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3%
1979 - 1990 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3%
1991 - 1995 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3%
1996 - 2000 0.0% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3%
2001 - 2004 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3%
2005 - 2010 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 2.3%
Based on IWU / BEI (2010).
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Table D.9: Distribution of New Heaters Installed in 2010
gas oil biomass heatpump
single dwelling
year of construction
until 1918 7.9308% 2.6599% 0.5342% 0.6976%
1919 - 1948 7.7124% 2.5866% 0.5194% 0.6784%
1949 - 1978 21.3081% 7.1464% 1.4351% 1.8744%
1979 - 1990 5.6628% 1.1024% 0.2410% 0.8156%
1991 - 1995 1.7252% 0.3359% 0.0734% 0.2485%
new building (since 2005) 9.9751% 0.6252% 1.4881% 5.7876%
multi dwelling
year of construction
until 1918 1.6996% 0.5256% 0.1056% 0.0055%
1919 - 1948 1.4807% 0.4579% 0.0920% 0.0048%
1949 - 1978 6.4123% 1.9832% 0.3983% 0.0209%
1979 - 1990 1.3330% 0.2280% 0.0498% 0.0068%
1991 - 1995 0.4531% 0.0775% 0.0169% 0.0023%
new building (since 2005) 1.0790% 0.0418% 0.1242% 0.2372%
Based on BDH (2010),Destatis (2010b),IWU / BEI (2010)
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D.3 Sensitivity Analysis of the Assumed Interest Rate
In the following, we provide a sensitivity analysis assuming an interest rate of 3%. Figure
D.1 illustrates the welfare-based GHG abatement cost curves (i.e., based on the excess
burden) for each of the three policies for an interest rate of 3% (dashed lines) and
6% (solid lines). Interestingly, the welfare-based GHG abatement costs decrease for a
lower interest rate. The explanation is that less carbon intensive, but capital-intensive
technologies such as heat pumps or biomass heaters become relatively cheaper compared
to, e.g., gas-fired heaters. Therefore, abatement costs decrease. However, in the case of
a subsidy, the opposite holds. This reason is that the subsidy, which is paid lump-sum
when the investment is made becomes less valuable since the interest rate is lower.
Figure D.1: Marginal Excess Burden of GHG Abatement for Different Interest Rates
D.4 Discrete Choice Model - Statistics, Welfare Measure-
ment and Tests
Figure D.2 presents the structure of newly installed heating systems in Germany in
2010 across different dwelling types and their total annual heating costs in Euro. The
groups contain dwellings of the same type with the same year of construction, housetype
(single/double or multiple and average insulation status/heat demand). The frequency
of each group in the sample is indicated by the area of the circles81. Analyzing these
heating system choices leads to the assumptions that the annual costs of a heating
system might have an impact on the households’ heating system choices. Yet, costs are
81Please note that the group with the construction period 1949 – 1978 includes so many buildings
because it covers the longest time period. There was no further differentiation of construction periods in
the data. In the two vintage classes 1996 – 2000 and 2001 – 2004 there were almost no newly installed
heating systems in 2010 because of the 15-year lifetime of heating systems on average in Germany.
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not the only driver. In addition, the heating system choice differs systematically across
the different dwelling types and the buildings’ vintage class.
Figure D.2: Costs and Frequency of Energy Carriers Installed in Different Dwellings
in 2010
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Table D.10 presents the summary statistics of our discrete choice estimation.
Table D.10: Summary Statistics
mean std. dev. min max
choice
biomass 0.0507 0.2194 0 1
heatpump 0.1042 0.3056 0 1
gas 0.6681 0.4710 0 1
oil 0.1770 0.3817 0 1
costs over all alternatives 0.1336 0.0315 0.0870 0.2155
biomass 0.1437 0.0362 0.0977 0.2155
heatpump 0.1222 0.0200 0.0985 0.1624
gas 0.1172 0.0264 0.0870 0.1711
oil 0.1514 0.0273 0.1206 0.2072
single 0.8313 0.3745 0 1
heatdemand 122.3183 29.5189 70 149.2417
Later works on random utility models of discrete choice or mixed logit models (McFadden
and Train, 2000, Train, 2003) or the approach presented by Berry (1994), Berry et al.
(1995) and others point out that the approaches presented in McFadden (1976, 1974)
neglect product heterogenity. We assume, that this might be true for products such
as cars but is not valid in the case of heating systems installations since the product
heat energy is a rather homogenous good. In addition, especially the approach of Berry
et al. (1995) accounts for price endogeneity and price formation on the market level
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by demand and supply. Our analysis sets its focus on energy consumption neglecting
supply and is thus a partial analysis of the residential heat market. Further, we do not
deal with price endogeneity as we assume that energy prices are not determined by the
residential energy demand: the price of oil and gas is influenced by global supply and
demand effects and other sectors such as power generation, transport or industry sectors
rather than private households’ heat demand. We also assume the price of biomass to be
exogenous because the final biomass consumption of the residential sector accounted for
16% of German and only 3% of the European primary biomass production and there is
still a significant unused biomass potential (European Commission, 2007, Eurostat, 2011.
Another often mentioned problem with the presented approach is the Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption, which we test for (see the last section of this
Appendix).
Computation of the compensating variation
Small and Rosen (1981) introduce a methodology to determine the aggregated compen-
sating variation for discrete choice models and overcome the difficulty of the demand
function aggregation and the discontinuity of the demand functions. We apply a gen-
eralization of this apporoach to determine the compensating variation CVn of the rep-
resentative household n based on McFadden (1999) associated with a changing of Vn,j
resulting from introducing a policy.
We have the distribution of the energy carriers j chosen based on the following:
Pn,j =
eVn,j∑
i e
Vn,i
(D.4)
To compute the consumer surplus based on the utility in the no-policy case and the
policy case we get:
∫ V no policyn,j
0
Pn,jdVn,j (D.5)
and ∫ V policyn,j
0
Pn,jdVn,j (D.6)
Thus, for the difference in consumer surpluses of the two scenarios we get:
∫ V policyn,j
V no policyn,j
Pn,jdVn,j =
[
ln
∑
i
eαj+βcn,j+γ1,jz1,n+γ2,jz2,n
β
]V policyn,j
V no policyn,j
(D.7)
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To compute the compensating variation of household n CVn, we need to find the amount
of money CVn that compensates the costs caused by the policy measures to keep the
utility at the ’without policy’ level. Thus, the following equation based on McFadden
(1999) must hold for the compensating variation CVn of household n for each period y:
ln
∑
j
eαj+β(c
policy
n,j −CVn)+γ1,jz1,n+γ2,jz2,n
β
= ln
∑
i
eαi+βc
no policy
n,j +γ1,jz1,n+γ2,jz2,n
β
(D.8)
We have a constant β over all alternatives, so the formula by Small and Rosen (1981)
to compute the compensating variation in our logit model can easily be derived:
CVn =
1
β
ln∑
j
exp(V policyn,j )− ln
∑
j
exp(V no policyn,j )
 (D.9)
The division by β translates the utility into monetary units. This formula by Small and
Rosen (1981) depends on certain assumptions: the goods considered are normal goods,
the representatives in each group (households with the same dwelling characteristics) are
identical with regard to their income, the marginal utility of income β is approximately
independent of all costs and other parameters in the model, income effects from changes
of the households’ characteristics are negligible, i.e. the compensated demand function
can adequately be approximated by the Marshallian demand function.
Hausman-McFadden Test
We conduct tests of Hausman and McFadden (1984) to make sure the Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption holds. We therefore reestimate the model
presented in Table 5.1 by dropping different alternatives i. For instance one could assume
that the choice of a heating technology depends rather on fossile versus non-fossile fuels
than on the different energy carriers presented. Thus, we first drop the alternative
biomass, oil, and heatpump in seperate tests, and then both biomass and oil and both
oil and heatpump. We compare these estimators with those of our basic model.
Under H0 the difference in the coefficients is not systematic. The test statistic is the
following:
t = (b− β)′(Ωb − Ωβ)−1(b− β), with t ∼ χ2(1) (D.10)
b is the cost coefficient of the reduced estimations dropping alternatives and Ωb and Ωβ
are the respective estimated covariance matrices.
Table D.11 shows the results:
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Table D.11: Hausman-McFadden Test of IIA
b β T Prob(T>t)
cost coeff. drop biomass -31.97016 -26.76507 0.83 0.3633
cost coeff. drop oil -26.06515 -26.76507 0.04 0.8399
cost coeff. drop heatpump -3.358324 -26.76507 0.28 0.5969
cost coeff. drop biomass and oil -32.64896 -26.76507 0.66 0.4167
cost coeff. drop heatpump and oil -19.15256 -26.76507 0.03 0.8693
The results show that IIA cannot be rejected.
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